Interim Submission to the Royal Commission on Antisemitism and Social Cohesion

Commissioner: The Hon. Virginia Bell AC SC Established: 9 January 2026 Interim report due: 30 April 2026

Submitted by Jacob Carswell-Doherty | Principal, Jake McKinley | March 2026

Preface

1. The submitter is Jacob Carswell-Doherty, a Sydney-based legal practitioner with 15 years of experience in litigation, property, commercial, and dispute resolution practice. A full curriculum vitae, including qualifications, professional history, published work, and research methodology, is set out in the final submission and available to the Commission on request.

2. This interim submission responds to the Commissioner’s statement at the opening hearing on 24 February 2026 that the Commission is to deliver an interim report by 30 April 2026 focusing on the third term of reference — the circumstances leading up to and surrounding the attack on 14 December 2025 — and identifying “any issues that require urgent or immediate action.”[^1] It addresses matters falling within the evidence topics identified by Senior Counsel Assisting, Mr Richard Lancaster SC, as the third and fourth broad topics: what law enforcement and security agencies have been doing to tackle antisemitic conduct and how the response could be improved, and the circumstances leading up to and surrounding the Bondi attack.[^2]

3. The central proposition of this submission is that the Bondi attack was enabled by specific, identifiable, and remediable failures in Australia’s intelligence, law enforcement, and post-sentence supervision systems — and that none of those failures would have been addressed by the legislative response that followed, which targeted political speech rather than the security gaps that permitted the attack to occur.

3AA. Fifteen people were killed at a Hanukkah celebration at Bondi Beach on 14 December 2025, including a ten-year-old child, an 87-year-old Holocaust survivor, and a pregnant woman. The institutional failures documented in this submission are not abstract policy questions. They are the specific, traceable reasons those people are dead. The security reforms proposed below are directed at ensuring that the systems designed to prevent such attacks — systems that existed and were funded but did not function — are made to work.

3A. The submission is structured as follows. Section 1 documents the radicalisation pipeline — the Al Madina Dawah Centre network, its connections to ISIS, and the documented chain from Haddad’s preaching to the Bondi attack — drawing on Federal Court judgments, sentencing remarks, and public-record intelligence reporting. It then identifies the intelligence and institutional failures, matching publicly available evidence to the elements of existing criminal offences that were never invoked. Section 2 addresses and refutes the “environment” narrative linking the attack to pro-Palestinian protests. Section 3 identifies the specific security reforms the interim report should recommend. Section 4 examines the New Zealand Royal Commission precedent. Section 5 sets out the recommendations, each tied to a documented failure. A summary of recommended findings follows this preface.

3AB. The submission’s central contention may be expressed in terms of the structured proportionality framework applied by this Commissioner in McCloy v New South Wales (2015) 257 CLR 178 and Clubb v Edwards (2019) 267 CLR 171. The post-Bondi legislative response — directed at political speech and assembly — fails the necessity limb of that test. Less restrictive means were reasonably available to achieve the legitimate purpose of protecting the community from terrorism: specifically, the operational security reforms identified in this submission, each of which directly addresses the pathway that produced the attack without burdening the implied freedom of political communication.

3B. The scope of this submission is deliberately narrow. It addresses the security failures that enabled the Bondi attack and the specific, implementable reforms those failures require. Matters bearing on the other terms of reference — data methodology, the lawfare pattern, constitutional analysis, the conflation dynamic, the IHRA definition, legislative proportionality, social cohesion, and foreign influence — are addressed in the final submission, which should be read together with this document.

4. The Letters Patent require that the Commission’s inquiry must not prejudice any future criminal proceedings relating to the Bondi attack. The Commissioner reiterated this constraint at the opening hearing. This submission draws exclusively on material already in the public domain — court judgments, published sentencing remarks, Senate Estimates testimony, ASIO public statements, and media reporting. It does not purport to address matters that may be the subject of ongoing investigation or prosecution.

5. Senior Counsel Assisting noted at the opening hearing that “the process of document production by some recipients of notices is not presently where we would like it to be,” and that delays associated with public interest immunity, statutory non-disclosure provisions, and legal professional privilege have constrained the Commission’s access to classified material. Mr Dennis Richardson AC’s work as special adviser to the Commission will in due course provide the classified intelligence picture. This submission addresses a different gap: it presents the public-record evidence that identifies remediable system failures — evidence that is available now and that supports recommendations the interim report can make without awaiting the conclusion of the classified review.

Summary of Recommended Findings

The following table synthesises the findings of fact and inference sought throughout this submission, cross-referenced to the supporting evidence and paragraph numbers. The Commission is respectfully invited to adopt these findings on the basis of the publicly available material cited.

Section 1: The Bondi Attack

Terms of Reference 3 (Bondi) and 1 (drivers of antisemitism)

1.1 The Radicalisation Pipeline

Understanding the Islamic State

6. The organisation referred to throughout this submission as “ISIS” (the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria) requires brief context, as its ideology is central to the Bondi attackers’ radicalisation. ISIS split from al-Qaeda in 2014, declared a worldwide caliphate, and at its territorial peak controlled approximately 100,000 square kilometres. Its last significant territory fell in March 2019. It now operates through decentralised sleeper cells and affiliated “provinces” (wilayat) across Africa, South-East Asia, and the Middle East. ISIS follows Salafi-jihadist ideology — a fundamentalist interpretation of Sunni Islam combined with the doctrine of violent jihad. The concept of takfir (excommunicating other Muslims as apostates) is central to its theology and distinguishes it from virtually all mainstream Islamic scholarship.[^3]

7. ISIS, Hamas, and Hezbollah are ideologically distinct and in many respects adversarial organisations. ISIS pursues a global theocracy with no national borders; Hamas is an Islamist-nationalist movement focused on Palestinian statehood; Hezbollah is a Shia Islamist organisation aligned with Iran. ISIS declared takfir on Hamas and has perpetrated violence against Palestinian refugees. The conflation of these organisations — and by extension, the conflation of pro-Palestinian protest with ISIS-inspired terrorism — collapses distinctions fundamental to any serious threat assessment.[^4]

8. ISIS operated a sophisticated multi-platform propaganda apparatus — including Dabiq magazine, the Al-Hayat Media Centre, and Amaq News Agency — that functioned as its primary recruitment tool. This machinery is relevant because the AMDC’s own media operation was a local adaptation of the ISIS propaganda model, scaled to a suburban Sydney mosque.[^5]

9. The Al Madina Dawah Centre operated from 54 Kitchener Parade, Bankstown — an industrial building converted into a prayer space, with three hundred to four hundred attending Friday prayers. The founder, Wissam Haddad, built an infrastructure that functioned simultaneously as mosque, community centre, and radicalisation pipeline.[^6]

Finding sought [Direct]: The Commission should find, on the basis of the Haddad Affidavit (NSD 1503/2024) and convictions in R v El Matari [2021] NSWSC 1260 and R v Uweinat [2021] NSWSC 1256, that the Al Madina Dawah Centre in Bankstown functioned simultaneously as mosque, community centre, and radicalisation pipeline, and that its founder Wissam Haddad built an infrastructure that produced multiple individuals convicted of terrorism offences. (ToR 3, ToR 1)

10. The Federal Court case Wertheim v Haddad [2025] FCA 720 documented the content of Haddad’s teaching. The judgment found the Al Madina Dawah Centre promoted “antisemitic views” and “extremist ideology,” identifying twenty-five separate antisemitic imputations.[^7] ASIO identified Haddad as “the most important jihadist, extremist preacher in Sydney.”[^8] In January 2015, police raided Haddad’s home and reportedly found an ISIS flag, ISIS DVDs, a machete, tasers, capsicum spray, and newspaper clippings about counter-terrorism operations. Haddad received a good behaviour bond for possessing three prohibited weapons — two tasers and capsicum spray. He was not charged with any terrorism-related offence. The centre remained open.[^9] In one 2023 post, Haddad declared:

“We hate the disbelievers. The sword is the only weapon to deal with such people.”

11. A critical finding of the Wertheim proceedings — largely overlooked in public commentary — is that Haddad’s antisemitism does not represent mainstream Islamic teaching. Professor Gabriel Reynolds, Jerome Crowley Professor of Islamic Studies and Theology at the University of Notre Dame and CEO of the International Qur’anic Studies Association, provided expert evidence that while Haddad’s Quranic quotations are “generally accurate,” his use of them is “often selective in a way that produces a maximally anti-Jewish presentation of Muhammad’s biography.” Haddad’s generalisations connecting ancient Jewish tribes to modern Jews are “not consistent with the Qur’an or the hadith, and many Muslim scholars do not reach this conclusion.”[^10] Professor Reynolds identified that Haddad’s additions are his own invention, not drawn from medieval Islamic sources. This finding establishes that the antisemitic content emanating from AMDC was Haddad’s personal editorialising grafted onto religious texts, not a necessary or mainstream expression of Islamic teaching. A further finding of significance is that Haddad explicitly rejected the distinction between Zionism and Judaism, referring to “the Jews” no fewer than 169 times without qualification — establishing that the ideology underlying the Bondi attack was antisemitic, not anti-Zionist.

12. During the years Naveed Akram was frequenting the centre, it operated freely.

13. Haddad’s own sworn affidavit confirms he studied under Dr Bilal Phillips and completed studies of “Al wala wal barra” — “Loyalty and Disavowal” — a concept foundational to Salafi-jihadi ideology. He was unaccredited at the time of the speeches the court found unlawful; his sole formal accreditation — an “Ejeza” obtained through Sheikh Ibrahim Barakat in Lebanon — was awarded in June 2024, seven months after those speeches. The accreditation chain traces to Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab, the founder of Wahhabism.[^11]

14. Haddad’s affidavit confirms he taught youth classes of “15 youth members between the ages of 12 to 21,” later “approximately 20 male youth members.”[^12] Weekly lessons covered Islamic scripture and ideology. In November 2023, he delivered a lecture series called “The Jews of Al Madina,”[^13] quoting the hadith:

“The Jews will fight with you, and you will be given victory over them so that a stone will say, O Muslim! there is a Jew behind me; kill him!”

15. The centre’s reach extended well beyond its Friday congregation. AMDC operated a Saturday school — “KIDS SHARIAH Saturdays, 9am to 1pm” — for boys and girls in Grades K-6, charging $200 per child and covering Sharia, Quran, Hadith, and Arabic.[^14] Haddad also tutored homeschooled children. The centre engaged and paid a content design team in Indonesia to produce material for its platforms, which Haddad could instruct to “put something up or take something down.”[^15] YouTube shut down AMDC’s channel. The centre also ran a “#StayMuslimDontVote” campaign promoting the position that democratic participation constitutes shirk — the greatest sin in Islam.[^16] This anti-democratic stance is consistent with Haddad’s public declaration that “prime ministers are false gods; we should not join and not vote.”

16. The provocation emanating from AMDC was deliberate and media-literate. Cross-examination in Wertheim revealed a consistent cycle: Haddad delivered inflammatory content, MEMRI TV picked it up, mainstream media amplified it, and Haddad then leveraged the coverage on social media for further distribution. When media reported on the antisemitic sermon, his response — captured in his own affidavit — was: “But since this hadith angered you, I want to increase this anger by quoting more scripture.”[^17] He admitted under cross-examination that he was “happy” to criticise Christians and Hindus from an ideological point of view and was “entirely unconcerned by the offence” he might cause.[^18] Haddad maintained contact with Khaled Sharrouf and Mohamed Elomar — both of whom had travelled to Syria to fight with ISIS — and in 2016 showed a journalist from The Australian footage on his phone of the pair executing Iraqi prisoners.[^19] In 2014, he had encouraged further recruitment to the Syrian conflict: “Even if it’s a thousand, I think it should be double that.”

17. The Street Dawah network was Haddad’s mobile proselytising operation. A van bearing the centre’s branding transported young men to locations across Sydney where they engaged passersby in religious conversation and recorded video for online distribution. The operation presented as earnest religious outreach. Its function, as established in subsequent terrorism prosecutions, was recruitment. Court documents from four separate terrorism prosecutions explicitly identify street dawah as the radicalisation vector.[^20]

18. Federal Court filings in Wertheim v Haddad [2025] FCA 720 identify the individual known as “Brother Ye Ye” or “Mr Ye” as Yahya Ye — a committee member of AMDC Inc responsible for media, a joint bank account signatory alongside Haddad and Enver Neziroski, and co-founder of The Dawah Van Incorporated with Haddad in 2022.[^21] Post-attack reporting confirmed that Yahya Ye recruited the then-17-year-old Naveed Akram into the AMDC orbit and introduced him to Bankstown Street Dawah, where he encountered members of the El Matari cell. Ye has never been charged with any offence.

19. Post-attack CNN reporting identified Naveed Akram in 2019-era Street Dawah videos. One showed him outside a Sydney train station, urging passersby to embrace Islam. Another captured him telling two young boys that “the law of Allah” was “more important than anything else.” Post-attack reporting citing senior officials stated Akram was “a street preacher for Mr Haddad’s Dawah Van.” He was seventeen at the time.[^22]

20. Isaac El Matari styled himself “IS Commander Australia.” R v El Matari [2021] NSWSC 1260 documents his vision: a militant cell in rural Australia modelled on ISIS operations in the Philippines. Surveillance captured him stating:

“So that the brothers would start a STATE out in the bush here like the boys in Marawi did.”[^23]

21. The connections between Naveed Akram and the Al Madina Dawah Centre network are documented through multiple independent sources. ABC News, citing counterterrorism officials, reported that Akram and El Matari were “close” and that ASIO’s October 2019 investigation was triggered by El Matari’s arrest in July 2019.[^24] Counterterrorism officials separately confirmed to TIME magazine that the ASIO investigation “identified his links to Wisam Haddad.” Prime Minister Albanese confirmed the investigation was opened because Akram was “associated with others” and was “accessing extremist material online; speaking with other radicalised men.” No court cases name Akram, but three independent categories of sources confirm his connections to the network: government statements, intelligence source reporting, and media investigations.

22. Youssef Uweinat was recruited at fourteen by street preachers the court described as “well-known to national security authorities.”[^25] By the time of his arrest, he was an ISIS recruiter himself. He served as a youth leader at the Al Madina Dawah Centre during the period Naveed Akram attended. ABC News confirmed Akram’s “association with” Uweinat.

23. The centre functioned as connective tissue for a network that produced multiple terrorism convictions. El Matari, Uweinat, Khaled Sharrouf, Mohamed Elomar, and Mostafa Mahamed Farag all attended the same centres and were present at the same Friday prayers.[^26] Another preacher who lectured at the centre’s predecessor, Al Risalah, was Abu Sulayman (Mahamed Farag) — described as “one of Australia’s highest-ranking al-Qa’ida terrorists in Syria.”[^27] The 2019 ASIO investigation confirmed Akram was connected to at least three members of the network.

24. A comprehensive network map identifying at least 28 individuals — including 11 convicted terrorism offenders, multiple control order subjects, and international connections extending to a UN-sanctioned ISIS figure — is set out in the Appendix, drawn from sentencing judgments, control order proceedings, and Federal Court filings.

Finding sought [Direct]: The Commission should find, on the basis of sentencing judgments in R v El Matari [2021] NSWSC 1260, R v Uweinat [2021] NSWSC 1256, R v Lawrence [2023] NSWSC 1428, and CDPP v Saadieh [2021] NSWCCA 232; control order proceedings in Booth v Dakkak [2020] FCA 1882 and Attorney-General v Amin [2023] NSWSC 1280; Federal Court filings in Wertheim v Haddad [2025] FCA 720; and Senate Estimates testimony of Senator Cash (February 2024), that the Al Madina Dawah Centre network comprised at least 28 identified individuals including 11 convicted terrorism offenders, multiple control order subjects, uncharged associates, and international connections extending to a UN-sanctioned ISIS figure in Kenya and ISIS-affiliated groups in the Philippines. The Commission should further find that three additional prohibited contact lists — Saadieh (34 names, suppressed), Amin (31 names), and the balance of the Dakkak schedule — contain further network members whose identities and current activities are unknown. (ToR 3, ToR 2)

25. Following the territorial collapse of its caliphate by 2019, ISIS adapted its strategy: followers who could not migrate to the caliphate were directed to conduct attacks in their home countries. The Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD Global) tracked 26 ISIS-linked attacks across 29 countries between January 2024 and December 2025, of which 11 (42.3%) targeted Jews or Israelis. Eighty-four disrupted plots were identified, of which 27 (32.1%) targeted Jewish institutions.[^28] After October 7, 2023, ISIS published targeting guidance through its official channels calling for attacks on synagogues, Jewish neighbourhoods, and Jewish economic interests — framed not as support for the Palestinian cause but as attacks on Jews as Jews. By mid-2025, pro-ISIS magazines ran articles titled “The Nation Deserving Holocaust the Most.” Encrypted Telegram channels circulated what Tech Against Terrorism analysts described as “low-tech attack strategies against synagogues, timed for religious festivals.”[^29]

26. The Bondi attack on 14 December 2025 targeted a Hanukkah celebration — a Jewish religious festival — consistent with the targeting guidance ISIS had published over the preceding two years. Joshua Roose, in an RSIS Commentary published 9 February 2026, described the attack as “ISIS-inspired antisemitic terrorism” that “exposed legislative and security gaps, failures in threat assessment and protective security, and political inaction amid escalating antisemitism.”[^28] It is submitted that the Commission should recognise the critical distinction between ISIS and Hamas: they are enemies, not allies.[^30] ISIS declared takfir on Hamas years before October 7 and views Palestinian nationalism as apostasy. ISIS’s post-October 7 response was not to support the Palestinian cause but to redirect followers toward attacking Jews globally. This is the opposite of the Palestinian solidarity movement’s central claim — that opposition to Israeli government policy is political, not religious. The failure to distinguish these fundamentally opposed ideologies misdirected the policy response. The Bondi attack was committed by a man radicalised through an ISIS-aligned network, motivated by ISIS-specific theology, following ISIS-published targeting guidance. The legislation passed after the attack does not address ISIS radicalisation networks, intelligence failures, or the specific pathway that produced it.

Finding sought [Direct]: The Commission should find, on the basis of the ASIO investigation timeline (October 2019), the AFP statement of 22 December 2025, and the comprehensive search of all 19 documents filed in Wertheim v Haddad (finding no protest attendance references), that the evidence does not support a causal link between the pro-Palestinian protest movement and the radicalisation of the Bondi attackers. Naveed Akram was identified by ASIO in 2019, four years before the Opera House protests and five years before university encampments. The AMDC operated through mosque-based indoctrination and personal recruitment, not through street protest. (ToR 1, ToR 3)

1.2 Intelligence and Institutional Failures

27. ASIO infiltrated Haddad’s network for six years through an undercover agent codenamed “Marcus.” In April 2025, Marcus broke his cover on ABC Four Corners, describing the centre as “feeling like an ISIL camp.” He stated he “repeatedly warned the agency that Haddad was indoctrinating young people.” He confirmed Haddad called ISIS “the brothers” and the black flag “the flag of the Muslims.”[^31] Marcus explained Haddad’s model: he was attempting to “copy Choudary’s experience into the Australian community” — a reference to Anjem Choudary, the British extremist whose network radicalised dozens of terrorists.[^32]

28. When ABC confronted Haddad with the allegations, he responded:

“If I am a leader of violent extremism, why is it that people on the grapevine are saying these words, but law enforcement don’t have the same information?”[^33]

He denied membership of al-Muhajiroun but called its founder Omar Bakri and Choudary “brothers in Islam” and “people who are going through a struggle for speaking the truth.”

29. The outcome: Haddad was never charged. The centre remained open. The street dawah operations continued uninterrupted.

30. The institutional failure extended beyond intelligence. The existing criminal law provided multiple avenues to address Haddad’s conduct, and none were used. It is anticipated that the response will be that intelligence agencies could not use their information for prosecution because it would disclose sources and methods. That response does not withstand scrutiny: the publicly available evidence alone — court judgments, Haddad’s own sworn affidavit, his social media posts, and media reporting — matches the elements of at least three criminal provisions without requiring disclosure of any classified material.

31. Section 93Z of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) criminalises public threats or incitement of violence on grounds of race or religion. Haddad publicly quoted the hadith “O Muslim, there is a Jew behind me; kill him” and stated “the sword is the only weapon to deal with such people” — statements directed at a religious group and available on public social media platforms. Section 93Z has produced no sustained convictions since its introduction in 2018: two convictions were annulled because police commenced prosecutions without the required DPP consent, and a third was quashed on appeal.[^34]

32. Division 80 of the Criminal Code (Cth) criminalises urging violence against groups distinguished by race or religion, carrying a maximum penalty of seven years’ imprisonment. Haddad’s statements urging that Jews should be dealt with by “the sword” and his promotion of content celebrating violence against Jewish people were publicly available. The AFP referred one of the sermons to an anti-terror squad; no charges followed under any provision.

33. Section 18C of the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth), under which the private Wertheim proceedings were eventually brought, had been available since 1995. It took a private applicant — not the state — to use this provision, and the Federal Court found 25 antisemitic imputations. The conduct was unlawful under existing law; the failure was that no public authority acted.

34. The state had at least three separate legal instruments capable of addressing Haddad’s conduct and used none of them. Every element of every offence identified above could have been established from publicly available material — Haddad’s own affidavit, his social media posts, media reporting, and the Wertheim court record. The sources-and-methods justification for inaction does not explain why publicly available evidence was not prosecuted using publicly available legal tools.[^35]

Finding sought [Direct]: The Commission should find that at least three separate legal instruments existed to address Haddad’s conduct — section 93Z of the NSW Crimes Act, Division 80 of the Criminal Code (Cth), and section 18C of the Racial Discrimination Act — and that none were used by any law enforcement or prosecutorial authority; and further that the elements of each offence could have been established from publicly available material without requiring disclosure of classified intelligence. (ToR 2)

35. ASIO investigated Naveed Akram from October 2019 to April 2020. Prime Minister Albanese confirmed the investigation was opened because Akram was “associated with others” — specifically, his connections to El Matari, Uweinat, and Haddad. The investigation found he was “accessing extremist material online” and “speaking with other radicalised men.” It concluded there was “no indication of any ongoing threat.” Home Affairs Minister Tony Burke stated: “More than half a decade ago, it was not the case that he had the motivation or the ideology where horrifically we saw him end up half a decade later.” Akram was never placed on a terrorism watchlist. From that point until the attack — six years — there is “no indication he came under the attention of authorities at any point.”[^36]

36. The timeline warrants emphasis. ASIO identified Akram’s connections to the ISIS network in October 2019 — four years before the Opera House protests, six years before Australia formally recognised the State of Palestine on 21 September 2025. His radicalisation was not the product of the Palestinian solidarity movement. It was the product of a documented network with documented links to ISIS, operating from a documented centre that ASIO itself had infiltrated for six years.

37. In November 2022, ASIO Director-General Mike Burgess lowered the national terrorism threat level from PROBABLE to POSSIBLE for the first time since September 2014. “The threat from religiously motivated violent extremists has moderated,” he stated. “Dissipated, not disappeared.”[^37] Five weeks before the Bondi attack, in his February 2025 Annual Threat Assessment, Burgess reported fewer than half of potential terrorist matters were religiously motivated and stated the Middle East conflict “did not directly inspire terrorism here.”[^38] After Bondi, he acknowledged: “One of these individuals was known to us, but not in an immediate-threat perspective.” Two distinct failures require differentiation. The threat-level downgrade and deprioritisation of Islamic extremism proved directly wrong — a Salafi-jihadist network that ASIO had identified in 2019 carried out the worst terrorist attack in Australian history. The Middle East conflict assessment is more nuanced: the evidence presented in this submission supports the finding that the attack was the product of the AMDC network’s long-standing radicalisation pipeline, not a direct response to the Gaza conflict. But the framing that the conflict had no terrorism relevance in Australia failed to account for the possibility that the conflict environment could reactivate dormant networks or accelerate existing radicalisation trajectories.

38. The consequences of the strategic pivot were operational. The Nightly reported that an AFP national surveillance team under the Counter-Terrorism Special Investigations Command, mandated to monitor High Risk Terrorist Offenders released into the community, was disbanded weeks before the Bondi attack due to funding shortfalls.[^39] The team responsible for monitoring released terrorists was defunded. A released terrorist’s associate then attacked Bondi Beach.

39. The same month Burgess declared the threat “dissipated,” Uweinat was released from prison. No ankle bracelet. No curfew. No banned contacts. The government’s supervision application had been filed six days before his release. It failed. The expert who assessed Uweinat had warned his beliefs “could re-emerge” if he was “reunited with his former network.” Within weeks, he was back at Haddad’s centre. By August 2025, he was standing on the Sydney Harbour Bridge during a protest of approximately 90,000 people, waving the black shahada flag. Haddad was beside him. This was approximately three months before the Akrams flew to the Philippines.[^40]

40. The Continuing Detention Order regime — enacted under Division 105A of the Criminal Code for high-risk terrorism offenders — has been systematically underutilised. No publicly reported CDO application has been made since Attorney-General Dreyfus took office, although non-publication orders may conceal applications the Commission is in a position to verify.[^41] The risk assessment tool used in CDO proceedings, VERA-2R, was found by a government-commissioned report to perform no better than chance, a finding suppressed for more than two years.[^42] [^43] The CDO failures are examined in detail in Section 3.2 below.

41. El Matari’s incarceration at the High Risk Management Correctional Centre did not contain his influence. In September 2019, police found a three-page letter he had written to fellow inmate Tukiterangi Lawrence — a New Zealand-born convert convicted of terrorism offences — laying out operational doctrine:

“A small enclosed battalion to exploit the exposed landscape, taking to remote regional areas to plan the orchestration of attacks.”[^44]

42. Lawrence described El Matari’s letter as “beautiful” and endorsed the insurgency plans. The sentencing remarks of R v Lawrence [2023] NSWSC 1428 record that the correspondence demonstrated a shared commitment to violent action, not merely shared ideology.[^44] The prison letter network extended further. In May 2020, three letters from El Matari were seized from Uweinat’s cell — addressed not to Uweinat’s legal name but to his jihadi name: “Abu Musa al-Maqdisi.” El Matari was not on Uweinat’s approved association list. The letters penetrated Goulburn’s Supermax facility regardless — a failure of the prison communications monitoring system at Australia’s highest-security correctional centre.[^45] El Matari also wrote to Joseph Saadieh, a member of the same network who had participated in Street Dawah alongside Uweinat and was later charged with IS membership. On Saadieh’s devices, police found 26 explosive-related files — including instructions for constructing improvised explosive devices — that Joint Counter-Terrorism Team expert analysis confirmed were “generally viable.” These files were in the possession of a person directly connected to El Matari four years before the Bondi attackers built five pipe bombs.[^46]

43. Sajid Akram applied for a firearms licence in 2020 — one year after his son came to ASIO’s attention. Despite a 2.5-year processing delay, it was granted in 2023. By the time of the attack, he possessed six high-powered firearms. Under NSW law, association with someone on a terrorism watchlist should be grounds for denial. No cross-check between ASIO’s records and the firearms registry occurred. In October 2025 — before the Philippines trip — police video shows father and son conducting firearms training at a rural NSW property near Goulburn.[^47]

44. From 1-28 November 2025, father and son travelled to Davao City in Mindanao, a region associated with ISIS-affiliated groups.[^50] A month-long trip to a known terrorism hotspot triggered no intelligence alerts. Three weeks after returning, on 14 December 2025, they attacked a Hanukkah celebration at Archer Park near Bondi Beach. Eighty-three shots were fired from four firearms over approximately twelve minutes, with 57 magazine changes during the attack. The five IEDs — homemade pipe bombs — failed to detonate. Fifteen people were killed, including a ten-year-old girl, an 87-year-old Holocaust survivor, a retired police officer, and a pregnant woman. It was the worst terrorist attack on Australian soil and the second-deadliest mass shooting in modern Australian history after Port Arthur.[^48]

1.3 The Facilitation Chain

45. The AFP stated on 22 December 2025 that “there is no evidence to suggest these alleged offenders were part of a broader terrorist cell, or were directed by others to carry out an attack.”[^49] It is submitted that this assessment warrants scrutiny. The absence of evidence is not evidence of absence — particularly where the surveillance systems that would have detected network involvement had been dismantled or never established. The AFP surveillance team for released terrorism offenders was disbanded weeks before the attack. No control order was in place on Uweinat, meaning three years of his communications went unmonitored. Haddad — the network hub — was never charged, never subject to a control order, and never placed under any monitoring regime despite ASIO identifying him as the most important jihadist preacher in Sydney. The claim that the Akrams acted alone must be assessed against the reality that the agencies making that claim had no surveillance in place capable of detecting the connections this submission documents.

46. The documented connections between the Akrams and the network are extensive. Naveed Akram was identified by ASIO in 2019 through his connections to El Matari, Uweinat, and Haddad. He was recruited into the AMDC orbit by Yahya Ye at age 17. Uweinat — his youth leader at AMDC — was an ISIS recruiter who distributed Philippines-specific ISIS content after release. El Matari — to whom Akram was connected — had articulated a doctrine of attacks modelled on ISIS operations in the Philippines, offered access to weaponry and explosives suppliers from inside Supermax, and maintained an operational correspondence network that reached multiple members of the same circle. Saadieh — in the same network — possessed 26 viable IED files four years before the Akrams built five pipe bombs. The Akrams then travelled to the Philippines — the exact region El Matari’s doctrine celebrated and that multiple control orders in the network had specifically prohibited — and returned with IED capability. The proposition that all of this is coincidence, and that the Akrams independently conceived, planned, and executed the attack without any facilitation from the network in which they were embedded, is one the Commission should test rigorously.

47. The documented evidence discloses a facilitation chain. El Matari provided the doctrine and the Philippines contacts. His surveillance transcripts celebrated “the brothers in the Philippines” who had “achieved great success.” His letters reached Uweinat in prison, circumventing the approved association list to reach a fellow extremist using his jihadi name. Uweinat distributed Philippines-specific ISIS content after release. Haddad connected those who came through his centre. The network had documented connections to the Philippines that courts recognised as serious enough to prohibit — Hamdi Alqudsi’s control order explicitly banned Philippine contacts, and the Cerantonio case confirmed a plan to travel to the southern Philippines to engage with Islamist militant groups.[^51] The question of how the Akrams connected with ISIS-linked figures in Mindanao remains unanswered, but the documented Philippine links across El Matari’s surveillance transcripts, Alqudsi’s control order, and the Cerantonio case make the absence of any investigation into that question a significant gap.

48. Without a control order, no one monitored Uweinat’s communications after his release in November 2022. Whether he passed along Philippine contacts from El Matari’s network, or made introductions for Akram, is unknown — and unknowable, because the systems that would have answered these questions did not exist. Had Uweinat been subject to a control order with standard telecommunications monitoring, any contact with Akram would have been detected. Had Haddad been subject to surveillance following the 2015 raid, his continued role as the network’s connective hub would have been visible. Had the AFP surveillance team not been disbanded, released offenders returning to Haddad’s centre would have been observed. Three years of unmonitored communications — the direct consequence of a CDO application filed six days late — is not merely a procedural failure. It is the gap through which the facilitation chain operated undetected.

49. The full extent of the network has never been publicly mapped. When Joseph Saadieh was granted bail in September 2021, the court imposed a prohibition on contacting 34 named individuals. In February 2021, AFP surveillance had recorded Saadieh at the Holocaust Memorial at Rookwood Cemetery, where he declared “hellfire for all of you.”[^52] Those 34 names are court-suppressed. That list, if disclosed to this Commission, would provide the most comprehensive map of the Sydney ISIS-aligned network available from any single court document.

50. Separately, the confirmed control order in Booth v Dakkak [2020] FCA 1882 — imposed on Radwan Dakkak, convicted of two counts of associating with a terrorist organisation — lists 11 prohibited contacts. The named individuals include Isaac El Matari, Wissam Haddad, Youssef Uweinat, Joseph Saadieh, and a UN-sanctioned Kenyan ISIS figure whose presence on the list confirms the network’s international connections. Three further individuals — Hozan Alou (born 1999, the same generation as Naveed Akram), Abdullah Azari (who also appears on a second prohibited contact list in separate proceedings), and Seeyar Siddiqi — have no public information attached to them.[^53]

51. On 23 December 2025, the Sydney Morning Herald reported what investigators had said privately for years: Haddad was “a good intel source.”[^54] If accurate, a calculation was made that his intelligence value outweighed his danger as a radicaliser. Whether police protection of an asset enabled a massacre is a question this Commission must address.

Section 2: The Environment Narrative

52. A central contention in public discourse is that pro-Palestinian protests created an “environment” contributing to the attack. The evidence does not support this. The AMDC radicalisation network operated through mosque-based indoctrination and personal recruitment, not through street protest. ASIO identified Akram’s connections to the ISIS network in October 2019 — four years before the Opera House protests, five years before university encampments. A comprehensive search of all 19 documents filed in Wertheim v Haddad found no reference to Haddad or any of his associates attending rallies, protests, marches, or demonstrations, with the single exception of the August 2025 Harbour Bridge march where Uweinat — already radicalised for over a decade — was photographed.[^55] The AFP stated there is “no evidence” the attackers were part of a broader cell.[^49] The ASIO Director-General stated that “none of the terrorism threats investigated since October had been inspired by Gaza.”[^56] Deputy Commissioner Hudson confirmed that “none of the individuals we have arrested have displayed any form of antisemitic ideology.”[^57] The most serious post-October 7 attacks on Jewish targets — the Lewis Continental Kitchen arson and the Adass Israel Synagogue firebombing — were directed by the Iranian IRGC using criminal proxies who held no antisemitic ideology.[^56] The correct threat vector was the Al Madina Dawah Centre network — a specific, identifiable radicalisation pipeline operating through a centre ASIO itself had infiltrated for six years. The final submission addresses the environment narrative in full.

Finding sought [Direct]: The Commission should find, on the basis of a comprehensive search of all 19 documents filed in Wertheim v Haddad [2025] FCA 720, together with the AFP’s statement that there was “no evidence” the attackers were part of a broader cell and the ASIO Director-General’s statement that “none of the terrorism threats investigated since October had been inspired by Gaza,” that the evidence does not support the contention that the protest movement contributed to the Bondi attack. The correct threat vector was the Al Madina Dawah Centre radicalisation network. (ToR 1, ToR 2, ToR 3)

Section 3: Actual Security Fixes

Terms of Reference 2 (law enforcement) and 3 (Bondi)

53. The Commissioner noted at the opening hearing that delays in obtaining and assessing material may mean that some evidence concerning the adequacy of security arrangements and intelligence agency effectiveness will form part of the final report rather than the interim report. Mr Dennis Richardson AC’s work as special adviser will in due course provide the classified picture. The recommendations below are based on the public record alone. They identify systemic failures visible from court judgments, Senate Estimates testimony, and published reporting. If the classified material reveals additional failures, the case for reform is stronger, not weaker.

54. The Bondi attack was enabled by specific, identifiable, fixable failures in the systems designed to prevent it. None of those failures would have been addressed by restricting political speech.

3.1 Database Integration

55. Former Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull asked the central question:

“Why when ASIO had identified Naveed Akram in 2019, was his father allowed to keep six guns? Are databases talking to each other?”[^58]

56. They were not. ASIO’s records, the NSW Firearms Registry, and Border Force travel monitoring operate as separate systems with no automatic cross-referencing.

57. It is submitted that if a person is flagged by ASIO, that flag should automatically appear when any member of their household applies for a firearms licence. If a firearms licence holder or their immediate family member travels to a terrorism-linked region, that should trigger automatic review. These are database queries. They require no new legislation. They require the existing systems to communicate.

Finding sought [Direct]: The Commission should find, on the basis of former Prime Minister Turnbull’s public statement and the operational evidence set out in Section 1, that ASIO records, the NSW Firearms Registry, and Border Force travel monitoring operate as separate systems with no automatic cross-referencing, and that this separation directly enabled the Bondi attack: ASIO identified Akram in 2019, his father obtained six firearms in 2023, and the family travelled to Mindanao in 2025, all without triggering intelligence alerts. (ToR 2, ToR 3)

58. The financial intelligence gap is similarly significant. Sajid Akram transferred the family property — purchased for $700,000 — into his wife’s name at a stated value of $477,500 approximately 22 months before the attack, then moved between short-term rentals. The Akrams paid for 28 consecutive nights at a Davao hotel in cash without providing identification. Neither income source readily explains the cumulative cost of international travel, six firearms, bomb-making materials, and weeks of accommodation. No AUSTRAC investigation connected to the attack has been publicly disclosed.[^59]

3.2 Post-Release Supervision and Risk Assessment

59. Continuing Detention Orders were Parliament’s answer to a specific problem: the management of convicted terrorists who have served their sentences but remain dangerous. Enacted under Division 105A of the Criminal Code in 2016[^60], CDOs permit the Attorney-General to apply to detain high-risk terrorism offenders beyond their prison term, indefinitely if necessary, where there is an “unacceptable risk.” No publicly reported CDO application has been made since Attorney-General Dreyfus took office — although it is possible that applications have been made subject to non-publication orders, a matter the Commission is in a position to verify.

60. Senator Michaelia Cash, then Shadow Attorney-General, identified the pattern at Senate Estimates in February 2024 — ten months before Bondi:

“For Mr Uweinat [the CDO application] was six days before the sentence expired and, in relation to Mr Cerantonio, Mr Benbrika and Mr Al Maouie, there was no application for a post-sentence order at all.”[^61]

61. Every release date was known years in advance. The government had years to prepare a CDO application for Uweinat; it filed six days before release, and the application failed. For Robert Cerantonio — an ISIS propagandist convicted of planning to establish a caliphate in the Philippines — no application was made. For Al Maouie, none was made. The Benbrika case requires qualification: a 3-year CDO was obtained under the previous government (Minister for Home Affairs v Benbrika [2020] VSC 888), but upon its expiry the Commonwealth sought only an Extended Supervision Order — not a CDO — after its own expert assessed Benbrika as low risk. Hollingworth J rejected the three-year ESO sought by the Commonwealth and imposed a 12-month ESO: Benbrika v Attorney-General (Cth) [2024] VSC 265.[^61A] The institutional concern is that the Commonwealth’s VERA-2R-based risk methodology informed its decision to seek an ESO rather than a CDO — a decision that, while ultimately endorsed by the Court as to the type of order, illustrates the consequences of relying on a tool the government’s own research found to be unreliable.

62. The Department’s explanation was that “when responsibility for doing the HRTO work came across to the Attorney-General’s Department, there was very limited resourcing and capability in that area.”[^61] The failure was not in the legislative framework. Parliament created CDOs and funded them. The failure was in executive implementation. It is submitted that CDO assessments should commence no later than 12 months before any terrorism offender’s scheduled release, with dedicated resourcing for preparation, expert engagement, and timely judicial review.

63. This failure is about to repeat itself. Isaac El Matari — the self-declared IS Commander of Australia, who plotted attacks from inside Supermax, maintained an active prison correspondence network with Uweinat, Lawrence, and Saadieh, and whose surveillance transcripts celebrated “the brothers in the Philippines” — has been parole-eligible since approximately January 2025. His maximum sentence expires approximately November 2026. The CDO legislative regime sunsets on 7 December 2026 — weeks after his potential release. Media reporting in January 2026 indicated the AFP was taking steps toward a CDO application, but no formal application has been publicly confirmed. The structural problem remains regardless: the CDO sunset date creates an unacceptable gap. If El Matari is released at sentence expiry without a CDO, and the regime expires weeks later, Australia will have lost the only legislative mechanism available for post-sentence supervision of a convicted terrorism plotter.

Finding sought [Direct]: The Commission should find, on the basis of the sentencing in R v El Matari [2021] NSWSC 1260 and the sunset clause in Division 105A of the Criminal Code, that Isaac El Matari’s maximum sentence expires approximately November 2026 and the CDO legislative regime sunsets on 7 December 2026, creating an unacceptable gap in which the only legislative mechanism for post-sentence supervision may expire weeks after the most dangerous terrorism offender in the network becomes eligible for release. (ToR 2, ToR 3)

64. The risk assessment tool used in CDO proceedings — VERA-2R — was found by a government-commissioned report to have predictive validity no better than chance.[^62] The then Home Affairs Minister Peter Dutton suppressed the report for more than two years. During those years, government lawyers presented VERA-2R assessments to courts as evidence in CDO proceedings while the tool’s unreliability was known. Justice Hollingworth called the suppression “a disgrace” and “serious interference with the administration of justice.”[^62]

65. The supervision regime has failed systematically. Radwan Dakkak, convicted of associating with a terrorist organisation, breached his interim control order within 16 days of release.[^63] In November 2025, the Supreme Court imposed a significantly relaxed ESO on Mustapha, removing electronic monitoring, curfew, and association restrictions for an individual whose expert assessment found he “does not support democracy,” “believes in violence, both in general terms and with respect to jihad,” and “is supportive of Islamic State.”[^64] Tukiterangi Lawrence, despite catastrophic physical disability rendering him tetraplegic, maintained 123,822 extremist images and 1,192 videos while subject to an ESO and told assessors that police officers are “legitimate targets Islamically.”[^65]

66. Research on Australian jihadist cases found fewer than 10% of offenders were assessed as genuinely contrite, and approximately 29% were judged to have good prospects for rehabilitation.[^66] Uweinat told Justice Bellew under oath that he had “completely renounced” ISIS. The court accepted this and declined to impose a CDO. Within weeks of release, Uweinat returned to the Al Madina Dawah Centre — the same centre where he had been radicalised, the same preacher whose ideology led to his conviction.[^67]

3.3 Network Disruption

67. Haddad appears on every control order examined — Dakkak, Biber, Church, Amin. Released extremists are forbidden from contacting him, yet he remained free to receive them.[^68] When Abdul Nacer Benbrika was released in December 2023, AFP surveillance documented his communications with Haddad within days. They met in person.[^69]

68. In April 2021, police conducting routine supervision checks on Moudasser Taleb — a convicted ISIS supporter from the AMDC network sentenced in 2018 for advocating terrorism — discovered him in possession of an illegally modified sawn-off shotgun while subject to an Extended Supervision Order.[^70]

69. Haddad functioned as a hub. The asset-value calculation that apparently protected him from prosecution should be reassessed in light of the Bondi attack. Whatever intelligence he provided, the cost of leaving the radicalisation infrastructure intact must be weighed against fifteen deaths.

70. The prison communications failure is particularly grave. Isaac El Matari was held at the High Risk Management Correctional Centre at Goulburn — Australia’s highest-security facility, designed specifically to contain the most dangerous inmates. From inside Supermax, El Matari maintained an active correspondence network. He wrote to Lawrence laying out operational doctrine for an insurgency; Lawrence called it a “beautiful letter.” Three letters from El Matari were seized from Uweinat’s cell — addressed to Uweinat’s jihadi name — despite El Matari not being on Uweinat’s approved association list. In the Lawrence correspondence, El Matari offered access to weaponry suppliers — including explosives and suicide vests — and false document suppliers, all from inside the country’s most secure prison.[^71] These communications were discovered only during routine searches.

Finding sought [Direct]: The Commission should find, on the basis of the sentencing remarks in R v Lawrence [2023] NSWSC 1428 and R v El Matari [2021] NSWSC 1260, that the self-declared IS Commander of Australia maintained an active correspondence network from inside the country’s most secure prison — communicating operational doctrine, offering access to weaponry suppliers including explosives and suicide vests, and reaching inmates not on his approved association list — and that this was only discovered during routine searches. (ToR 2, ToR 3)

3.4 Travel Monitoring

71. The Akrams spent 28 days in Mindanao. El Matari’s doctrine celebrated the Philippines. Dakkak’s control order explicitly banned Philippine contacts. Uweinat distributed Mindanao-specific ISIS content after release. Multiple members of the same network had documented connections to the Philippines — connections courts recognised as serious enough to prohibit.

72. The legal framework already existed to address this. On 12 September 2023, the Governor-General designated Islamic State East Asia as a terrorist organisation under subsection 102.1(1) of the Criminal Code, listing 17 aliases including Dawlah Islamiyah-Torayfie Group — the faction operating in Davao, where the Akrams spent 28 days. The Maute Group, which El Matari explicitly cited as his model, is also designated. Any contact between the Akrams and members of these groups constituted a criminal offence.[^72] The designation was current. The travel was to the designated group’s territory. The existing legal framework should have identified this. It did not, because the databases that would have connected a known associate of a convicted ISIS network to travel in a designated terrorist organisation’s operating area do not communicate with each other.

73. It is submitted that an Australian citizen spending a month in a region with active ISIS-affiliated groups should trigger an automatic intelligence review, particularly where that citizen has any recorded association with known terrorism networks. This is not mass surveillance; it is targeted monitoring of specific travel patterns that match documented radicalisation pathways.

3.5 The Encrypted Communications Challenge

74. ASIO Director-General Mike Burgess told a Senate hearing on 11 February 2026 that the Bondi attackers “demonstrated a high level of security awareness to hide their plot. In simple terms, they went dark to stay off the radar.”[^73] It is submitted that the resources presently directed toward speech legislation and protest policing should be redirected toward the intelligence capabilities that would address the actual threat — human intelligence penetration of extremist networks, post-release monitoring, database integration, and travel surveillance.

Section 4: New Zealand Precedent — Security Findings

75. The New Zealand Royal Commission of Inquiry into the Christchurch mosque attack (Ko tō tātou kāinga tēnei, 26 November 2020) constitutes the closest international precedent for the present Commission. That inquiry investigated 51 deaths in a mass-casualty terrorist attack and had full access to classified intelligence material. Two findings are directly relevant to the interim report.

76. On the intelligence failure, the NZ Commission found “a systemic failure to recognise that there was a threat of extreme right-wing domestic terrorism that was not understood” and that “the allocation of counter-terrorism resources almost completely to Islamist extremist terrorism was not the result of a considered system-wide decision” but rather “was not based on an informed assessment of the threats of terrorism associated with other ideologies” and was “therefore inappropriate.”[^74] It is submitted that the parallel to Bondi is structural: in both cases, an intelligence agency failed to detect a threat because its resource allocation reflected institutional assumptions rather than evidence-based assessment.

77. The NZ Commission produced 44 recommendations. None proposed the prohibition of a political slogan or the restriction of political speech. The Commission’s conclusion — that systemic intelligence failures, not insufficient speech restrictions, were the root cause — applies with equal force to the Bondi attack.

Finding sought [Direct]: The Commission should find, on the basis of the New Zealand Royal Commission report Ko tō tātou kāinga tēnei (26 November 2020), that the NZ Commission produced 44 recommendations after investigating 51 deaths in a mass-casualty terrorist attack, and not one proposed the prohibition of a political slogan or the restriction of political speech. The NZ Commission’s conclusion — that systemic intelligence failures, not insufficient speech restrictions, were the root cause — applies with equal force to the Bondi attack. (ToR 2, ToR 3)

78. The final submission examines the NZ precedent in full, including its findings on social cohesion, hate speech law, freedom of expression, and the securitisation of communities.

78A. Since the preparation of this interim submission, the constitutional challenge to the post-Bondi PARD scheme has progressed. In Jarrett & Ors v State of New South Wales (NSWCA 2026/44249), the UN Special Rapporteur on Counter-Terrorism and Human Rights, Professor Ben Saul, intervened as amicus curiae and found the PARD — a 90-day protest ban covering Greater Sydney’s three Metropolitan Police Regions, affecting 5.2 million people — to be “presumptively disproportionate” under ICCPR Article 21. The PARD lapsed on 17 February 2026 without producing any documented improvement in community safety. It is submitted that this development reinforces the central argument of the interim submission: that the political and institutional response to the Bondi attack has been directed overwhelmingly at speech and assembly rather than at the intelligence, surveillance, and database failures that enabled the attack. The final submission analyses this legislative response in detail.¹

Section 5: Recommendations

79. The following recommendations address matters requiring urgent or immediate action, consistent with the Commissioner’s stated purpose for the interim report. Each recommendation is tied to a specific, documented failure identified in the preceding sections and identifies the agency or body responsible for implementation.

Recommendation A (URGENT): Examine the CDO position for Isaac El Matari. El Matari’s maximum sentence expires approximately November 2026. The CDO legislative regime sunsets on 7 December 2026. The Commission should urgently examine whether a CDO application has been made or is in preparation, and whether the sunset date creates an unacceptable gap in public protection. (Section 3.2, paragraph 63)

Recommendation 1: The Commission should examine the intelligence relationship between Wissam Haddad and law enforcement agencies, including what information flowed in each direction and whether the decision not to charge Haddad was justified given the cost of leaving the radicalisation infrastructure intact. The Commission is respectfully invited to exercise its coercive powers to obtain the relevant intelligence files. (Section 1.2, paragraph 51)

Recommendation 2: The Commission should examine the adequacy of post-release monitoring of Youssef Uweinat between November 2022 and December 2025, including whether the absence of a control order created a gap through which facilitation of Philippine-based network contacts could have occurred undetected. Without a control order, three years of his activities went unmonitored — the direct consequence of a CDO application filed six days late. (Section 1.3, paragraph 48)

Recommendation 3: The Commission should examine the firearms licensing failure — specifically, why ASIO’s identification of Naveed Akram in 2019 was not cross-referenced when his father applied for a firearms licence in 2020 — and recommend automatic cross-referencing between ASIO databases, the firearms registry, and Border Force travel records. Any ASIO flag should trigger review of associated firearms licences and travel patterns. This requires no new legislation; it requires existing systems to communicate. The Attorney-General’s Department, in coordination with ASIO and the relevant state firearms registries, should implement the cross-referencing mechanism. (Sections 1.2 and 3.1, paragraphs 43 and 55–57)

Recommendation 4: It is submitted that CDO assessment should be required to commence no later than 12 months before the scheduled release of any terrorism offender — or such longer period as the complexity of the case requires, particularly where fairness requires the respondent the opportunity to obtain independent expert evidence — with dedicated resourcing to prepare applications in time for thorough judicial review. Every release date is known years in advance. The Attorney-General’s Department should be directed to implement this requirement. (Section 3.2, paragraph 62)

Recommendation 5: VERA-2R should be replaced with a validated risk assessment instrument — such as the ERG 22+ (used by HM Prison and Probation Service, United Kingdom) or the TRAP-18, both subject to independent peer-reviewed validation — and independent review should be commissioned of all CDO and ESO assessments conducted using VERA-2R, including the Benbrika assessment. The Attorney-General’s Department should commission the review. (Section 3.2, paragraph 64)

Recommendation 6: It is submitted that automatic intelligence flags should be established for travel to terrorism-linked regions by any person with terrorism-related associations. The Akrams spent 28 days in Mindanao — the operating area of a designated terrorist organisation — and cleared customs without triggering any alert. The Department of Home Affairs, in coordination with ASIO and Border Force, should implement the automated flagging system. (Section 3.4, paragraphs 71–73)

Recommendation 7: A comprehensive audit of prison communications security for all terrorism offenders should be conducted. El Matari communicated operational doctrine from Supermax to at least three members of the network, including offers of access to weaponry suppliers and false document suppliers. The communications were only discovered during routine searches. Corrective Services NSW and equivalent state agencies, in coordination with the AFP, should conduct the audit. (Section 3.3, paragraph 70)

Recommendation 8: The Commission should seek disclosure of the suppressed Saadieh prohibited contact list (34 names) and the full Dakkak control order schedule, and examine the current status and activities of all individuals on them. The Commission should exercise its powers under the Royal Commissions Act to obtain these documents. (Section 1.3, paragraphs 49–50)

Recommendation 9 (Community-based prevention): The Commission should examine the evidence for community-based counter-radicalisation programs and recommend a nationally coordinated intervention framework — modelled on approaches examined by the New Zealand Royal Commission — operating independently of law enforcement to preserve community trust. The Department of Home Affairs should implement. (NZ precedent; Section 1.1)

80. Each of these recommendations addresses a documented failure in the systems designed to prevent the Bondi attack. None requires restricting political speech. None requires new criminal offences for protest activity. All are implementable within existing legislative frameworks or through administrative action. Fifteen people were killed because these systems did not function. The interim report is the opportunity to ensure they do.

Section 6: Conclusion

81. The evidence before this Commission establishes that the Bondi attack was enabled by identifiable and rectifiable system failures. An intelligence agency that infiltrated the radicalisation network for six years but did not dismantle it. A firearms licensing system that did not cross-reference ASIO records. A border security system that did not flag a month-long journey to a terrorism hotspot. A post-sentence framework that left convicted terrorists unsupervised because applications were filed outside the statutory timeframe. A risk assessment tool found to perform no better than chance — and the finding suppressed.

82. It is submitted that the remedies are specific, implementable, and do not require speech restrictions. Database integration, timely CDO applications, travel monitoring, validated risk assessment instruments, prison communications audits, community-based counter-radicalisation, and network disruption are operational changes within the power of the executive government. They address the actual pathway that produced the attack.

83. The interim report presents an urgent opportunity for action. Isaac El Matari’s sentence expires in approximately November 2026. The CDO regime sunsets on 7 December 2026. If the Commission does not address this gap in its interim report, the window may close before the final report is delivered.

84. Fifteen people were murdered at Bondi Beach. This submission identifies the systemic failures that enabled the attack and the measures capable of remedying them. The Commission is respectfully invited to recommend their implementation without delay.

Notes

Appendix A: AMDC Network Map

The following table maps the identified members of the Al Madina Dawah Centre network, drawn from sentencing judgments, control order proceedings, the Wertheim v Haddad Federal Court filings, and post-attack reporting. It does not purport to be exhaustive — the suppressed Saadieh prohibited contact list (34 names), the Amin prohibited contact list (31 names), and the full Dakkak control order schedule contain additional individuals not publicly identified.

Final Submission to the Royal Commission on Antisemitism and Social Cohesion

Commissioner: The Hon. Virginia Bell AC SC Established: 9 January 2026 Interim report due: 30 April 2026

Submitted by Jacob Carswell-Doherty | Principal, Jake McKinley | April 2026

Executive Summary

This submission addresses all four terms of reference. It presents evidence that the Bondi Beach attack of 14 December 2025 was the product of a specific, identifiable radicalisation network centred on the Al Madina Dawah Centre and enabled by systemic failures in intelligence sharing, firearms licensing, post-release supervision, and travel monitoring — none of which would have been prevented by restricting political speech.

The submission identifies five core problems with Australia’s current response:

1. The security failures are fixable but unaddressed. ASIO identified the lead attacker in 2019. His father subsequently obtained a firearms licence and acquired six firearms. No cross-reference between ASIO’s intelligence holdings and the NSW Firearms Registry occurred at any point. Convicted terrorists were released without supervision orders. Prison communications networks operated from inside Supermax. These are system failures requiring system solutions — database integration, mandatory CDO timelines, prison communication audits, and travel pattern monitoring.

2. The data infrastructure is unreliable. Antisemitism incident data relied upon for policy is collected by advocacy organisations without independent government verification, using methodology that conflates political speech with racial hatred. NSW Police’s own antisemitism taskforce admitted to misclassifying, inflating, and duplicating incidents.

3. The legislative response fails proportionality analysis. Post-Bondi legislation criminalising protest slogans and symbols has already produced two constitutional defeats, with a third under active challenge. The PARD scheme — enabling 90-day protest bans covering 5.2 million people — has been found “presumptively disproportionate” by the UN Special Rapporteur on Counter-Terrorism. Assessed against the structured proportionality framework established in McCloy v NSW and applied in Clubb v Edwards, these measures fail the necessity limb — less restrictive means exist and have not been tried — and risk failing the adequacy of balance.

4. The institutional conflation of Jewish identity with Israel amplifies the antisemitism it purports to address. Academic evidence, the organisations’ own charters, and the post-October 7 data — record advocacy coinciding with record incidents — are consistent with the hypothesis that this conflation widens the channel through which conflict-activated prejudice reaches diaspora communities.

5. The lawfare pattern undermines social cohesion. Six major legal proceedings since October 2023 seeking to classify criticism of Israel as antisemitism have overwhelmingly failed on the merits. Forty-seven documented cases of individuals targeted for pro-Palestinian speech — disproportionately women — demonstrate a chilling effect regardless of legal outcome.

The submission makes 17 recommendations spanning security reform, data methodology, legal proceedings, the conflation dynamic, legislative proportionality, and community engagement. Each is specific, implementable, and tied to a term of reference.

Section 0: Preface and Standing

1. My name is Jacob Carswell-Doherty. I am a Sydney-based lawyer with 15 years of experience in litigation, property, commercial, and dispute resolution practice. A full curriculum vitae — including qualifications, professional history, published work, and research methodology — was provided in the interim submission filed on 13 March 2026 and is available to the Commission on request. I make this submission as an independent researcher, not as a representative of any political party, advocacy organisation, or community group.

2. This final submission addresses all four terms of reference and should be read together with the interim submission filed on 13 March 2026. The interim submission focused on the third term of reference — the circumstances leading up to and surrounding the Bondi attack — and identified security matters requiring urgent or immediate action for the interim report due 30 April 2026. This submission addresses the full scope of the Commission’s inquiry, including matters bearing on all four of the broad evidence topics identified by Senior Counsel Assisting, Mr Richard Lancaster SC, at the opening hearing on 24 February 2026: (a) identifying antisemitic conduct in Australian society; (b) the drivers of antisemitism, including radicalisation pathways; (c) what law enforcement and security agencies have been doing and how the response could be improved; and (d) the circumstances surrounding the Bondi attack.

3. The Letters Patent require that the Commission’s inquiry must not prejudice any future criminal proceedings relating to the Bondi attack. The Commissioner reiterated this constraint at the opening hearing on 24 February 2026. This submission draws exclusively on material already in the public domain — court judgments, published sentencing remarks, Senate Estimates testimony, ASIO public statements, and media reporting.

4. I make this submission in a spirit of constructive engagement. Antisemitism in Australia is real and rising. The fear in Jewish communities is justified. Fifteen people were murdered at Bondi Beach during a Hanukkah celebration. The Adass Israel Synagogue was firebombed. Jewish Australians report unprecedented fear. These facts are not in dispute.

5. The question before this Commission is not whether antisemitism exists. It is whether Australia’s response will address what actually went wrong — or whether it will misdirect resources toward restricting political speech while leaving the intelligence, policing, and institutional failures that enabled the Bondi attack unaddressed.

6. Effective response requires accurate diagnosis. This submission presents evidence bearing on that diagnosis.

7. The submission is structured as follows. Section 1 summarises the Bondi attack — the radicalisation pipeline, intelligence failures, and facilitation chain examined in full in the interim submission (Terms of Reference 1 and 3). Section 1A responds to the Commissioner’s invitation at the opening hearing to receive submissions on the controversial IHRA illustrative examples. Section 2 examines the data infrastructure on which policy is being built, including the methodology used to categorise antisemitic incidents and the absence of independent government verification (Term of Reference 1). Section 3 examines the pattern of legal proceedings since October 2023 and the court record on conflation of criticism of Israel with antisemitism (Terms of Reference 1 and 4). Section 3A sets out the constitutional framework — the implied freedom of political communication and the structured proportionality test that Commissioner Bell AC SC helped to build during her tenure on the High Court — and analyses its application in Wertheim v Haddad and Lees v State of NSW (Terms of Reference 2 and 4). Section 4 presents the academic evidence on the institutional conflation of Jewish identity with the State of Israel (Terms of Reference 1 and 4). Section 5 assesses the legislative response through a structured proportionality analysis (Terms of Reference 2 and 4). Section 5A examines the social cohesion cost of the current institutional strategy (Terms of Reference 1 and 4). Section 5B examines the New Zealand Royal Commission into the Christchurch mosque attack as the closest international precedent (Terms of Reference 1, 2, and 4). Section 6 reproduces in summary form the security reform recommendations set out in the interim submission (Terms of Reference 2 and 3). Section 7 examines foreign influence (Terms of Reference 1 and 4). Sections 8 and 9 summarise all recommendations and conclude.

Section 1: The Bondi Attack (Summary)

Terms of Reference 3 (Bondi) and 1 (drivers of antisemitism)

The interim submission filed on 13 March 2026 detailed the radicalisation pipeline, intelligence failures, facilitation chain, and environment narrative in full. The following summary is included for completeness. The full evidentiary case, with all source citations, appears in the interim submission.

8. The Bondi Beach attack of 14 December 2025 was the product of a specific, identifiable radicalisation network centred on the Al Madina Dawah Centre (AMDC) in Bankstown, founded by Wissam Haddad. The Federal Court in Wertheim v Haddad [2025] FCA 720 documented 25 antisemitic imputations. ASIO identified Haddad as “the most important jihadist, extremist preacher in Sydney” and infiltrated the network for six years through an undercover agent. The centre functioned simultaneously as mosque, community centre, and radicalisation pipeline, producing multiple terrorism convictions including Isaac El Matari (“IS Commander Australia”), Youssef Uweinat (recruited at 14, convicted ISIS recruiter), and connecting to Khaled Sharrouf and Mohamed Elomar (both killed fighting for ISIS in Syria).[^1]

Finding sought [Direct]: The Commission should find, on the basis of Wertheim v Haddad [2025] FCA 720, sentencing judgments in R v El Matari [2021] NSWSC 1260 and R v Uweinat [2021] NSWSC 1256, and ABC Four Corners reporting, that the Al Madina Dawah Centre in Bankstown functioned as a radicalisation pipeline that produced multiple individuals convicted of terrorism offences, including Isaac El Matari and Youssef Uweinat, and that the Federal Court documented 25 antisemitic imputations in speeches delivered at the Centre. (ToR 3, ToR 1)

8A. The network centred on the AMDC comprised at least 28 identified individuals. Convicted terrorism offenders include El Matari (R v El Matari [2021] NSWSC 1260), Uweinat (R v Uweinat [2021] NSWSC 1256), Tukiterangi Lawrence (R v Lawrence [2023] NSWSC 1428), Joseph Saadieh (CDPP v Saadieh [2021] NSWCCA 232), Radwan Dakkak (Booth v Dakkak [2020] FCA 1882), Abdul Nacer Benbrika, Robert Cerantonio, Moudasser Taleb, Hamdi Alqudsi, Omarjan Azari (R v Azari [2019] NSWSC 314), and Bayda and Namoa (R v Bayda; R v Namoa [2019] NSWSC 24). Control order subjects who list Haddad as a prohibited contact include Amin (Attorney-General v Amin [2023] NSWSC 1280 — 31 prohibited contacts), Biber, Church, and Mustapha (State v Mustapha [2025] NSWSC 1339 — ESO relaxed one month before Bondi). Uncharged associates identified in Wertheim v Haddad Federal Court filings include Yahya Ye (who recruited Naveed Akram at 17) and Enver Neziroski (joint bank account signatory). The Dakkak prohibited contact list names three individuals with no public information — Hozan Alou (born 1999, the same generation as Akram), Abdullah Azari (who appears on a second list in separate proceedings), and Seeyar Siddiqi — plus a UN-sanctioned Kenyan ISIS figure confirming international connections. Three additional suppressed lists — Saadieh (34 names), Amin (31 names), and the balance of the Dakkak schedule — contain further network members whose identities and current activities are unknown. The full network table with sources appears in the interim submission at paragraph 25A.

Finding sought [Direct]: The Commission should find, on the basis of sentencing judgments, control order proceedings, and Federal Court filings identified above, that the AMDC network comprised at least 28 identified individuals across convicted offenders, control order subjects, uncharged associates, and international connections, and that suppressed prohibited contact lists contain up to 76 additional names (a maximum figure assuming no overlap between separately compiled suppressed lists) whose current status is unknown. (ToR 3, ToR 2)

9. ASIO investigated Naveed Akram from October 2019 to April 2020, identifying his connections to El Matari, Uweinat, and Haddad. The investigation concluded there was “no indication of any ongoing threat.” Akram was never placed on a terrorism watchlist. From that point until the attack — six years — there is “no indication he came under the attention of authorities at any point.” His radicalisation was identified four years before the Opera House protests and five years before the university encampments. It had nothing to do with the Palestinian solidarity movement.[^2]

Finding sought [Direct]: The Commission should find, on the basis of the Prime Minister’s public statement, Minister Burke’s confirmation, and Senate Estimates testimony, that ASIO investigated Naveed Akram from October 2019 to April 2020, identified his connections to the AMDC network including El Matari, Uweinat, and Haddad, concluded there was “no indication of any ongoing threat,” and that Akram did not come under the attention of authorities at any point between April 2020 and December 2025. (ToR 3, ToR 2)

10. The intelligence failures were systemic. In November 2022, ASIO lowered the terrorism threat level and pivoted toward foreign interference. The same month, Uweinat was released from prison without supervision — the government’s CDO application had been filed six days before his release and failed. An AFP surveillance team mandated to monitor released terrorists was disbanded weeks before Bondi due to funding shortfalls. Sajid Akram obtained six firearms in 2023 despite his son’s identification by ASIO in 2019 — no cross-reference between ASIO records and the firearms registry occurred.[^3]

Finding sought [Direct]: The Commission should find, on the basis of the ASIO Director-General’s threat level statement of 29 November 2022, Senator Cash’s Senate Estimates testimony of 14 February 2024, The Nightly’s reporting on the AFP surveillance team, and NSW Firearms Registry records, that (a) in November 2022, ASIO lowered the terrorism threat level and pivoted toward foreign interference; (b) Youssef Uweinat was released from prison in November 2022 without a supervision order, the government’s CDO application having been filed six days before his release; (c) the AFP surveillance team mandated to monitor released terrorists was disbanded due to funding shortfalls; and (d) no cross-reference occurred between ASIO’s identification of Naveed Akram in 2019 and his father Sajid Akram’s firearms licence application in 2020. (ToR 2, ToR 3)

Finding sought [Direct]: The Commission should find, on the basis of NSW Firearms Registry records and Senate Estimates testimony, that Sajid Akram obtained six firearms through the NSW Firearms Registry despite his son’s prior identification by ASIO as connected to the AMDC terrorism network, and that no mechanism existed to flag this connection automatically. (ToR 2, ToR 3)

11. Father and son travelled to Davao City, Mindanao — a region with active ISIS-affiliated groups — for 28 days in November 2025. A month-long trip to a terrorism hotspot triggered no intelligence alerts. The network had documented Philippine connections that courts had recognised as serious enough to prohibit. Three weeks after returning, they attacked a Hanukkah celebration, killing fifteen people in the worst terrorist attack on Australian soil.[^4]

Finding sought [Direct]: The Commission should find, on the basis of the OHPI report, media reporting of Border Force travel records, and the designation of Islamic State East Asia under subsection 102.1(1) of the Criminal Code (12 September 2023), that Naveed and Sajid Akram travelled to Davao City, Mindanao — a region with active ISIS-affiliated groups — for 28 days in November 2025, that the AMDC network had documented Philippine connections recognised by courts as serious enough to prohibit, and that no publicly disclosed evidence indicates that this travel triggered intelligence alerts. (ToR 3, ToR 2)

12. The facilitation chain remains incompletely examined. El Matari’s surveillance transcripts celebrated “the brothers in the Philippines.” His letters reached Uweinat in Supermax prison despite not being on Uweinat’s approved association list. Uweinat distributed Mindanao-specific ISIS content after release. Haddad was reported to have been “a good intel source” — raising the question of whether police protection of an asset enabled a massacre. Without a control order, three years of Uweinat’s post-release communications went unmonitored.[^5]

Finding sought [Direct]: The Commission should find, on the basis of the sentencing remarks in R v Lawrence [2023] NSWSC 1428 and the Statement of Facts in R v Uweinat [2021] NSWSC 1256, that Isaac El Matari communicated operational content from inside Supermax prison to members of the AMDC network, including to Youssef Uweinat, despite not being on Uweinat’s approved association list, and that this communication was not detected or prevented by prison authorities. (ToR 3, ToR 2)

Finding sought [Inference]: On the basis of the CDO proceedings in R v Uweinat [2021] NSWSC 1256, the AFP surveillance team disbanding reported by The Nightly, and the absence of travel alerts for the Akrams’ Mindanao trip, the evidence is consistent with the finding that the failure to impose a control order on Uweinat created a three-year gap in monitoring (November 2022 to December 2025) during which the facilitation chain connecting the AMDC network to Philippine-based networks operated without oversight. The CDO failure, the disbanding of AFP surveillance, and the absence of travel monitoring were concurrent and compounding failures. (ToR 3, ToR 2)

13. The protest movement and the radicalisation network are separate phenomena with different causes, different participants, different goals, and different methods. The AMDC operated through mosque-based indoctrination and personal recruitment, not street protest. Haddad explicitly rejected democratic participation. A comprehensive search of all 19 documents filed in Wertheim v Haddad found no reference to Haddad or his associates attending rallies or protests — with the single exception of the August 2025 Harbour Bridge march, where Uweinat attended three years after his release, already radicalised. The causal arrow runs unambiguously from radicalisation to protest attendance, not the reverse. The full analysis of the environment narrative, including the academic literature on radicalisation pathways, the empirical data on protest and violence, and the counterarguments the Commission should consider, appears in the interim submission.

Finding sought [Direct]: The Commission should find, on the basis of the ASIO investigation timeline (October 2019), the AFP statement of 22 December 2025, the ASIO Director-General’s confirmation that “none of the terrorism threats investigated since October had been inspired by Gaza,” and the comprehensive search of all 19 documents filed in Wertheim v Haddad, that the evidence does not support a causal link between the pro-Palestinian protest movement and the radicalisation of the Bondi attackers. Naveed Akram was identified by ASIO in 2019, four years before the Opera House protests and five years before university encampments. The AMDC operated through mosque-based indoctrination and personal recruitment, not through street protest. (ToR 1, ToR 3)

Finding sought [Inference]: On the basis of the AFP statement of 22 December 2025, the ASIO Director-General’s Annual Threat Assessment, and the Wertheim v Haddad document corpus (finding no rally attendance references), the Commission should find that in the case of the Bondi attackers, the causal arrow ran from radicalisation to protest attendance, not the reverse: the AMDC network’s methods — mosque-based indoctrination, prison correspondence, encrypted communications, and personal recruitment — are structurally distinct from the political protest movement, and no evidence has been adduced connecting protest activity to the operational planning of the Bondi attack. This finding does not exclude the possibility that protest environments may contribute to radicalisation in other cases, but the evidence before this Commission does not support that conclusion for the Bondi attack. (ToR 1, ToR 3)

Recommendation 1: The Commission should examine the intelligence relationship between Wissam Haddad and law enforcement agencies, including what information flowed in each direction and whether the decision not to charge Haddad was justified. Previously submitted in the interim submission of 13 March 2026.

Recommendation 2: The Commission should examine Youssef Uweinat’s communications between November 2022 and December 2025, including whether he facilitated introductions to Philippine-based networks. Previously submitted in the interim submission of 13 March 2026.

Recommendation 3: The Commission should examine the firearms licensing failure — specifically, why ASIO’s identification of Naveed Akram in 2019 was not cross-referenced when his father applied for a firearms licence in 2020. Previously submitted in the interim submission of 13 March 2026.

Section 1A: Response to the Commissioner’s IHRA Position

Invited by Commissioner Bell AC SC at the opening hearing on 24 February 2026

14. At the opening hearing, the Commissioner stated that “in investigating the nature and prevalence of antisemitism in Australia, the Commission will apply the IHRA working definition.” She noted that “at least two of the examples are controversial and have led some critics to argue that the IHRA working definition wrongly labels as antisemitic the expression of political views which do not reflect a hatred of Jews.” The Commissioner stated that she was “open to receiving submissions on the issue” while expressing her “current view” that concerns about the examples “pay insufficient regard to the terms of the definition itself” and are “apt to overlook the requirement to take account of the overall context in which conduct occurs.” This submission accepts that invitation.

15. This submission does not challenge the core definition. The Commissioner is correct that it is “uncontroversial that criticism of the policies that may be pursued by the government of Israel from time to time is not, of itself, antisemitic.” The core definition — “Antisemitism is a certain perception of Jews which may be expressed as a hatred towards Jews” — is an appropriate analytical framework for the Commission’s work.

16. The concern is with the illustrative examples, particularly examples 7 and 11. Example 7 identifies as potentially antisemitic: “Denying the Jewish people their right to self-determination, e.g., by claiming that the existence of a State of Israel is a racist endeavor.” Example 11 identifies: “Drawing comparisons of contemporary Israeli policy to that of the Nazis.” These examples, when applied as legal or regulatory instruments rather than as analytical aids, have produced documented chilling effects on political speech in every jurisdiction where they have been adopted (see Section 3 below, and the BRISMES/ELSC empirical study of 40 UK university cases).[^6]

17. The Commissioner’s own framework supports this submission’s position. Her insistence on “overall context” is precisely the analytical discipline that codification of the examples as legal instruments would eliminate. A legal prohibition derived from Example 7 would capture, without contextual analysis, the position of Jewish Voice for Peace (approximately 32,000 dues-paying members as reported in its 2023 annual report[^137]), the Jewish Council of Australia (over 1,300 signatories[^42]), and over 350 scholars of Jewish Studies and Antisemitism Studies who endorsed the Jerusalem Declaration on Antisemitism.[^124] A legal prohibition derived from Example 11 would capture, without contextual analysis, the statements of Israeli scholars at Yad Vashem who have themselves drawn such comparisons in academic contexts. The “overall context” qualifier that the Commissioner correctly identifies as essential is the very thing that codification removes.

18. The Federal Court has already drawn this line without the IHRA definition. In Wertheim v Haddad [2025] FCA 720, Justice Stewart developed a tripartite framework for distinguishing antisemitic speech from political criticism — entirely from the statutory text of section 18C and from first principles. The IHRA definition was not relied upon by either party and played no role in the analysis.[^7] The court’s distinction — that “disparagement of Zionism constitutes disparagement of a philosophy or ideology and not a race or ethnic group” — achieves the analytical precision the Commissioner seeks without the definitional overreach the examples introduce.[^8]

Finding sought [Direct]: The Commission should find that the Federal Court in Wertheim v Haddad developed a framework for distinguishing antisemitic speech from political criticism of Israel entirely from the statutory text of section 18C of the Racial Discrimination Act, and that the IHRA Working Definition was not relied upon by either party and played no role in the court’s analysis. (ToR 1, ToR 4)

19. Kenneth Stern, the lead drafter of the original 2004–2005 text that IHRA adopted, has testified before both the US House and Senate that the definition “was never intended to target or chill speech on a college campus” and that “many pro-Israel Jewish groups eventually weaponised the definition to suppress student speech.”[^9] Stern draws the exact distinction the Commissioner appears to be drawing: the definition as an analytical tool (acceptable) versus the definition as a legal instrument (dangerous). This submission respectfully submits that the Commissioner’s framework — applying the core definition while assessing conduct in “overall context” — is sound, and that the controversial examples should not be recommended for adoption as legal or regulatory instruments.

Finding sought [Direct]: The Commission should find that Kenneth Stern, the lead drafter of the original text that the IHRA adopted, has testified before the US Congress that the definition “was never intended to target or chill speech on a college campus” and that its application as a legal or regulatory instrument goes beyond its intended purpose. (ToR 4)

20. The evidence supporting this position is set out in full in Section 3 (the lawfare pattern), Section 3A (the constitutional framework), and Section 4 (the conflation dynamic) below.

Recommendation 7 (reframed): The core IHRA definition is appropriately applied as an analytical framework for the Commission’s inquiry. The Israel-related illustrative examples — particularly examples 7 and 11 — should not be recommended for adoption as legal or regulatory instruments (that is, as a basis for complaints, prosecutions, employment sanctions, or institutional codes of conduct), because their codification would eliminate the contextual analysis the Commissioner has correctly identified as essential.

Section 2: The Data Problem

Term of Reference 1 (prevalence and drivers of antisemitism)

21. Term of Reference 1 requires the Commission to examine the “prevalence, trends, and drivers” of antisemitism in Australia. This examination depends entirely on how antisemitism is measured. If the data collection methodology is flawed—if it conflates distinct phenomena, lacks verification, or attributes ideological motivation without evidence—then the Commission’s findings under Term of Reference 1 will be built on unreliable foundations, and any policy recommendations that follow will be misdirected. The evidence presented in this section suggests that Australia’s current data infrastructure is not adequate to the task the Commission has been given.

2.1 The “Far-Left” Finding

22. The Jewish Community Council of Victoria is one of two peak Jewish community organisations in Australia that publishes annual antisemitism data (the other being the Executive Council of Australian Jewry). The JCCV’s reports are widely cited in parliamentary debates, media coverage, and government policy discussions. Its 2024 report contained a finding that has shaped the political response to antisemitism: 53.4% of antisemitic incidents were attributed to “far-left” perpetrators, a shift from 8% before October 2023.[^10] This finding requires scrutiny because it has been used to justify legislation targeting the political left, including speech restrictions and protest bans.

23. The JCCV explicitly defines “far-left” as encompassing “revolutionary socialist, anarchist, or radical anti-fascist ideologies.” This is a specific ideological claim about the perpetrators. However, the same report reveals that 99% of these “far-left” incidents were “explicitly connected to Israel, Palestine, or Zionism.”

24. This creates a fundamental question: is the “far-left” category capturing actual ideological motivation, or is it capturing the context of pro-Palestinian protests? A person shouting abuse at an identifiable Jewish person during a Palestine rally may be correctly classified as committing an antisemitic incident. The abuse is real. The harm is real. But whether that person holds “revolutionary socialist” convictions—or is motivated by them—is a separate empirical question the methodology does not answer.

25. The distinction between context and ideology has direct policy implications. If antisemitism is being driven by committed far-left ideologues whose revolutionary worldview generates hostility to Jews, interventions should target that ideological infrastructure: counter-radicalisation programs, monitoring of far-left organisations, ideological counter-messaging. If antisemitism is being driven by situational factors—people with no particular ideological commitment swept up in the emotions of a conflict and directing hostility at the nearest available target—then de-escalation strategies, conflict resolution approaches, and education about distinguishing political criticism from ethnic hatred are the relevant interventions.

26. Genuine ideological movements do not multiply sixfold overnight. What changed was not the number of revolutionary socialists in Australia. It was the Gaza conflict and its associated protests. The category appears to respond to current events rather than track a stable ideological tendency. The current data cannot tell us which is occurring. It counts incidents and attributes them to categories but cannot explain the mechanisms. Policy built on categories that conflate situational hostility with ideological commitment risks misdirecting resources toward the wrong interventions.

Finding sought [Direct]: The Commission should find that the JCCV’s attribution of 53.4% of antisemitic incidents to “far-left” perpetrators is based on a methodology that does not distinguish between ideological motivation and situational context, and that 99% of these “far-left” incidents were “explicitly connected to Israel, Palestine, or Zionism.” (ToR 1)

Finding sought [Inference]: On the basis of the JCCV’s own data showing 99% of “far-left” incidents were “explicitly connected to Israel, Palestine, or Zionism,” the Commission should find that the sixfold increase in incidents attributed to “far-left” perpetrators is more consistent with a surge in conflict-related situational hostility than with a sixfold increase in the number of Australians holding revolutionary socialist or anarchist convictions. The category appears to track the Gaza conflict rather than a stable ideological tendency. (ToR 1)

2.2 The Verification Gap

27. If the Commission is to make evidence-based recommendations about the prevalence of antisemitism, it needs reliable data. The question is whether Australia’s current data infrastructure provides it. In every comparable democracy, government agencies independently collect and verify hate crime statistics alongside community organisations. Australia does not. The Commission should understand what this gap means for the reliability of the evidence it is being asked to rely upon.

28. Australia’s antisemitism statistics come almost entirely from community organisations—the Executive Council of Australian Jewry and the JCCV. No Australian government body independently tracks and publishes antisemitism data.[^11] This stands in contrast to the United Kingdom (Home Office statistics alongside Community Security Trust monitoring), the United States (FBI hate crime statistics alongside ADL data), Germany (police statistics complementing government-funded RIAS monitoring), and France (integrated community and government systems).

29. Even NSW Police have acknowledged fundamental problems with their own data. Deputy Commissioner David Hudson testified that police antisemitism records were “subjective” and “not to keep accurate statistical information; it’s for operational use”: “The purpose of this spreadsheet or database is not to keep accurate statistical information; it’s for an operational use… it was for a specific purpose, not to keep accurate data.”[^12] Analysis found 38 duplicates among 367 entries — a 10% error rate. When asked whether police had a database recording how many hate crimes were charged, Hudson answered simply: “No.” The “Dural Caravan” incident, prominently cited to justify hate crime legislation, was later revealed as an operation orchestrated by organised crime.

30. The data problems extend to the figures cited at the highest levels of government. Premier Minns and the NSW Police Minister publicly cited a figure of “over 700 antisemitic attacks.” Deputy Commissioner Hudson clarified under parliamentary questioning that the figure captured “a lot more than just antisemitism. I think there were Islamophobia incidents as well on that.” When asked whether the public claim was misleading, Hudson replied: “I think it might have been a mistake. I don’t know if it was misleading or purposely misleading.”[^13]

Finding sought [Direct]: The Commission should find that Deputy Commissioner David Hudson testified that NSW Police antisemitism records were “subjective” and “not to keep accurate statistical information,” that the database contained a 10% duplication rate, and that NSW Police had no database recording how many hate crimes were charged. (ToR 1, ToR 2)

Finding sought [Direct]: The Commission should find that the “over 700 antisemitic attacks” figure publicly cited by Premier Minns and the NSW Police Minister was inaccurate; that Deputy Commissioner Hudson clarified the figure captured “a lot more than just antisemitism” including “Islamophobia incidents”; and that Hudson stated “I think it might have been a mistake.” (ToR 1)

The Australian Human Rights Commission has also exercised caution about data reliability: when asked about the Australian Jewish University Student Experience Survey — commissioned by the Zionist Federation of Australia, with under 20% response rate — AHRC representative Hashini Panditharatne stated: “The citation of that Australian Jewish University Student Experience Survey in the Human Rights Commission interim report shouldn’t be taken to be an endorsement of that report as reliable.” AHRC President Hugh de Kretser added: “There’s a range of criticisms levelled at different methodologies. They all tend to be imperfect in different ways.”[^14] The provenance of the campus antisemitism claim itself warrants scrutiny. The ZFA’s widely reported assertion that “two-thirds of Australian Jewish university students have experienced antisemitism” — cited in parliamentary debates and media coverage — was debunked in submissions to the Toltz v Riemer proceedings: Jews Against the Occupation ’48 demonstrated that the figure derived from “64% of 7% of Jewish students affiliated with Zionist organisations,” a convenience sample that could not support the population-level claim being made. When the government’s own human rights commission declines to endorse the data being used to justify legislation, and the government’s own police acknowledge their database was never designed for accurate statistics, the Commission should approach all quantitative claims with appropriate caution.

Finding sought [Direct]: The Commission should find that the Australian Human Rights Commission declined to endorse the ZFA-commissioned Australian Jewish University Student Experience Survey as reliable, with AHRC President Hugh de Kretser stating “there’s a range of criticisms levelled at different methodologies. They all tend to be imperfect in different ways.” (ToR 1)

Finding sought [Direct]: The Commission should find that the ZFA’s claim that “two-thirds of Australian Jewish university students have experienced antisemitism” was demonstrated in the Toltz v Riemer proceedings to derive from “64% of 7% of Jewish students affiliated with Zionist organisations” — a convenience sample that cannot support the population-level claim. (ToR 1)

31. The nature of the incidents counted also warrants scrutiny. Parliamentary questioning of ECAJ Co-CEO Alex Ryvchin by Dr Amanda Cohn revealed that 33% of reported incidents were posters, 19% were graffiti, and 14% were messages — a total of 66% in categories that are inherently more difficult to assess for antisemitic motivation than physical assaults. Dr Cohn pressed on whether political messages were being counted as antisemitic. Ryvchin acknowledged “some might be a little bit debatable.”[^15] This is not to minimise the distress caused by hostile posters or graffiti. It is to note that two-thirds of the incident base consists of categories where the distinction between political expression and racial hatred — the distinction the Commission must draw — is most difficult to make, and where the methodology for making it is least transparent.

32. Submissions by organisations relying on ECAJ data reproduce it inconsistently, revealing the absence of quality controls. Submission 99 (5A) cites a “738% increase” in antisemitic incidents; ECAJ’s own reporting for the same period states a “five times” increase — a five-fold increase is 400%, not 738%. The same submission describes “Free Palestine” as “inherently racist” and proposes regulating protest frequency — positions unsupported by any court finding or academic authority cited in the submission. AIJAC (Submission 19 to the slogans inquiry) proposes banning six slogans “and all variants” — a formulation so open-ended it could capture any political statement about Palestine. HAZAK (Submission 90) proposes a “rebuttable presumption” that the word “Zionist” means “Jew” — a legal mechanism that would require any person accused of antisemitism to prove they were not referring to Jews when they used the word “Zionist,” effectively reversing the onus of proof for political speech. These submissions are cited by the organisations that produced them as evidence of community consensus. They are better understood as evidence that ECAJ’s data is being consumed and reproduced without independent verification, quality control, or critical assessment — which is precisely why independent government data collection is essential.[^16]

33. Neither ECAJ nor JCCV publishes inter-rater reliability data or quality control procedures. When multiple reviewers assess the same incident, how often do they reach the same classification? What training do reviewers receive on distinguishing “far-left” from other categories? These are standard requirements in academic research but absent from published reports. The reports do not explain how investigators determine whether a perpetrator at a protest holds anarchist views versus having no particular political ideology. When data with these deficiencies is used to justify restricting political speech, particular caution is warranted.

34. The impartiality of the data collection itself warrants examination. Julie Nathan has served as ECAJ’s Research Director and lead author of its annual Report on Anti-Jewish Incidents in Australia since 2013 — the report that produces the incident figures cited in parliamentary debates, media coverage, and government policy documents. In February 2025, Nathan retweeted a post on X describing Palestinians as “like a pack of salivating bloodthirsty hyenas” and stating “Hamas = Gaza and Gaza = Hamas.” The retweet was subsequently deleted. In October 2024, she retweeted far-right commentator Douglas Murray, calling him “insightful” while he claimed Muslims only protest Israeli actions due to “hatred of the Jews.”[^17] ECAJ did not respond to questions about these posts. The person responsible for classifying whether incidents are antisemitic — the person whose judgments produce the data on which legislation is built — publicly endorsed content dehumanising Palestinians and equating an entire civilian population with a proscribed terrorist organisation. This does not establish that the data is fabricated. It establishes that the data is produced by a researcher whose publicly expressed views raise questions about the objectivity of her classifications — particularly in the 66% of incidents (posters, graffiti, messages) where the distinction between political expression and racial hatred requires precisely the kind of impartial judgment her social media activity calls into question. The Commission should satisfy itself that ECAJ’s data collection meets minimum standards of researcher impartiality before relying on it for findings under Term of Reference 1.

Finding sought [Direct]: The Commission should find that Julie Nathan, ECAJ’s Research Director and lead author of its annual antisemitism reports since 2013, publicly endorsed on social media content describing Palestinians as “like a pack of salivating bloodthirsty hyenas” and promoted far-right commentator Douglas Murray’s claim that Muslims only protest Israeli actions due to “hatred of the Jews.” These publicly expressed views raise questions about the objectivity of classifications in the 66% of incidents (posters, graffiti, messages) where the distinction between political expression and racial hatred requires impartial judgment. (ToR 1)

2.3 The Organised Crime Dimension

35. The Commission’s ability to recommend effective interventions depends on accurately identifying what is driving attacks on Jewish Australians. If attacks are ideologically motivated, counter-radicalisation programs are the appropriate response. If they are directed by a foreign state using criminal proxies, disruption of foreign intelligence operations and organised crime networks is the appropriate response. Current data collection systems cannot make this distinction—but the police investigation into the most serious post-October 7 attacks on Jewish targets in Sydney has produced evidence that challenges the prevailing narrative.

36. Strike Force Pearl was established by NSW Police to investigate a series of high-profile attacks on Jewish targets in Sydney, including arson, firebombings, and shootings. Deputy Commissioner David Hudson, the senior officer overseeing the investigation, provided testimony that directly bears on how the Commission should understand the nature of the threat:

“None of the individuals we have arrested have displayed any form of antisemitic ideology. I think these organised crime figures have taken an opportunity to play off the vulnerability of the Jewish community.”[^18]

37. ASIO formally assessed that Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps directed at least two attacks on Australian Jewish targets using criminal proxies: the arson at Lewis Continental Kitchen in October 2024 and the firebombing of the Adass Israel Synagogue in December 2024. The IRGC was subsequently listed as a state sponsor of terrorism under the Criminal Code Amendment (State Sponsors of Terrorism) Act 2025—the first listing under that new legislative framework.[^19]

38. The terrorism-organised crime intersection is documented in the court record. The control order in Attorney-General v Amin [2023] NSWSC 1280 contains 31 prohibited contacts — the most comprehensive ISIS network map found in Australian court documents. The list includes Wissam Haddad and Isaac El Matari alongside five convicted terrorists: Hamdi Alqudsi (convicted of facilitating travel to Syria to fight with ISIS), Omarjan Azari (convicted of conspiracy to commit a terrorist act, radicalised through street preaching with Sharrouf and Elomar), Mohamed Ali Baryalei (Australia’s most senior IS recruiter, reportedly killed in Syria), Khaled Cheikho (convicted in 2009 as part of Australia’s first prosecuted terrorist cell), and Mazen Touma (convicted of foreign incursion offences). The same schedule lists Bassam Hamzy, founder of the Brothers 4 Life prison gang — one of Australia’s most violent criminal organisations — and Adnan Darwiche, a major organised crime figure from Sydney’s gang wars. Their presence on the same prohibited contact list as ISIS-aligned terrorists is not coincidental: it documents the operational nexus between radicalised ideology and criminal infrastructure that characterises the Sydney threat environment.[^20]

39. Fifteen of the 31 individuals on the Amin prohibited contact list have no public information attached to them whatsoever. Cross-referencing all four control orders examined in this submission (Dakkak, Biber, Church, and Amin), Haddad is the only individual who appears on every list — confirming his role as the hub of the network. The terrorism-organised crime intersection the Amin order documents has direct implications for how the Commission should understand the most serious post-October 7 attacks on Jewish targets: Deputy Commissioner Hudson’s finding that “none of the individuals we have arrested have displayed any form of antisemitic ideology” and the IRGC’s use of criminal proxies are not aberrations. They reflect a structural feature of the threat — a feature that speech restrictions cannot address but that disrupting organised crime networks can.

Finding sought [Direct]: The Commission should find that Deputy Commissioner Hudson testified that “none of the individuals we have arrested [in Strike Force Pearl] have displayed any form of antisemitic ideology” and that ASIO assessed the IRGC directed at least two attacks on Australian Jewish targets — the Lewis Continental Kitchen arson and the Adass Israel Synagogue firebombing — using criminal proxies. (ToR 1, ToR 2)

40. Current data collection systems cannot distinguish between ideologically motivated antisemitism, situational hostility arising from conflict dynamics, and criminal attacks directed by foreign states. An anarchist motivated by ideology, a university student caught up in protest emotions, and a criminal paid by the IRGC to attack Jewish targets might all be counted in the same statistics and attributed to the same categories. These three phenomena require entirely different interventions: ideological counter-messaging, de-escalation and education, and disruption of foreign intelligence operations respectively. Conflating them does not protect Jewish Australians. It misdirects resources toward the wrong interventions while leaving the most dangerous threats—state-sponsored terrorism and organised crime—inadequately addressed.

Finding sought [Inference]: On the basis of Deputy Commissioner Hudson’s testimony that NSW Police records were “subjective” and “not to keep accurate statistical information,” the ASIO assessment of IRGC-directed attacks, and the JCCV’s methodology that does not distinguish motivation from context, the Commission should find that current data collection systems cannot distinguish between ideologically motivated antisemitism, situational hostility arising from conflict dynamics, and criminal attacks directed by foreign states, and that this inability to distinguish between fundamentally different threat categories compromises the reliability of any policy response built on the aggregate data. (ToR 1, ToR 2)

2.4 International Comparison

41. The Commission’s terms of reference ask it to identify “drivers” of antisemitism. International comparison is the standard methodological approach to isolating drivers: if the same phenomenon occurs simultaneously across countries with different domestic policies, the driver is more likely to be a shared external variable than any country-specific domestic factor. The data from comparable democracies is unambiguous.

42. Post-October 7 increases in antisemitic incidents occurred in every comparable country regardless of domestic advocacy strategy. The United Kingdom experienced a 589% increase. Canada experienced a 670% increase. Australia experienced a 316% increase.[^21] The pattern is global. When violence escalates in the Middle East, antisemitism rises everywhere.

43. The country-by-country data makes this clear. The United States, with the broadest free speech protections of any democracy, experienced a 140% increase in antisemitic incidents in 2023 (ADL). Germany, with the strictest hate speech regime in Europe — criminalising Holocaust denial, incitement to hatred (Volksverhetzung), and online hate speech (NetzDG) — experienced an 83% increase (RIAS). France, which criminalises incitement to racial hatred and Holocaust denial under the Gayssot Act, experienced a 284% increase (SPCJ/CRIF). The United Kingdom, with hate speech provisions under the Public Order Act, experienced a 147% increase (CST). Australia, with s 18C racial vilification provisions, experienced a 316% increase (ECAJ). Canada, with Criminal Code hate speech provisions, experienced a 109% increase (B’nai Brith Canada). Argentina experienced a 44% increase (DAIA).[^22] Every country experienced a massive surge regardless of its domestic legal framework. If anything, countries with speech restrictions (France at 284%, Australia at 316%) saw larger surges than those without (the United States at 140%). There is no correlation between the strictness of domestic speech or protest regulation and the magnitude of the surge.

44. The J7 Task Force — comprising the ADL, CST, RIAS, B’nai Brith Canada, CRIF, DAIA, and ECAJ — published the first comprehensive cross-national comparison in May 2025, covering the seven largest Jewish diaspora communities. It found common trends across all seven countries: rises in violent incidents, targeting of Jewish institutions, escalation of online hate, and growing insecurity.[^23] The EU Fundamental Rights Agency’s longitudinal data confirms this is not a new phenomenon: every major escalation in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict since the Second Intifada has produced corresponding spikes in antisemitic incidents across all EU member states, regardless of their domestic regulatory settings. The FRA’s foundational 2004 report established that Middle East conflict events function as “trigger events” for antisemitic incidents in European countries — a finding replicated in every subsequent survey.[^24] The OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights reported the same pattern across 48 participating states in 2023, encompassing legal systems ranging from the First Amendment to authoritarian speech codes.[^25]

45. The academic literature is consistent. Feldman (2018), studying Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom for the Pears Institute for the Study of Antisemitism at Birkbeck, found that levels of recorded antisemitic incidents “fluctuated in step with developments in the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians” since 2011, with peaks during the 2012 and 2014 Gaza wars.[^26] The Kantor Center at Tel Aviv University reported that antisemitic incidents worldwide declined from the post-October 7 peak as the conflict receded from public consciousness but remained significantly elevated above baseline — establishing that incidents track the conflict’s salience, not changes in domestic law or protest regulation.[^27] Allington and Jikeli (2025), using ADL Global 100 data, found that European antisemitic attitude distributions remained relatively stable despite the incident surge, suggesting the conflict activates existing prejudice rather than creating new prejudice — meaning domestic regulation of speech or protest cannot address the underlying driver.[^28]

46. This global pattern suggests the primary driver of antisemitic incidents is the conflict itself, not domestic advocacy strategies. The variable that correlates with incident rates is the intensity of the Middle East conflict, not the domestic regulatory environment.

Finding sought [Inference]: On the basis of the simultaneous increases documented across all comparable democracies regardless of domestic regulatory framework, the Commission should find that the primary driver of the post-October 7 antisemitism surge was the armed conflict itself — a shared external variable — rather than any domestic factor that Australia could address through speech regulation or protest restrictions. (ToR 1)

47. Professor Eitan Hersh, a political scientist at Tufts University, studied the relationship between campus advocacy and antisemitism and found the narrative that campus protest drives antisemitism does not match the evidence.[^29] Australia’s explicit “far-left” percentage reporting is unusual internationally. Neither the UK Community Security Trust nor the US Anti-Defamation League produces “far-left” percentages—both categorise by incident type rather than perpetrator ideology.[^30] The Institute for Jewish Policy Research in the UK found that “levels of antisemitism among those on the left-wing of the political spectrum, including the far-left, are indistinguishable from those found in the general population,” while “the most antisemitic group on the political spectrum consists of those who identify as very right-wing.” Australia is producing a category of data that comparable organisations internationally have chosen not to produce, potentially because of the methodological difficulties involved in attributing ideological motivation to individual incidents.

48. The research literature on drivers of antisemitic incidents is consistent: armed conflict involving Israel is the strongest predictor of antisemitic spikes globally. The UK Community Security Trust’s longitudinal data since 1984 shows that every major escalation in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict—the First Intifada (1987), the Second Intifada (2000–2005), Operation Cast Lead (2008–2009), Operation Protective Edge (2014), the May 2021 Gaza conflict, and post-October 7—produced corresponding spikes in antisemitic incidents in Britain. The pattern repeats across every country that tracks this data. The ADL’s US data shows the same correlation. France’s Service de Protection de la Communauté Juive data shows the same correlation. The variable that predicts antisemitic incident rates is not domestic free speech policy, campus protest activity, or the regulatory environment. It is the intensity and visibility of the armed conflict itself.[^31]

49. This finding has direct implications for the Commission’s work. If war is the primary driver of antisemitic incidents, then policies that restrict political speech about the war will not address the underlying cause. Speech restrictions may suppress visible protest while leaving the hostility that generates incidents untouched—or, by creating a sense of grievance and suppression, may intensify it. The evidence suggests that the most effective way to reduce antisemitic incidents in Australia is to reduce the intensity of the conflict that generates them, and to invest in education that distinguishes between a foreign government’s policies and the Jewish community—the opposite of the conflation strategy currently being pursued.

Recommendation 4: The Commission should recommend the establishment of an independent government mechanism for collecting, verifying, and publishing antisemitism data, consistent with arrangements in the United Kingdom, United States, Germany, and France.

Recommendation 5: The Commission should examine the methodology used by ECAJ and JCCV to categorise incidents by perpetrator ideology, including inter-rater reliability, quality control procedures, and the basis for distinguishing ideological from situational motivation.

Section 3: The Lawfare Pattern

Terms of Reference 1 (drivers) and 4 (social cohesion)

50. Term of Reference 4 requires the Commission to examine threats to “social cohesion.” Social cohesion requires trust—trust in institutions, trust in the legal system, and trust that the law applies equally. When a pattern of legal proceedings systematically targets one side of a political debate, and when those proceedings consistently fail on their merits, the legal system itself becomes a weapon. The cost of defending against formal proceedings—in money, reputation, and emotional toll—deters future speech regardless of outcome. This section examines whether the pattern of litigation since October 2023 constitutes a coordinated deterrent strategy, and whether the Commission should consider its impact on social cohesion.

3.1 The Court Record

51. Since October 2023, nine significant legal proceedings have been brought concerning the boundary between criticism of Israel and antisemitism under Australian law. The outcomes form a consistent pattern. In the two cases where applicants succeeded on the merits — Wertheim v Haddad and Vorchheimer v Tayeh — the courts explicitly held that criticism of Zionism is not inherently antisemitic, while finding that the specific conduct in context crossed the line. In the remaining cases, the courts either rejected the core proposition that criticism of Israel constitutes antisemitism under Australian law, or the claims were withdrawn, dismissed, or settled with acknowledgments that the targets were not antisemitic. This pattern warrants examination by the Commission.

52. Wertheim v Haddad [2025] FCA 720. The Executive Council of Australian Jewry pursued Wissam Haddad under section 18C of the Racial Discrimination Act. The Federal Court found Haddad’s characterisation of Jews as “descendants of pigs and monkeys” constituted unlawful vilification. However, Justice Stewart drew a distinction that became binding precedent:

“Disparagement of Zionism constitutes disparagement of a philosophy or ideology and not a race or ethnic group.”[^8]

53. While the court found three of Haddad’s five speeches constituted unlawful racial vilification — vindicating ECAJ’s core claim — the judgment also established, through detailed analysis of the remaining speeches, that criticism of Zionism and political criticism of Israel are not racial vilification under Australian law. The distinction was not abstract. Justice Stewart applied it concretely to Speech B, the “Murdered by Israel” Friday sermon delivered to 300–400 congregants on 10 November 2023. Unlike the “Jews of Al Madina” lecture series, Speech B directed its criticism at “Israel, the IDF and Zionists” rather than at Jews as a people. Justice Stewart held at [107]:

“The ordinary, reasonable listener would understand that not all Jews are Zionists or support the actions of Israel in Gaza and that disparagement of Zionism constitutes disparagement of a philosophy or ideology and not a race or ethnic group. Needless to say, political criticism of Israel, however inflammatory or adversarial, is not by its nature criticism of Jews in general or based on Jewish racial or ethnic identity.”[^59]

53A. The significance of this finding is reinforced by what the applicants themselves conceded. ECAJ’s legal team — led by P S Braham SC — did not submit that political criticism of Israel constitutes racial vilification. Justice Stewart recorded: “Indeed, the applicants did not submit that it is.”[^59] This is the peak representative body of the Australian Jewish community, through Senior Counsel, accepting in Federal Court proceedings that criticism of Israel — however inflammatory — is not antisemitic. That concession should inform the Commission’s assessment of proposals that would treat such criticism as a basis for regulatory intervention.

Finding sought [Direct]: The Commission should find that in Wertheim v Haddad [2025] FCA 720, the Federal Court held that “disparagement of Zionism constitutes disparagement of a philosophy or ideology and not a race or ethnic group” and that “political criticism of Israel, however inflammatory or adversarial, is not by its nature criticism of Jews in general or based on Jewish racial or ethnic identity.” (ToR 1, ToR 4)

Finding sought [Direct]: The Commission should find that ECAJ’s own legal team, led by P S Braham SC, did not submit that political criticism of Israel constitutes racial vilification — a concession recorded by the court at [107] in the words “Indeed, the applicants did not submit that it is.” (ToR 1, ToR 4)

Finding sought [Direct]: The Commission should find that the Federal Court’s analysis of Speech B — the “Murdered by Israel” sermon — found that criticism directed at “Israel, the IDF and Zionists” did not convey the pleaded antisemitic imputations, and that the corrective notice was edited to refer only to the three lectures found to contravene section 18C. (ToR 1, ToR 4)

54. The Wertheim proceedings revealed the depth of fear Haddad’s preaching generated. Five Jewish lay witnesses — identified only as “Retiree,” “Teacher,” “Senior Engineering Manager,” “Family Business,” and “Data Scientist” — were granted 20-year identity suppression orders under sections 37AF and 37AI of the Federal Court of Australia Act. Their names were withheld even from Haddad personally, disclosed only to his solicitor.[^32] This is not anecdotal fear. It is fear assessed by a Federal Court judge as meeting the statutory threshold for a two-decade suppression order. Their sworn evidence documented behavioural changes — removing mezuzot from doorposts, avoiding entire suburbs, concealing children’s Jewish identity on school forms, and unprecedented discussions about emigration. One witness stated: “If I were younger, I would consider leaving Australia unless things got better.”[^33] A teacher with 30 years of interfaith work described those relationships as damaged beyond recognition. The antisemitism documented in Wertheim is real, it is serious, and it caused measurable harm to Jewish Australians. The question is whether the institutional response to it — pursuing political critics rather than addressing enforcement failures — has made things better or worse.

Finding sought [Direct]: The Commission should find that five Jewish lay witnesses in Wertheim v Haddad were granted 20-year identity suppression orders, and that their sworn evidence documented behavioural changes including removing mezuzot from doorposts, avoiding suburbs, concealing children’s Jewish identity, and considering emigration — establishing that the antisemitism perpetrated by Haddad caused measurable harm to Jewish Australians. (ToR 1)

55. Haddad’s defence strategy is relevant to the Commission’s broader work. His legal team argued that his antisemitic speeches were constitutionally protected religious expression — that section 18C, applied to speech “sourced directly in Islamic religious texts,” violates both the implied freedom of political communication and section 116 of the Constitution (freedom of religion). This argument was formally notified to all Commonwealth and State Attorneys-General via a section 78B notice. The court rejected both limbs. The Reynolds expert evidence (see paragraph 14 above) was decisive: both the applicants’ and respondents’ own expert agreed that Islam does not require or permit the wholesale condemnation of Jews. Haddad’s late-emerging claim that his speeches targeted only “Jews of faith” rather than ethnic Jews was characterised by the applicants as a “recent invention” — it appeared in neither the Defence, nor his affidavit, nor opening submissions, and the speeches themselves never use the phrase.[^34]

56. Lattouf v Australian Broadcasting Corporation [2025] FCA 669. Journalist Antoinette Lattouf was dismissed from ABC Radio Sydney after reposting a Human Rights Watch report about starvation in Gaza. Evidence revealed a 156-member “Lawyers for Israel” WhatsApp group had orchestrated complaints. Robert Goot AO SC—the same Senior Counsel who appeared in Wertheim—fed intelligence from inside the ABC back to the group. He wrote: “I understand she will be gone from morning radio from Friday.” When asked in the group chat why Lattouf should be fired, Goot responded with a single word: “Israel.” Then-ABC chair Ita Buttrose, under pressure, emailed management: “Has Antoinette been replaced? I’m over getting emails about her. Why can’t she come down with flu or COVID or a stomach upset? We owe her nothing.” An internal ABC investigation found Lattouf had breached no policy. Senior executives nevertheless overruled that finding and conducted their own separate inquiry. The ABC’s managing director branded her social media as containing “antisemitic hatred” based on a personal Google search, without ever putting that allegation to her. Justice Darryl Rangiah found:

“The complaints were an orchestrated campaign by pro-Israel lobbyists to have Ms Lattouf taken off air.”

“The ABC let down the Australian public badly when it abjectly surrendered the rights of its employee Ms Lattouf to appease a lobby group.”

“It did so for spurious reasons and without giving Ms Lattouf the opportunity to defend herself.”

57. Lattouf offered to settle for $85,000. The ABC refused. Final cost to taxpayers: $2.62 million, including over $1.1 million in legal costs alone. Nine lawyers were granted suppression orders concealing their identities for ten years.[^35] Employees are now expressly protected under the common law when sharing material critical of Israel—the opposite of the intended outcome.

Finding sought [Direct]: The Commission should find that the Federal Court in Lattouf v ABC found that a 156-member “Lawyers for Israel” WhatsApp group orchestrated complaints leading to Lattouf’s dismissal; that Robert Goot AO SC — the same Senior Counsel who appeared in Wertheim — fed intelligence from inside the ABC to the group; that the ABC’s internal investigation found no policy breach; and that senior executives overruled that finding. (ToR 4)

Finding sought [Direct]: The Commission should find that Lattouf was dismissed for sharing a Human Rights Watch report about starvation in Gaza; that she offered to settle for $85,000; that the ABC refused; and that the final cost to taxpayers was $2.62 million. (ToR 4)

58. The personal toll on Lattouf is documented in the judgment. Justice Rangiah found that she experienced “shock and humiliation” immediately after her termination, which was publicised by The Australian before she had even returned home. Over the following weeks she experienced “notable dips in her mood,” became “increasingly anxious,” and found herself “crying frequently throughout the day.” She experienced “feelings of paranoia” which caused her to “feel unsafe.” She had trouble sleeping, suffered three panic attacks, began drinking alcohol more frequently, and started taking sedatives. Her personal relationships were adversely affected. She received death threats and was forced to hire personal security. Her talent agent told her she had been rendered unemployable — “no other outlet has gone near me in the past year or so.” Dr Nigel Strauss, a consultant psychiatrist, diagnosed an exacerbation of her underlying persistent depressive disorder with high levels of anxiety, describing her as “a very vulnerable person at the time she was let go from the ABC.” Justice Rangiah, observing Lattouf in the witness box, found it “apparent… that the termination of her employment and the circumstances in which it occurred caused her great distress and continues to do so.” The Court awarded $70,000 in compensation for non-economic loss and subsequently ordered $150,000 in pecuniary penalties against the ABC. Lattouf had shared a Human Rights Watch report.[^36]

59. The institutional consequences were severe. The ABC’s managing director resigned. Its chief content officer resigned. The MEAA membership passed a vote of no confidence in ABC management. The new managing director publicly acknowledged that “any undue influence or pressure on ABC management of its employee must always be guarded against.” The ABC’s credibility as an independent institution — a matter going to the democratic infrastructure of the country — was damaged by the very organisations that now ask this Commission to recommend expanded institutional protections for their interests.

60. Lees v State of NSW [2025] NSWSC 1209. The Crimes Amendment (Places of Worship) Act was enacted after a protest near the Great Synagogue. Justice Anna Mitchelmore struck the legislation down:

“Protest inherently involves disruption—noise, assembly, and mobilising public awareness—and this is constitutionally protected.”

“[The law] impermissibly burdens the implied constitutional freedom of communication on government or political matters and is invalid.”[^37]

Finding sought [Direct]: The Commission should find that the Crimes Amendment (Places of Worship) Act 2025 (NSW) was struck down as unconstitutional in Lees v State of NSW, and that Justice Mitchelmore found the legislation “impermissibly burdens the implied constitutional freedom of communication on government or political matters.” (ToR 4, ToR 2)

61. Shurat HaDin v Lynch. An Israeli law centre sought to outlaw the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions movement at the University of Sydney. The case was dismissed. Costs were awarded against Shurat HaDin.

62. Parke v Rubenstein. AIJAC’s Colin Rubenstein called former Labor MP Melissa Parke an antisemite. Rubenstein settled by publicly acknowledging she was not antisemitic.

63. Cassuto v Kostakidis. Mary Kostakidis is one of Australia’s most recognised broadcast journalists, having presented SBS World News for nearly two decades. In January 2024, she reposted on X footage of a speech by the late Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah, adding commentary criticising Israel’s military campaign — every major international and Australian news outlet had reported on the same speech. In July 2024, ZFA chief executive Alon Cassuto lodged a complaint under section 18C of the Racial Discrimination Act with the Australian Human Rights Commission. Arnold Bloch Leibler acts as legal counsel for the ZFA in the matter. After AHRC mediation failed, the ZFA filed in the Federal Court in March 2025 on the last possible filing day. By October 2025, the amended claim encompassed 61 of Kostakidis’s tweets and retweets spanning October 2023 to March 2025 — not “two retweets” as originally framed. Kostakidis issued a public statement condemning antisemitism and apologising for any misconstrual. In July 2025, Justice Stephen McDonald declined to dismiss the case entirely but struck certain paragraphs from the ZFA’s complaint. PEN International has issued a statement in Kostakidis’s support. The “Stand with Mary” campaign has attracted endorsements from journalists, politicians, legal professionals, and public figures internationally. Kostakidis is now 18 months into Federal Court proceedings for having done, on her personal social media account, what every newsroom in the country did on its professional platforms: reported on a speech by a party to an armed conflict. The proceedings rely on legal theories the Federal Court has already rejected in Wertheim.

64. Toltz v Riemer (NSD950/2025) and Toltz v Keane (NSD951/2025). These companion proceedings, filed on 13 June 2025 and heard by Justice Kennett, represent the converse of the Kostakidis pattern. Four Jewish and Israeli staff and students at the University of Sydney — Dr Joseph Toltz, Professor Emeritus Suzanne Rutland OAM, Ariel Eisner, and Yaniv Levy — sued two academics and the University itself under section 18C. Dr Nick Riemer, Senior Lecturer in Linguistics, former NTEU President and Head of Sydney Staff for BDS, is alleged to have committed 14 impugned acts — X posts, reposts, speeches, and an academic article — including the statement that “there is no room for Zionism in our unions” and a repost calling Zionists “racists” with the hashtag #ZionistFragility. Professor John Keane, Professor of Politics and BDS proponent, is alleged to have posted Hamas flags on X the day after the October 7 attack and to have publicly named 17 mostly Jewish and Israeli academics in a post describing their correspondence as “self-righteous indignation of people convinced they are victims of non-humans (Palestinians) who imperil their Promised Land.” That post remained online for over six months despite immediate complaints, and is alleged to have caused Dr Loren Mowszowski to resign and Associate Professor Andy Smidt to leave the University.

65. The central legal proposition in the Toltz proceedings is that “references to Zionists are, properly understood, to be a reference to (at least) a majority of Jewish people and Israeli people in Australia” (ASOC paragraph 87a). The applicants rely on survey evidence that 77% of Australian Jews identify as Zionist. The respondents rely on Wertheim. Justice Kennett delivered interlocutory rulings on 14 November 2025: he struck out several paragraphs — including the cumulative assessment framework and certain historical context — but the core claims survived and the respondents’ applications were “otherwise dismissed.” Defences are due in March 2026.

66. The proceedings are significant for what they reveal about both sides of the section 18C equation. A SafeWork investigation found that the University of Sydney “prioritised free speech over psychosocial health and safety of its workers and students” and that “Jewish workers and students experienced antisemitism daily, creating a workplace of fear, anxiousness and a fear of retribution.” Vice Chancellor Mark Scott publicly admitted “failing” Jewish students. The Hodgkinson Report (November 2024) acknowledged antisemitism at the University. These findings demonstrate real institutional failure. At the same time, the University’s own affidavit adduced evidence from 52 Jewish university staff and alumni who signed an open letter in Overland on 29 May 2025 stating: “We repudiate the attempt by those making the complaint to conflate Zionism, a political ideology with Jewish and non-Jewish adherents, with Jewish identity. This implicates Jews all over the world in the Israeli Government’s current actions.” The Jewish Council of Australia, Tzedek Collective, Jewish Voices of Inner Sydney, and Jews Against the Occupation ’48 each filed submissions opposing the characterisation of anti-Zionist speech as racial vilification. The case demonstrates that section 18C is being deployed on both sides of the Israel/Palestine debate — and that the Jewish community itself is divided on whether the conflation of Zionism with Jewish identity protects or endangers Jewish Australians.

67. The University of Sydney’s litigation position warrants specific attention. In February 2025, the University endorsed the Universities Australia definition of antisemitism, which states: “For most, but not all Jewish Australians, Zionism is a core part of their Jewish identity. Substituting the word ‘Zionist’ for ‘Jew’ does not eliminate the possibility of speech being antisemitic.” Yet in court, the University argued that the reaction of most Jewish Australians to anti-Zionist conduct should be treated as potentially “irrational” and that anti-Zionist speech cannot constitute racial discrimination. This contradiction — endorsing a definition that acknowledges the link between Zionism and Jewish identity while simultaneously arguing in court that the link has no legal significance — illustrates the institutional incoherence the Commission must navigate.

67A. Vorchheimer v Tayeh [2026] VCAT 134. On 26 February 2026, Vice President Judge Tran found that Hasheam Tayeh contravened ss 7 and 8 of the Racial and Religious Tolerance Act 2001 (Vic) by initiating a chant of “All Zionists are terrorists” at a pro-Palestinian rally on 23 March 2025. This is the first post-October 7 vilification proceeding in which the applicant succeeded on the merits. The decision warrants close attention.

67B. Judge Tran’s reasoning rested on the Victorian Act’s incitement standard — whether conduct is likely to incite hatred, serious contempt, revulsion or severe ridicule in the audience — which differs from the s 18C standard applied in Wertheim (whether conduct is reasonably likely to offend, insult, humiliate or intimidate the target). On the definitional question, Tran’s finding was consistent with Wertheim: “Zionist does not mean Jew. Not all Jewish people are Zionists.” However, Tran found a “very strong association between Zionists and Jewish people in the minds of ordinary rally participants” — etymological, semantic, historical, and statistical — and that the word “all” added de-individuation, “a hallmark of racism,” counteracting any ambiguity. The rally context included explicitly antisemitic elements: witnesses gave uncontested evidence of abuse including “Dirty Jew,” “Fuck the Jews,” and “Do you want this money, Jew”; placards included a Star of David in a rubbish bin, “Death to the Zionist regime,” Holocaust inversions, and inverted red triangles (a Hamas symbol); and an attendee wore a t-shirt reading “Bash Zionists.” Two voices added to the chant “Zionists rape children.” Tran found that disclaimers of antisemitism and expressions of love for “Jewish brothers and sisters” were not sufficient to negate incitement, citing the Court of Appeal’s warning in Catch the Fire Ministries that “words inciting hatred… have often been accompanied by expressions of real or assumed concern about the persons against [whom] hatred… is incited.” The s 11 public interest defence failed because the chant was directed at all supporters of Israel’s existence as a Jewish state, not merely at the current regime’s post-October 7 actions as Tayeh claimed.[^130]

67C. The decision is significant in three respects. First, it establishes that the manner and context of expression can transform political criticism into racial and religious vilification — even where the words used are not, in the abstract, racial or religious terms. This is a contextual analysis, consistent with the Commissioner’s insistence on “overall context.” Second, it demonstrates that the Victorian incitement standard can reach conduct that the federal s 18C standard might not — the two statutes ask different questions and can produce different results on similar facts. Third, the evidentiary record of antisemitic conduct at pro-Palestinian rallies — uncontested witness evidence of direct antisemitic abuse alongside political protest — is directly relevant to the Commission’s work under Term of Reference 1. The Commission should consider this evidence when assessing the relationship between protest activity and antisemitic incidents.

67D. Critically, however, Vorchheimer does not establish that the word “Zionist” is synonymous with “Jew” or that criticism of Zionism is inherently antisemitic. Tran expressly rejected that proposition: “Zionist does not mean Jew.” What the decision establishes is that a chant labelling “All Zionists” as terrorists, in a rally context saturated with antisemitic elements, crossed the line from political criticism to incitement of racial and religious hatred. A different formulation — criticism of Zionism as a political ideology, without the absolutist “all” and the dehumanising “terrorists,” in a context without antisemitic accompaniment — would not necessarily produce the same result. The analytical distinction drawn in Wertheim — between disparagement of Zionism as a philosophy and disparagement of a race — survives Vorchheimer. What Vorchheimer adds is that context, manner, and audience matter, and that the line between political criticism and racial vilification is not always where advocates on either side would place it.

Finding sought [Direct]: The Commission should find that in Vorchheimer v Tayeh [2026] VCAT 134, the chant “All Zionists are terrorists” in a rally context that included explicitly antisemitic elements was found to contravene ss 7 and 8 of the Racial and Religious Tolerance Act 2001 (Vic); that Judge Tran expressly held “Zionist does not mean Jew”; and that the decision establishes that manner, context, and audience can transform political criticism into racial and religious vilification. (ToR 1, ToR 4)

Finding sought [Direct]: The Commission should find that the evidentiary record in Vorchheimer included uncontested evidence of antisemitic conduct at pro-Palestinian rallies — abuse including “Dirty Jew,” “Fuck the Jews,” and “Do you want this money, Jew”; placards including a Star of David in a rubbish bin; and additions to the chant of “Zionists rape children.” This evidence is relevant to the Commission’s assessment under Term of Reference 1 of the relationship between protest activity and antisemitic incidents. (ToR 1, ToR 4)

68. Nine cases. The court record is not monolithic. Wertheim succeeded in establishing that Haddad’s speeches constituted unlawful racial vilification — while explicitly holding that criticism of Zionism is not racial vilification. Vorchheimer succeeded in establishing that the chant “All Zionists are terrorists,” in its specific rally context, constituted racial and religious vilification under the Victorian Act — while explicitly holding that “Zionist does not mean Jew.” The remaining cases either rejected the proposition that criticism of Israel constitutes antisemitism, or were withdrawn, dismissed, or settled with acknowledgments that the targets were not antisemitic. No case has established the core proposition that criticism of Israel, as such, constitutes antisemitism under Australian law. The same small group of lawyers and organisations appears across the cases. Robert Goot AO SC appears in two. Arnold Bloch Leibler — whose senior partner Mark Leibler AC is National Chairman of AIJAC — is instructed in another. The pattern of overlapping legal representation warrants examination.

Finding sought [Direct]: The Commission should find that of nine significant legal proceedings since October 2023 concerning the boundary between criticism of Israel and antisemitism, no case has established the core proposition that criticism of Israel, as such, constitutes antisemitism under Australian law. (ToR 1, ToR 4)

Finding sought [Direct]: The Commission should find that a small group of overlapping lawyers and organisations appears across the cases — Robert Goot AO SC in at least two proceedings and Arnold Bloch Leibler instructed in another — and that this pattern of overlapping legal representation warrants examination. (ToR 4)

3.2 The Conflation Problem

69. This Commission adopts the IHRA Working Definition of Antisemitism as its reference framework, as directed by the Letters Patent. This submission does not challenge the Commission’s use of the definition as an analytical tool. The concern is different: whether the IHRA definition should be recommended for adoption as a legal or regulatory instrument — used to ground complaints, prosecutions, or institutional sanctions — given the evidence that such downstream application conflates political criticism with racial hatred. The distinction matters. A reference framework guides inquiry. A legal instrument constrains conduct. The evidence below addresses the latter.

70. Of the IHRA definition’s 11 illustrative examples, seven relate to Israel. Kenneth Stern, the lead drafter of the original 2004–2005 text that IHRA adopted, has become one of its strongest critics. In September 2024 Senate testimony, he stated:

“[The definition] was never intended to target or chill speech on a college campus” and “many pro-Israel Jewish groups eventually weaponised the definition to suppress student speech.”[^9]

71. Stern’s critique is not isolated. It is supported by the most detailed technical analyses available. Peter Ullrich, in an expert opinion commissioned by medico international and the Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung (2019), produced the most comprehensive assessment of the definition’s drafting quality, concluding it is “inconsistent, contradictory and formulated very vaguely” and “does not satisfy the requirements of a good definition.” Rebecca Ruth Gould, in Law, Culture and the Humanities (2022) — the first extended scholarly treatment — demonstrated how the definition reaches beyond its “non-legally binding” status to function as “quasi-law,” exercising de facto legal authority without legal legitimacy.[^38] Deckers and Coulter, in Res Publica (Springer, 2022), published the first comprehensive philosophical analysis, concluding the definition should be rejected due to intrinsic definitional problems, political instrumentalisation, and suppression of free speech.[^39]

72. The legal position is equally clear. Hugh Tomlinson QC of Matrix Chambers (2017) found the definition has “no legal status” and that a public authority applying it to prohibit criticism of Israel would be acting “unlawfully.” Geoffrey Robertson QC (2017) found the definition “does not cover the most insidious forms of hostility to Jewish people” and that “the looseness of the definition is liable to chill legitimate criticisms of the state of Israel.”[^40] Two UN Special Rapporteurs have weighed in: E. Tendayi Achiume, Special Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Racism (2022), warned the definition is “wielded to prevent or chill legitimate criticisms of the State of Israel” and recommended member states “suspend adoption and promotion” of it; Farida Shaheed, Special Rapporteur on the Right to Education (2024), reported that approximately 120 UK universities adopted the definition, “which conflates criticisms of Israel with antisemitism, to silence lawful speech supportive of Palestinian human rights.”[^41]

73. The first empirical study of the definition’s impact in universities — conducted by the British Society for Middle Eastern Studies and the European Legal Support Center (2023) — analysed 40 cases in UK universities between 2017 and 2022 where staff and students were accused of antisemitism based on the IHRA definition. In all instances except two ongoing cases, the accusations were dismissed. The study found the definition creates “a chilling effect among staff and students, deterring individuals from speaking about or organising events that discuss Palestine,” with academics on temporary contracts and students “particularly susceptible to self-censorship.”[^6] The American Association of University Professors has separately warned that IHRA-based legislation creates “a state-imposed orthodoxy” violating academic freedom principles.

74. Over 128 leading scholars in antisemitism and Jewish studies have criticised the definition. Over 104 human rights organisations—including Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch—urged the United Nations not to adopt it.

75. Within the Australian Jewish community, dissent from the conflation of anti-Zionism with antisemitism is significant. The Jewish Council of Australia—over 1,000 members—has argued that “recommending the adoption of politicised definitions of antisemitism aims at silencing political speech.”[^42] Dr Larry Stillman of the Australian Jewish Democratic Society has published detailed critiques, arguing ECAJ reports conflate “political hurt over Israel” with “deep hurt or intimidation on the basis of ethnicity.” He notes reports list protest banners saying “From the River to the Sea” alongside neo-Nazi material without distinguishing between them: “I don’t like the slogan ‘From the River to the Sea’… But it is politically directed, it is not necessarily motivated by racism.”

76. Nine Jewish organisations—including the Jewish Council of Australia and the Australian Jewish Democratic Society—released an open letter calling for rejection of the Segal Report and the IHRA definition approach. The letter was supported by twenty civil society organisations including Amnesty International Australia and the Human Rights Law Centre. A significant minority of Australian Jews do not identify as Zionist. These are not fringe positions.[^43] They represent a substantial minority within the community who believe conflating criticism of Israel with antisemitism undermines the fight against genuine hatred.

77. The structural problem is this: insisting that Israel represents all Jews ensures that when Israel is condemned, Jews everywhere are blamed. The conflation does not protect Jewish Australians. It exposes them. This is not a theoretical concern — it is the explicit finding of multiple expert bodies. The NZ Royal Commission found that community organisations’ insistence on conflating Jewish identity with a foreign state’s policies “may inadvertently contribute to the very antisemitism they seek to combat” by reinforcing the association between diaspora Jews and the actions of the Israeli government (see Section 5B below).[^44] Professor David Feldman, director of the Pears Institute for the Study of Antisemitism at Birkbeck, University of London, concluded that the IHRA definition’s “chilling effect on free expression” was “not a hypothetical” but a documented institutional reality across universities, local government, and cultural organisations in the United Kingdom.[^45] Kenneth Stern, the lead drafter of the IHRA Working Definition itself, testified before the US Congress in 2017 that the definition was being “weaponised” in ways he never intended — used to suppress campus speech rather than to identify genuine hatred. He described its use in university policy as “an attack on academic freedom” and warned that “the way the definition is being wielded actually increases antisemitism.”[^46]

78. The mechanism operates in three ways. First, it inflates the data. When ECAJ classifies “Free Palestine” banners, BDS stickers, and political slogans alongside neo-Nazi graffiti and physical assaults, the resulting statistics overstate the prevalence of racial hatred while understating the prevalence of political dissent. This is not speculation — Dr Larry Stillman’s analysis of ECAJ reporting methodology found that reports conflate “political hurt over Israel” with “deep hurt or intimidation on the basis of ethnicity,” and that protest banners are listed alongside neo-Nazi material “without distinguishing between them.” HAZAK’s submission to the NSW slogans inquiry proposed a “rebuttable presumption” that the word “Zionist” means “Jew” — a definitional move that would reclassify virtually all political criticism of the Zionist project as racial hatred by default (see paragraph 104 above). When the data foundation is constructed this broadly, every policy recommendation built upon it is compromised.

79. Second, it misdirects institutional resources. The 47 cases documented in Section 3.3 below demonstrate a pattern of formal proceedings — complaints, dismissals, suspensions, prosecutions — overwhelmingly directed at political speech and overwhelmingly unsuccessful on the merits. Each case consumes institutional time, legal resources, and regulatory bandwidth. The ABC spent over $2.62 million defending its unlawful dismissal of Antoinette Lattouf for sharing a Human Rights Watch report. The ARC suspended Dr Randa Abdel-Fattah’s $870,000 research fellowship for 10 months before clearing her of all allegations. AHPRA processed 209 notifications against 101 health practitioners — none resulting in deregistration. During this same period, ASIO was tracking an actual Iranian state-sponsored terrorism campaign that culminated in the Bondi attack. The institutional energy directed at suppressing political speech was not available for addressing the threats that materialised.

80. Third, and most consequentially, it degrades the diagnostic power of the term itself. Antisemitism is real, dangerous, and requires precise identification to combat effectively. When the same label is applied to a neo-Nazi daubing swastikas on a synagogue, a university student chanting a political slogan, a journalist sharing a Human Rights Watch report, and a doctor using the word “genocide” on a personal social media post, the term ceases to function as a diagnostic category. It becomes a political instrument. The consequence is not that antisemitism is taken more seriously — it is that genuine antisemitism becomes harder to identify, harder to prioritise, and harder to address. Justice Stewart’s distinction in Wertheim — that “political criticism of Israel, however inflammatory or adversarial, is not by its nature criticism of Jews in general” — is not a concession to antisemitism. It is the analytical precision required to combat antisemitism effectively.[^47]

3.3 The 47 Cases of Counter-Targeting

81. If the Commission is to assess threats to social cohesion, it must examine the experience of people who have been targeted for political speech. The following cases are documented through court proceedings, industrial tribunal decisions, regulatory records, and published reporting. They establish a pattern: individuals who express support for Palestinian rights or criticise Israeli government policy face formal complaints, employment consequences, and legal proceedings—overwhelmingly unsuccessful on the merits but devastating in their personal and professional impact. The Commission should consider whether this pattern constitutes a chilling effect on political speech, and whether that chilling effect itself undermines the social cohesion it is tasked with protecting.

82. Since October 2023, at least 47 documented cases have emerged of journalists, academics, politicians, activists, and public figures facing accusations—from social media campaigns to Federal Court proceedings—for pro-Palestinian speech.

83. The Australian Health Practitioner Regulation Agency received 209 notifications against 101 practitioners—many targeting women with Middle Eastern names for using the word “genocide.” No doctors were deregistered.[^48] The individual cases follow a consistent pattern: expulsion or suspension followed by reinstatement; dismissal for sharing material from established human rights organisations; formal complaints that collapse on the merits.[^49] Over 50 Jewish university staff and alumni signed an open letter defending academics facing Section 18C complaints, stating: “These complainants do not speak for us as Jewish people.”

Finding sought [Direct]: The Commission should find, on the basis of the cases documented in Section 3.3 of this submission — drawn from court proceedings (Lattouf v ABC, Cassuto v Kostakidis, Toltz v Riemer), regulatory records (AHPRA notifications), and published reporting — that at least 47 documented cases since October 2023 involve individuals facing formal complaints, employment consequences, or legal proceedings for pro-Palestinian speech, and that these cases overwhelmingly failed on their merits or were resolved in the target’s favour. (ToR 4)

Finding sought [Direct]: The Commission should find that AHPRA received 209 notifications against 101 health practitioners — many targeting women with Middle Eastern names for using the word “genocide” — and that no practitioners were deregistered. (ToR 4)

84. Hash Tayeh, a Palestinian-Australian businessman and founder of the Burgertory restaurant chain, faces both criminal prosecution and a civil vilification finding. He was charged with “using insulting words in public” for chanting “all Zionists are terrorists” at Melbourne protests — one of the first criminal prosecutions of political speech at a protest about the Israel-Palestine conflict under Victoria’s public order laws. On 26 February 2026, Vice President Judge Tran in Vorchheimer v Tayeh [2026] VCAT 134 found that the same conduct contravened ss 7 and 8 of the Racial and Religious Tolerance Act 2001 (Vic) (see paragraphs 67A–67D above). Notably, Tayeh’s Burgertory restaurant was firebombed in November 2023, and his family home was attacked in April 2024. Those attacks remain unsolved. The juxtaposition warrants consideration: a man whose business and home were attacked faces both criminal prosecution and a civil vilification finding for his speech at protests, while the perpetrators of the physical attacks on him have not been identified.

85. Dr Randa Abdel-Fattah warrants specific examination. A sociologist at Macquarie University and award-winning children’s author, Abdel-Fattah held an $870,000 ARC Future Fellowship for research into the hidden history of Arab and Muslim Australian social movements. Following media reporting and political pressure from both the Coalition and the Albanese government — Education Minister Jason Clare wrote to the ARC directing it to investigate “as a matter of priority” — the ARC suspended her grant in February 2025. Over 7,500 people signed a petition demanding the minister retract his directive. More than 700 academics, including over 50 from Macquarie University, signed an open letter condemning the intervention. In December 2025, after a 10-month investigation, Abdel-Fattah was cleared of all allegations and her fellowship was reinstated. For 10 months, an academic was suspended from her research and employment for conduct that, upon rigorous investigation, disclosed no breach. The political demand to investigate had been made in an environment in which her pro-Palestinian advocacy was the animating grievance.

Finding sought [Direct]: The Commission should find that Dr Randa Abdel-Fattah’s $870,000 ARC Future Fellowship was suspended for 10 months following political pressure from the Education Minister, and that after investigation she was cleared of all allegations and reinstated. The suspension was initiated in an environment in which her pro-Palestinian advocacy was the animating grievance. (ToR 4)

86. The gendered dimension of this pattern warrants specific examination. Of the most prominent cases, a disproportionate number target women: Antoinette Lattouf, a journalist fired for sharing a Human Rights Watch report; Dr Randa Abdel-Fattah, an academic whose $870,000 research fellowship was suspended for 10 months before she was cleared of all allegations; Beatrice Tucker, a postgraduate student expelled then reinstated; Grace Tame, the former Australian of the Year facing public calls for prosecution after leading protest chants; Mary Kostakidis, a veteran journalist 18 months into Federal Court proceedings. The AHPRA complaint data reveals the pattern in aggregate: 209 notifications against 101 health practitioners, with complaints disproportionately targeting women with Middle Eastern names for using the word “genocide” in personal social media posts. No practitioners were deregistered.

Finding sought [Inference]: On the basis of the AHPRA notification data (209 notifications targeting practitioners including women with Middle Eastern names) and the individual cases documented in Section 3.1, the Commission should find that the pattern of complaints against pro-Palestinian speech disproportionately targets women — including Lattouf, Abdel-Fattah, Tucker, Tame, and Kostakidis — and that the AHPRA data confirms a gendered pattern in aggregate. (ToR 4)

87. The mechanism operates differently against women. Rita Nasr, writing in Women’s Agenda, identified the dynamic precisely: “Grace Tame is celebrated when she is the victim. She is punished when she is the activist.”[^50] Tame was made Australian of the Year for refusing to stay silent about sexual abuse. She was targeted for refusing to stay silent about Palestine. The defiance was identical. The subject changed. Women’s visible effort to speak—the physical strain of a woman refusing to whisper—is reframed as evidence of instability rather than conviction. The tone is policed rather than the argument addressed. This pattern is not unique to the Palestine context, but the Palestine context has provided a concentrated demonstration of it.

88. The complaints overwhelmingly fail on their merits. The process is the punishment[^51]—the cost of defending against formal complaints, the reputational damage of public accusations, the stress of years-long legal proceedings creates a chilling effect regardless of outcome. When a pattern of complaints by overlapping complainants produces consistent failure on the merits, the reasonable inference is that the process itself, not the outcome, is the mechanism. This pattern warrants examination by the Commission as a potential coordinated deterrent strategy.

Finding sought [Inference]: On the basis of the nine proceedings analysed in Section 3 and the 47 targeting cases documented in Section 3.1, the Commission should find that when a pattern of formal proceedings by overlapping complainants produces consistent failure on the merits, the reasonable inference is that the process itself — the cost of defending, the reputational damage, the years of legal uncertainty — functions as the deterrent mechanism, regardless of outcome. This constitutes a chilling effect on political speech that is relevant to the Commission’s assessment of social cohesion. (ToR 4)

Recommendation 6: The Commission should examine whether the pattern of complaints against pro-Palestinian speech—overwhelmingly unsuccessful on their merits, disproportionately targeting women, and involving overlapping complainants and legal representatives—indicates a coordinated deterrent strategy.

Recommendation 7: The Commission should not recommend adoption of the IHRA Working Definition as a legal or regulatory tool — that is, as a basis for complaints, prosecutions, employment sanctions, or institutional codes of conduct. The definition’s use as a reference framework for this Commission’s own inquiry is a separate matter. Its application as a legally operative instrument is opposed by its lead drafter, 128 scholars, 104 human rights organisations, and multiple Australian Jewish organisations.

Recommendation 8: The Commission should examine the role of lobby groups—including ECAJ, AIJAC, and the Zionist Federation of Australia—in influencing institutional decision-making through coordinated complaint campaigns, legal proceedings, and political pressure, and whether these tactics have contributed to social cohesion or undermined it.

Section 3A: The Constitutional Framework

Terms of Reference 2 (law enforcement) and 4 (social cohesion)

89. The court record examined in Section 3 does not exist in a constitutional vacuum. The judgments in Wertheim v Haddad, Lees v State of NSW, and Kvelde v State of NSW rest on a body of High Court jurisprudence — the implied freedom of political communication and the structured proportionality framework for assessing legislative restrictions on that freedom — that Commissioner Virginia Bell AC SC herself helped to build during her twelve years on the High Court. This section examines that constitutional architecture and its application to the two most significant post-October 7 judicial decisions. The Commission’s recommendations on speech regulation, protest management, and institutional policy will be assessed against this framework. Understanding it is essential.

3A.1 The implied freedom and structured proportionality

90. The implied freedom of political communication is derived from the text and structure of the Constitution — in particular sections 7 and 24, which require that members of Parliament be “directly chosen by the people.” The freedom was first recognised in Nationwide News Pty Ltd v Wills (1992) and Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1992), and consolidated in the unanimous decision of Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation [1997] HCA 25, which established the governing two-limbed test: (1) does the law effectively burden freedom of communication about government or political matters in its terms, operation, or effect; and (2) if so, is the law reasonably appropriate and adapted to serve a legitimate end compatible with the maintenance of the constitutionally prescribed system of representative and responsible government?[^52]

91. The freedom is not a personal right of free speech. It is a structural limitation on legislative power — extending to both Commonwealth and state parliaments — that operates only so far as necessary to protect the principles of representative and responsible government. Whether a law imposes an unjustified burden depends on “its effect on political communication as a whole,” not on the circumstances of any individual claimant. This characterisation — insisted upon in every joint judgment Bell J co-authored — has significant consequences. It means that the burden inquiry is systemic: it asks what effect the law has on the overall capacity for political communication in the polity. It prevents the freedom from evolving into a general free speech guarantee while maintaining meaningful constitutional scrutiny of laws that restrict political discourse.[^53]

92. The analytical tool for assessing whether a law that burdens the freedom is constitutionally valid is structured proportionality, adopted by the plurality of French CJ, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ in McCloy v New South Wales [2015] HCA 34 and refined in Brown v Tasmania [2017] HCA 43. The framework asks three sub-questions: Is the law suitable — does it have a rational connection to its purpose? Is it necessary — is there no obvious and compelling alternative, reasonably practicable means of achieving the same purpose with a less restrictive effect on the freedom? Is it adequate in its balance — is the importance of the purpose not outweighed by the extent of the restriction? The plurality drew on proportionality frameworks from Germany, Canada, the United Kingdom, Israel, and the European Union, treating them as “a source of analytical tools” rather than wholesale transplants.[^54]

Finding sought [Direct]: The Commission should find that the structured proportionality framework for assessing legislative restrictions on political communication was established in McCloy v NSW (2015), refined in Brown v Tasmania (2017), and applied in Clubb v Edwards (2019), with Commissioner Bell AC SC as co-author of the plurality judgments throughout; and that this framework requires any restriction on political communication to be suitable, necessary, and adequate in balance. (ToR 2, ToR 4)

93. The development of this framework was not sudden. It emerged through a sequence of joint judgments co-authored by Bell J between 2013 and 2019. In Monis v The Queen [2013] HCA 4, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ applied what was recognisably a proportionality analysis without labelling it as such, examining rational connection, availability of less restrictive alternatives, and the extent of the burden relative to the purpose served. In Tajjour v New South Wales [2014] HCA 35, the same trio explicitly considered whether “strict proportionality” should form part of the Lange inquiry, observing that “the question whether a test of strict proportionality is useful and appropriate in the Australian constitutional context has not been debated” since Lange — a clear signal that the question would be taken up at the next opportunity. That opportunity was McCloy. The intellectual lineage from Monis through Tajjour to McCloy represents a deliberate programme of doctrinal development in which Bell J was a participant from the outset.[^55]

3A.2 Brown v Tasmania: the Commissioner’s own jurisprudence

94. Brown v Tasmania [2017] HCA 43 is the most directly relevant authority for the Commission’s work. The case concerned the Workplaces (Protection from Protesters) Act 2014 (Tas), which empowered police to direct protesters to leave “business premises,” including forestry land, under threat of criminal penalty. Former Greens leader Bob Brown and Jessica Hoyt challenged the legislation after being arrested during forest protests. The plurality of Kiefel CJ, Bell and Keane JJ struck it down — the first occasion on which a law was held invalid on the necessity limb of structured proportionality.[^56]

95. The plurality’s reasoning in Brown established principles that now govern the assessment of anti-protest legislation in Australia. On the burden question, the plurality held that the chilling effect of uncertain statutory boundaries was itself a relevant burden: “some lawful protests will be prevented or discontinued and protesters will be deterred from further protesting” even where “there is no basis in law for the direction” ([77]). On necessity, the existing Forest Management Act 2013 (Tas) already achieved the same legitimate purpose — preventing interference with forestry operations — with a less restrictive effect on political communication. The Protesters Act was therefore unnecessary: it achieved its deterrent effect “by the uncertainty which surrounds the areas within which the Act applies,” which went “far beyond” what was reasonably necessary ([146]). On adequacy in balance (addressed in obiter), the plurality noted the communicative significance of place: on-site protest at logging operations would “more successfully attract the attention of the public and of politicians” than protest at a distance ([117]). The manner and location of political communication are constitutionally relevant.[^57]

96. A feature of the Brown plurality that is directly applicable to the post-October 7 legislative response is its treatment of police discretion. The plurality rejected the argument that broad statutory powers would be saved by their “sensible exercise” by police officers. Nettle J, concurring, stated: “where the means adopted is a power which turns upon the exercise of a discretion which is, in its terms, broad ranging, it is the more likely that it will disproportionately burden the implied freedom even though it might be said, or hoped, that the ‘actual application may be limited by the sensible exercise’ of the discretion” ([293]). Constitutional validity cannot rest on the hope that officials will exercise overbroad powers with restraint. This principle — authored during Bell J’s tenure on the Court — has direct implications for protest regulation provisions that rely on police discretion to determine what constitutes permissible political communication.

97. Bell J did not, in any implied freedom case, write a separate concurring or dissenting judgment. Her contributions were made exclusively through joint judgments — first with Crennan and Kiefel JJ, then with Kiefel CJ and Keane J. Professor Jeremy Gans of Melbourne Law School described the Kiefel-Bell-Keane partnership as “the most powerful bloc of judges in the court’s history,” noting that the three justices agreed in 88 per cent of 116 cases in which they sat together. The consistency of the joint judgments across McCloy, Brown, Clubb v Edwards, Unions NSW v NSW, and Comcare v Banerji reflects a shared commitment to structured proportionality as the correct analytical tool — a commitment that Bell J helped to build from its earliest intimations in 2013 through to its consolidation as the governing framework by the time of her retirement in 2021.[^58]

3A.3 Wertheim v Haddad: the line between antisemitism and political criticism

98. Wertheim v Haddad [2025] FCA 720 is the first Australian judicial determination of the boundary between antisemitism and political criticism of Israel. Justice Stewart’s analysis establishes a framework for distinguishing between racial vilification and political speech that has direct implications for every aspect of the Commission’s work — data collection, institutional policy, definitional frameworks, and legislative proposals. The core holding — that “disparagement of Zionism constitutes disparagement of a philosophy or ideology and not a race or ethnic group” and that “political criticism of Israel, however inflammatory or adversarial, is not by its nature criticism of Jews in general or based on Jewish racial or ethnic identity” ([107]) — was derived from the statutory text of section 18C of the Racial Discrimination Act, supported by the Constitutional Court of South Africa’s decision in Masuku [2022] ZACC 5.[^59]

99. The principal international authority, Masuku, held that inflammatory political criticism of Israel and Zionism — even when expressed in language that was “intemperate and provocative” — did not constitute hate speech directed at Jews as a racial or ethnic group. Stewart J adopted that distinction, holding that the ordinary reasonable listener would understand “that not all Jews are Zionists or support the actions of Israel in Gaza” and that criticism directed at “Zionists” is criticism of adherents to a political ideology, not criticism of a race.[^60]

100. Stewart J’s framework operated through a tripartite classification. First, speech that attributes negative characteristics to Jews as a racial or ethnic group — without distinguishing between Zionists and non-Zionists — constitutes racial vilification. This was the finding in relation to Haddad’s “Jews of Al Madina” lectures: the “unavoidable premise” was “the commonality between Jews then and Jews now” — what Stewart J characterised as a “racist project about Jews” ([204]). Second, speech directed specifically at “Zionists,” “Israel,” or “the IDF” in the context of the Gaza conflict does not target Jews as a racial group. Haddad’s Friday sermon “Murdered by Israel” — which referred to “the terrorist state of Israel and its mass murdering machine, the IDF” — was found not to convey the pleaded imputations, because the ordinary reasonable listener would understand the references as directed at political actors, not Jews generally ([104]–[107]). Even the phrase “cleansed from the filth of the Zionists” was held to be a reference to the Israeli occupation, not to Jews as a people ([110]). Third, where speech blurs the boundary, the question is resolved contextually.[^61]

101. The symmetrical logic of the framework is important. At [107]: “The conclusion that it is not antisemitic to criticise Israel is the corollary of the conclusion that to blame Jews for the actions of Israel is antisemitic; the one flows from the other.” The two principles are mirror images: the same framework that prohibits collective attribution of Israel’s actions to Jews also prohibits treating criticism of Israel as criticism of Jews. Conflating the two — insisting that criticism of Israel is inherently antisemitic — logically requires accepting the converse: that Israel’s actions are attributable to Jews as a group. That converse proposition is itself antisemitic. The conflation strategy entails the very harm it purports to combat.[^62]

102. The judgment identifies specific indicators of when speech crosses from political criticism into racial vilification: attributing characteristics to “Jews” without distinguishing between Zionists and non-Zionists ([46]); explicitly equating Jews and Zionists ([45]: “in essence there is no difference”); deploying antisemitic tropes attributed to Jews as a group ([51]); calling on individual Jews to account for Israel’s actions solely because they are Jewish, which is “by its nature fundamentally antisemitic” ([261]). Conversely, even highly inflammatory political language — “terrorist state,” “mass murdering machine,” “filth of the Zionists” — directed at a state, its military, or adherents to a political ideology does not engage the Racial Discrimination Act. Any data collection methodology, institutional policy, or legislative proposal that fails to observe this distinction operates on a legal foundation the Federal Court has rejected.[^63]

Finding sought [Direct]: The Commission should find that Wertheim v Haddad identifies specific indicators of when speech crosses from political criticism into racial vilification — including attributing characteristics to “Jews” without distinguishing Zionists from non-Zionists, explicitly equating Jews and Zionists, and deploying antisemitic tropes attributed to Jews as a group — and that any data collection methodology, institutional policy, or legislative proposal that fails to observe this distinction operates on a legal foundation the Federal Court has rejected. (ToR 1, ToR 4)

103. Two further aspects warrant the Commission’s attention. First, the IHRA Working Definition played no role in Stewart J’s analysis — it was apparently not relied upon by either party. The court developed the distinction entirely from the statutory text of section 18C and from first principles. The existing legislative architecture is sufficient to draw the line without resort to external definitional frameworks.[^7] Second, Stewart J confirmed that “it is not speech about Gaza that is impugned. It is speech about Jews” ([239]). Part IIA of the RDA does not target political speech about Israel; it targets racial vilification. The implied freedom of political communication is not engaged. The section 116 freedom of religion argument was also rejected: Haddad’s speeches, having no basis in mainstream Islamic teaching, were “little more than bigoted polemic” ([244]).

104. The Commission should note, however, that Wertheim does not foreclose all claims that anti-Zionist speech may contravene section 18C. In Cassuto v Kostakidis [2025] FCA 1226, Justice McDonald observed at [39] that “Wertheim is not authority for the notion that a statement about Zionists cannot be a contravention of 18C to Jewish or Israeli people,” and at [44] that “[c]onduct which consists of speech about an ideology or political position, or which amounts to criticism of official action by a country, may contravene s18C.” At [41]–[42], his Honour noted that “a statement might both criticise Israel and be antisemitic in nature.” The law is not settled. The Wertheim framework draws a principled line, but the line is contextual — and the Toltz v Riemer and Toltz v Keane proceedings (paragraphs 135A–135D above) will test its application to anti-Zionist academic speech directed at specific Jewish and Israeli individuals. This is precisely the kind of fact-specific determination that the courts are equipped to make on a case-by-case basis, and that a legislative or definitional shortcut — such as embedding the IHRA definition in regulatory frameworks — would collapse.

3A.4 Lees v State of NSW: the constitutional limits of the post-October 7 response

105. Lees v State of NSW [2025] NSWSC 1209 is the most significant judicial assessment of the post-October 7 legislative response. Justice Mitchelmore applied the Brown v Tasmania framework — Bell J’s framework — to invalidate section 200(5) of LEPRA, inserted by the Places of Worship Amendment Act 2025. The provision created an exception allowing police to issue move-on directions to protests occurring “in or near a place of worship” without the usual requirement of serious risk to safety. It had never been used against anyone at the date of hearing.[^64] [^65]

106. Mitchelmore J accepted that the purpose — protecting persons attending places of worship — was “both legitimate and compelling” ([6]). The plaintiff conceded this. The challenge was directed at the legislative mechanism, not the purpose. The provision failed at both the necessity and adequacy in balance stages of structured proportionality.[^66]

107. On burden, Mitchelmore J found the provision effectively burdened the implied freedom. The activities targeted have “an inherently political content,” with protest described as “the oldest and most orthodox form of public expression of political dissent in a representative democracy” (Clubb, Gageler J at [164]). The evidence demonstrated locational overlap between protest venues and places of worship: Town Hall Square, Hyde Park North, and the area around the Great Synagogue all fell within the provision’s reach. As in Brown, the chilling effect extended beyond actual enforcement to the deterrent effect of uncertain application ([121]).[^67]

108. The provision failed at necessity. The State’s own companion provision — section 214B of the Crimes Act 1900 — demonstrated “an obvious and compelling alternative that is equally practicable and would impose a lesser burden on the implied freedom” ([156]). Section 214B created offences of blocking, impeding, harassing, or threatening persons accessing or leaving a place of worship. It was “squarely directed at the rights and interests of the persons whom the legislation was intended to protect, rather than relying on proximity to a place as a proxy” ([157]). Section 200(5) operated by reference to place alone: a protest near a place of worship satisfied the conditions “even if the protest or demonstration is not directed to the place of worship or to persons seeking to access or leave it” ([98]). The legislature’s own drafting demonstrated a less restrictive alternative.[^68]

109. The evidentiary record is significant. In 2023, NSW Police were involved in 909 public assemblies; the Commissioner sought a prohibition order in one case. In 2024, 970 assemblies; prohibition sought in two ([28]). Police already possessed and exercised powers under section 200(3) — the serious risk to safety exception — before section 200(5) was enacted ([132]). The two Great Synagogue incidents that prompted the legislation were both condemned by the Palestine Action Group itself ([30]). Protest organisers were policing their own movement’s conduct, and the existing legal framework was adequate to address genuine threats.

Finding sought [Direct]: The Commission should find that the Places of Worship Act was enacted despite its protection being unnecessary: NSW Police were involved in 909 public assemblies in 2023 and sought prohibition orders in one case; 970 assemblies in 2024 and sought prohibition orders in two; and existing police powers under section 200(3) were adequate to address genuine threats. (ToR 2)

110. On adequacy in balance, Mitchelmore J quoted the Brown plurality on the inadequacy of broad discretionary power, and Walton J’s observation from Kvelde that “the common law tradition is against the idea that freedom of political communication lies in the gift of the government” ([137]). Reliance on the good faith of individual police officers was constitutionally insufficient.

3A.4A Jarrett v State of NSW: the PARD scheme under constitutional challenge

110A. The constitutional vulnerability identified in Lees extends to the broader post-Bondi legislative response. In Jarrett & Ors v State of New South Wales (NSWCA 2026/44249), three plaintiffs — Gumbaynggir, Bundjalung and Dunghutti activist Elizabeth Jarrett, Palestine Action Group organiser Joshua Lees, and Jews Against the Occupation ’48 organiser Michelle Berkon — challenge the Public Assembly Restriction Declaration (PARD) scheme enacted by the Terrorism and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2025 (NSW). The scheme empowers the Police Commissioner to ban public assemblies for up to 90 days across the entire state following a terrorist act. The PARD issued on 24 December 2025 initially covered the three Metropolitan Police Regions — an area encompassing 5.2 million people, over 60% of the NSW population — and restricted all public assemblies, not merely those connected to the Bondi attack.[^131]

110B. The plaintiffs’ submissions establish a “direct, substantial and discriminatory” burden on political communication. The provisions operate by removing statutory protections that have been in place since 1979 — the recognised right to protest described at the time of their enactment as “one of the fundamental bastions of any true democracy.” The PARD does not require the Commissioner to demonstrate any connection between the assemblies restricted and the terrorist act. The State’s own submissions confirm this: “The express criteria for making a PARD are not themselves necessarily related to the terrorist act” (DS [76]). The result is that protests on entirely unrelated subjects — including “Invasion Day” protests, Venezuela, and Indigenous deaths in custody — were captured by the restriction. The plaintiffs observe that the PARD would even restrict protests calling for a Royal Commission into the Bondi attack itself.[^132]

110C. The State of New South Wales defends the legislation on “social cohesion” grounds: “social cohesion can be seen to be a precondition to the full participation in civic life” (DS [61]). This formulation directly parallels the Commission’s own terms of reference — and reveals the tension at the heart of the legislative response. The State’s position is that restricting political speech promotes social cohesion. The plaintiffs’ position — supported by decades of protest jurisprudence — is that suppressing political speech undermines the democratic fabric from which cohesion derives. The Commission should note that the Government’s own characterisation of the legislation’s purpose confirms that the PARD scheme targets political communication, not security threats.

110D. The UN Special Rapporteur on Counter-Terrorism and Human Rights, Professor Ben Saul, intervened as amicus curiae. His submissions are significant for their institutional authority. The Special Rapporteur found that the PARD “does not satisfy the requirements of necessity and proportionality under article 21 of the ICCPR” and constitutes a “blanket restriction on all protests” that is “presumptively disproportionate” under international law. The Special Rapporteur specifically addressed the standard under which the PARD was issued: the Commissioner’s criterion of a mere “risk to community safety” falls “short of the more demanding standard” required by article 21, which requires “a real and significant risk to the safety of persons (to life or security of person) or a similar risk of serious damage to property.” The Commissioner’s own public statement that the PARD was applied “not only to ensure community safety, but also to ensure the community feels safe” exceeds both statutory authority and international law.[^133]

110E. The PARD lapsed on 17 February 2026. The State argued the case was moot. Whether or not the Court decides the constitutional question, the submissions have evidentiary value for this Commission. The State’s submissions cite four ASIO assessments (February 2024, August 2024, February 2025, November 2025) documenting the “normalisation of violent protest” and the assessment that “spikes in political polarisation and intolerance, uncivil debate and unpeaceful protests” create “a security climate that is more permissive of violence, including terrorism” (DS [65]). This is the same conflation dynamic examined in Section 4: ASIO assessments that treat protest activity as a security threat, which in turn justify legislative responses that restrict the implied freedom of political communication.

Finding sought [Direct]: The Commission should find, on the basis of the court submissions filed in Jarrett & Ors v State of New South Wales (NSWCA 2026/44249), that (a) the PARD scheme enacted after Bondi covered 5.2 million people and restricted protests on subjects entirely unrelated to the terrorist attack; (b) the State of New South Wales defends the legislation on “social cohesion” grounds, confirming that the scheme targets political communication; (c) the UN Special Rapporteur on Counter-Terrorism found the PARD “presumptively disproportionate” and inconsistent with ICCPR Article 21; and (d) the PARD lapsed on 17 February 2026 without producing any evidence of improved community safety during its operation. (ToR 2, ToR 4)

3A.5 The Commissioner’s unique position

111. The connection between Lees and Commissioner Bell’s jurisprudence is direct. Mitchelmore J’s judgment relies extensively on the Kiefel CJ, Bell and Keane JJ plurality in Brown v Tasmania. The practical deterrent effect of vague provisions on lawful protest ([77]); the inadequacy of relying on good-faith police discretion ([78]–[79]); the requirement that less restrictive alternatives be genuinely considered ([138]–[146]) — all adopted by Mitchelmore J — are principles that Bell J authored or joined. Lees is an application of Bell J’s own constitutional framework to legislation enacted in response to the events this Commission is examining.[^69]

112. The durability of the structured proportionality framework after Bell J’s retirement in February 2021 remains an open question within the High Court. Gageler CJ has maintained his preference for calibrated scrutiny; Gordon J has applied the traditional Lange test; Steward J has questioned whether the implied freedom exists at all. The methodological division persists. But the framework has been applied by lower courts — including in Lees and Kvelde — as the governing law. Whatever the High Court’s future direction, the Commission’s recommendations will be assessed against the principles that Brown, Clubb, and McCloy established. Commissioner Bell is uniquely placed — not merely as an expert in constitutional law, but as one of the architects of the framework itself — to assess whether the post-October 7 legislative response satisfies the constitutional standard.

113. The practical consequence for the Commission is this. Four bodies of court-made law and active litigation now constrain the policy space: (1) Wertheim establishes that criticism of Israel is not antisemitism under Australian law, and that the existing Racial Discrimination Act is sufficient to draw the line without the IHRA definition; (2) Lees establishes that post-October 7 legislation restricting protest activity near places of worship is constitutionally invalid where less restrictive means are available; (3) Brown establishes the constitutional framework against which any further legislative proposals — including those that may be recommended to this Commission — will be tested; and (4) Jarrett v NSW tests whether the PARD scheme — the most far-reaching post-Bondi protest restriction — is constitutionally valid, with the UN Special Rapporteur already finding it inconsistent with international law. Recommendations that conflict with these holdings risk further constitutional defeats. Recommendations that work within them have the strongest prospect of both surviving judicial scrutiny and achieving their protective purpose.

Finding sought [Direct]: The Commission should find that four bodies of court-made law and active litigation now constrain the policy space: (1) Wertheim establishes that criticism of Israel is not antisemitism; (2) Lees establishes that protest restrictions near places of worship are unconstitutional where less restrictive means exist; (3) Brown establishes the framework against which all further proposals will be tested; (4) Jarrett v NSW challenges the PARD scheme, with the UN Special Rapporteur finding it inconsistent with ICCPR Article 21. Recommendations that conflict with these holdings risk further constitutional defeats. (ToR 2, ToR 4)

Recommendation 8A: The Commission should conduct its assessment of existing and proposed speech restrictions by reference to the structured proportionality framework established in McCloy v NSW, Brown v Tasmania, and Clubb v Edwards, and applied in Lees v State of NSW — the framework that Commissioner Bell herself helped to build. Recommendations that fail the necessity limb — where less restrictive alternatives are available and workable — will not survive constitutional challenge.

Wertheim v Haddad [2025] FCA 720: The Judicial Line Between Antisemitism and Political Criticism — Report for Possible Inclusion in the Submission to the Royal Commission

1. Executive Summary

1. Wertheim v Haddad [2025] FCA 720 (Stewart J) is the most significant Australian judicial authority on the distinction between antisemitic speech and political criticism of Israel. The Federal Court upheld 25 imputations across three speeches deploying classical antisemitic tropes about Jewish people generally, but rejected the pleaded imputations in two speeches — a Friday sermon during the bombardment of Gaza (Speech B) and a media response interview (Speech D) — finding that an ordinary, reasonable listener would understand them as directed at Israel, the IDF, and “Zionist entities,” not at Jewish people by reason of their race or ethnicity.

2. This case is directly relevant to Terms of Reference (A) and (D) of the Royal Commission. It demonstrates three things Commissioner Bell should weigh:

   • Genuine antisemitism exists and is justiciable. The “Jews of Al Madina” lecture series deployed centuries-old antisemitic tropes — Jews as mischievous, conspiratorial, controlling media and banks, descendants of apes and pigs — in a manner that the Court found contravened s 18C of the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth). This is real antisemitism, properly restrained by law.

   • The applicants cast their net across political speech and antisemitic speech alike. Wertheim and Goot pleaded imputations across all five speeches — meaning they submitted that content the Court later found to be political criticism of Israel conveyed antisemitic imputations about Jewish people. The Court rejected this characterisation, finding at [44] that a Jewish listener and a general community listener would draw the same meanings from the speeches — the distinction between political criticism and antisemitism is universal, not perspectival. The applicants had the opportunity to argue that references to “Zionists” functioned as coded references to Jews; they chose not to, and their counsel ultimately declined to submit that political criticism of Israel is inherently antisemitic.

   • The pattern of over-pleading maps directly onto the broader coordinated campaign architecture documented elsewhere in this submission. The same organisations and individuals who brought this litigation (ECAJ, Goot) are central to the coordinated complaint campaigns addressed in the submission on coordinated targeting. The litigation strategy — cast the net wide, capture political criticism within antisemitism pleadings, then fail to establish those claims in court — reveals a methodology that, outside the courtroom, operates without the judicial check.

2. The Parties

3. The First Applicant, Peter Wertheim AM, is co-Chief Executive Officer of the Executive Council of Australian Jewry (ECAJ), the peak elected representative body of the Australian Jewish community. He has been involved in multiple prior racial vilification cases brought on behalf of the Jewish community (T31.47; Wertheim affidavit at [11]–[14]).

4. The Second Applicant, Robert Goot AO SC, is the elected Deputy President of ECAJ — the same Robert Goot who was identified in the Lawyers for Israel WhatsApp group as a key participant in the coordinated campaign to secure the dismissal of Antoinette Lattouf from the ABC (Sydney Morning Herald, 15 January 2024; Lattouf v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (No 2) [2025] FCA 669).

5. The First Respondent, Wissam Haddad (also known as Abu Ousayd), is a Western Sydney Islamic preacher and carpet layer who delivers sermons and lectures at the Al Madina Dawah Centre in Bankstown. The Second Respondent is Al Madina Dawah Centre Incorporated (AMDC Inc).

6. The applicants were represented by Deutsch Miller (solicitors) and Peter Braham SC, Hannah Ryan, and Joy Chen of Eleven Wentworth (counsel). The respondents were initially represented by Macquarie Law Group (Elias Tabchouri, Imad Jabbour), with counsel A Boe, D Fuller, and I Kallinosis.

3. The Five Speeches

7. In November 2023, in the weeks following the Hamas attacks of 7 October and the commencement of Israel’s military campaign in Gaza, Haddad delivered five speeches at the AMDC:

   • Speech A — “The Jews of Al Madina Part 1” (3 November 2023, ~40 attendees)
   • Speech B — “Murdered by Israel Khutbah Jummah” (10 November 2023, 300–400 congregants)
   • Speech C — “The Jews of Al Madina Part 2” (12 November 2023)
   • Speech D — “Media Response to Reality of World Palestine” (14 November 2023, video podcast)
   • Speech E — “The Jews of Al Madina Banu Quraytha Part 3” (29 November 2023)

8. All five speeches were published on AMDC social media accounts (Rumble, Facebook). Several were picked up by MEMRI TV (Middle East Media Research Institute), then covered by The Australian, Sky News, and the Daily Telegraph. The applicants’ complaint to the AHRC was lodged in March 2024; after the Commission terminated the complaint on 30 September 2024, proceedings were filed in the Federal Court on 25 October 2024.

4. What the Court Found: Speeches A, C, and E (Contravention Upheld)

9. The three “Jews of Al Madina” lectures were the centrepiece of the case. Stewart J found that these speeches contravened s 18C of the RDA. The imputations upheld included that:

   • Jews are a mischievous, oppressive, arrogant, shifty, slanderous, conspiratorial, treacherous people (Statement of Claim [29], [31], [33]);
   • Jews control the media and banks, love money, and seek power for nefarious means (29, (l), (m));
   • Jews are descendants of apes and pigs (33);
   • Towards the end of time, Muslims will fight Jews and the Jews should and will be killed (29);
   • Jews are cowards, want to attack women and children, and inherently dislike Muslims (29, 33, 29).

10. These speeches deployed what Dr Andre Oboler, the applicants’ expert witness (CEO of the Online Hate Prevention Institute), described as classical antisemitic tropes with centuries of documented usage as pretexts for violence against Jewish people. Both the applicants’ expert (Professor Gabriel Reynolds, Professor of Islamic Studies and Theology) and the respondents’ expert (Sheikh Ibrahim) agreed that Islam does not justify the wholesale condemnation of Jews. Sheikh Ibrahim’s report stated that “the Prophet dealt with Jews based on their actions, not their identity” ([51]), that “Islam teaches that generalising to include all Jews is incorrect” ([81]), and that “the Qur’an makes it clear that not all Jews are the same” ([84]).

11. Haddad’s own cross-examination was revealing. He admitted it would have been “improper” to describe all Jews as mischievous, arrogant, or murderous (T165.1–22). Yet his speeches did precisely that — referring to “the Jews” without qualification no fewer than 169 times across the five speeches, repeatedly linking past and present: “just like they do today,” “same thing, history repeating itself,” “like the cowards that they are today,” “no different, no different than today … nothing’s changed” (Applicants’ Closing Submissions at [51]).

12. The Court rejected the s 18D exemptions for these speeches. While teaching Tafsir and delivering religious lectures were accepted as genuine purposes in the public interest, Haddad’s conduct was neither reasonable nor in good faith. As the applicants submitted (at [76]): “whatever [teaching Tafsir] means, it does not require any mention of Jewish people. And if it did, it does not require this kind of attack.”

13. This submission does not defend Haddad’s conduct in Speeches A, C, and E. The “Jews of Al Madina” lectures deployed antisemitic tropes that are properly the subject of legal restraint. The Court’s findings on these speeches are consistent with the purposes of both s 18C and the IHRA working definition of antisemitism. Genuine antisemitism — including religious-garbed antisemitism that attributes inherent negative characteristics to Jewish people as a group — must be identified and addressed.

14. The strength of the Court’s findings on Speeches A, C, and E demonstrates that the existing legal framework is adequate to address genuine antisemitism. The applicants identified real hatred — centuries-old tropes about Jews as descendants of apes and pigs, conspiratorial control of media and banks, and apocalyptic calls for violence — proved it to the Federal Court’s satisfaction, and obtained appropriate restraining orders. This is the strongest possible evidence that legislative reform expanding the definition of antisemitism to encompass political speech is unnecessary: the current system already works. It identified genuine antisemitism, distinguished it from political criticism, and provided an effective remedy. The question is not whether the law can address antisemitism — Wertheim proves it can — but whether expanding the law to capture political speech would improve protection or merely extend the chilling effect the litigation process already imposes.

5. What the Court Found: Speeches B and D (Imputations Rejected)

15. The critical finding for the Royal Commission’s purposes is what Stewart J found about Speeches B and D.

16. Speech B (“Murdered by Israel Khutbah Jummah”) was a Friday sermon delivered to 300–400 congregants on 10 November 2023, in the immediate context of the bombardment of Gaza. Its title — “Murdered by Israel” — contextualised its contents as being focused on the conduct of the Israeli state. The applicants pleaded that Speech B conveyed the imputations that: (a) Jews control the media and right-wing politicians, who are “like dogs under a Jewish leash”; (b) the Jewish people are filthy; and (c) Jews and their supporters are murdering cowards (Statement of Claim [30]).

17. Speech D (“Media Response to Reality of World Palestine”) was a video podcast. The applicants pleaded that it conveyed the imputation that Jews are liars (Statement of Claim [32]).

18. Stewart J rejected the pleaded imputations for both speeches. His Honour’s analysis was grounded in the established Eatock v Bolt framework. At paragraphs [42]–[44], he adopted the principle from Eatock at [250]–[251] that conduct must be analysed from the perspective of the hypothetical ordinary, reasonable member of the affected group, with extreme or atypical reactions disregarded. Critically, at [44], his Honour found that this made no practical difference: “the speeches will convey the same meanings to the ordinary, reasonable listener who is a Jew in Australia as they do to the ordinary, reasonable listener who is conceived of as a member of the broader Australian community.” The distinction between antisemitism and political criticism of Israel is not a matter of perspective — it holds universally.

19. Applying that framework to Speech B, Stewart J found at paragraph [107] that Haddad:

“is quite specific in the sermon. He is critical of Israel, the IDF and Zionists … Political criticism of Israel, however inflammatory or adversarial, is not by its nature criticism of Jews in general or based on Jewish racial or ethnic identity.”

20. The Court further found:

“The ordinary, reasonable listener would understand that not all Jews are Zionists or support the actions of Israel in Gaza and that disparagement of Zionism constitutes disparagement of a philosophy or ideology and not a race or ethnic group.”

21. These findings represent the most authoritative Australian judicial statement on the distinction between antisemitism and political criticism of Israel. They are not obiter dicta — they are the operative reasoning that produces the conclusion at [109] that “the pleaded imputation is not established.” They are directly consistent with the IHRA working definition’s own caveat that “criticism of Israel similar to that levelled against any other country cannot be regarded as antisemitic.”

22. Critically, the applicants’ own counsel declined to argue otherwise. At paragraph [107], Stewart J noted the distinction and added: “Indeed, the applicants did not submit that it is.” The applicants had pleaded imputations across all five speeches — including Speech B — that required the Court to find political criticism of Israel conveyed antisemitic meanings about Jewish people. They had an expert witness, Dr Oboler, who could have been deployed to argue that references to “Zionists” and “Zionist entities” functioned as coded references to Jews — the so-called “dog-whistle” argument. They chose not to run it. When it came to submissions, they would not argue the point their own pleadings had put in issue. The gap between what was pleaded and what was argued is the gap this submission asks the Commission to examine.

6. The Pattern: Plead Wide, Fail to Establish on Political Speech

23. The litigation strategy revealed by the court record is significant for the Royal Commission’s inquiry into the drivers of social polarisation.

24. The applicants pleaded imputations across all five speeches. They submitted that content which the Court later found to be political criticism of Israel, the IDF, and Zionism conveyed antisemitic imputations about Jewish people. The Statement of Claim made no distinction between the antisemitic content of the “Jews of Al Madina” lectures and the political content of the Gaza sermon and media response.

25. The Court drew the distinction the applicants’ pleading had elided. Stewart J found that two of the five speeches were political criticism, not antisemitism. The three remaining speeches were properly found to contain genuine racial vilification.

26. Outside court, the applicants’ characterisation of the case maintained the conflation. Peter Wertheim stated publicly that the case “was not about freedom of expression, or freedom of religion, it was about antisemitism and the abuse of those freedoms to promote antisemitism.” He also stated it was not a debate about political criticism of Israel or Zionism, acknowledging such debate is “entirely within the scope of ordinary discourse.” This concession mirrors the in-court position but sits in tension with the original pleadings, which captured political speech within the same frame as the antisemitic tropes.

27. This is the pattern the Royal Commission must understand: cast the net wide, capture political criticism of Israel within antisemitism pleadings, then fail to establish those claims in court — but by that point the speech has been before the court for characterisation, the speaker has endured 16 months of litigation from complaint to judgment, and the chilling effect has been achieved regardless of the outcome.

7. The Expert Witness: Dr Andre Oboler’s Post-Judgment Commentary

28. Dr Andre Oboler (CEO of the Online Hate Prevention Institute), who served as the applicants’ expert witness on antisemitism, subsequently characterised the Court’s finding on Zionism as problematic. OHPI argued that “disparagement of Zionism” and “disparagement of Zionists” are different things and should not be conflated. OHPI also described the Court’s statement that political criticism of Israel is not by its nature criticism of Jews as appearing “somewhat out of the blue.”

29. This characterisation warrants scrutiny. The finding did not appear “out of the blue.” It arose directly and necessarily from the applicants’ own decision to plead imputations across all five speeches, including those the Court found to be political in nature. The Court was required to assess each speech against the statutory criteria. Having assessed Speeches B and D, Stewart J found they did not convey the pleaded imputations — precisely because they were directed at Israel, the IDF, and Zionism rather than at Jewish people by reason of their race or ethnicity.

30. Dr Oboler’s expertise warrants brief contextual examination. His affidavit detailed a career path that included: training through the Union of Jewish Students in the UK and during a program in Israel; having his name put forward by the Israeli Embassy in London for an Israeli Foreign Ministry “Young Jewish Diplomatic Leadership Program”; a year as a Legacy Heritage Fellow at NGO Monitor, an Israeli charity; and a Post-Doctoral fellowship under the supervision of the founder of NGO Monitor at Bar-Ilan University (Oboler affidavit at [8]–[9]). None of this disqualifies his expertise — the Court accepted his report — but it contextualises the institutional network from which the characterisation of political criticism as antisemitism is generated and propagated.

8. The Constitutional Dimension: s 116 and the Implied Freedom

31. The respondents raised two constitutional challenges to s 18C: that it imposed an unjustified burden on the implied freedom of political communication, and that it was a law “for prohibiting the free exercise of any religion” contrary to s 116 of the Constitution. Both challenges were advanced in the alternative — only if the Court found contravention by reason of political or religious content.

32. The constitutional arguments are significant not for their outcome in this case but for what they reveal about the stakes. The respondents submitted (Respondents’ Closing Submissions at [95]–[96]) that if s 18C were construed to proscribe speech of the kind in Speeches B and D — overtly political commentary about events in Gaza — “the resulting burden on political communication is not slight … Such a result would have a substantial chilling effect on discourse about an important political topic, and disproportionately so on discourse from an Islamic perspective.”

33. Stewart J’s distinction between the antisemitic lectures and the political speeches avoided the constitutional collision. By finding that political criticism of Israel does not contravene s 18C, the judgment preserves both the anti-vilification purpose of the Act and the constitutionally implied freedom of political communication. This is precisely the structured proportionality analysis Commissioner Bell pioneered in McCloy v NSW and defended in Clubb v Edwards.

9. The Connection to Legislative Proposals

34. The Wertheim v Haddad judgment acquires particular urgency in the context of proposed antisemitism legislation at both federal and state levels. If enacted, proposed bills in Queensland and at the Commonwealth level would vest the power to define antisemitism — and to characterise speech as antisemitic — in the minister or regulation, removing the judicial step that allowed Stewart J to distinguish between genuine racial vilification and political criticism.

35. The pattern revealed by the court record — plead wide, capture political criticism within antisemitism claims, then fail to establish those claims — depends on the existence of a judicial filter. The court performed exactly the function it should: it upheld the claims that were genuinely about antisemitism and rejected those that were about political speech. Remove the judicial filter, and the characterisation of political criticism as antisemitism becomes administratively unreviewable.

36. This is directly material to Term of Reference (D). Any recommendations this Commission makes regarding legislative reform to address antisemitism should ensure that the distinction Stewart J drew — between racial vilification and political criticism — is structurally preserved, not legislated away.

10. Relevance to the Coordinated Campaign Architecture

37. The overlap between the parties in this litigation and the coordinated campaigns documented elsewhere in this submission is not coincidental.

38. Robert Goot AO SC — the Second Applicant in Wertheim v Haddad — was identified in the Lawyers for Israel WhatsApp group as a key participant in the coordinated campaign against Antoinette Lattouf. On the morning of 20 December 2023, he told the group “I understand she will be gone from morning radio from Friday.” When asked whether this was due to “her stance on Israel or other reasons,” Goot replied: “Israel.” He urged the group to “keep writing” (Sydney Morning Herald, 15 January 2024). This was the same Robert Goot who, as ECAJ Deputy President, brought s 18C proceedings against Haddad — proceedings in which the Court found he had pleaded imputations that captured political criticism of Israel within an antisemitism claim.

39. Peter Wertheim AM — the First Applicant — has been ECAJ co-CEO throughout the period in which the coordinated campaigns documented in the companion submission occurred. He has personally been involved in multiple prior racial vilification cases (T31.47; affidavit at [11]–[14]).

40. The ECAJ is the same organisation whose sole listed public engagement officer, Ronit Gabriel, previously served as a defence cooperation coordinator at Israel’s defence mission in Paris and as cultural and academic adviser at the Israeli Embassy in Canberra.

41. None of this undermines the legitimacy of the Wertheim v Haddad proceedings in respect of the genuinely antisemitic content in Speeches A, C, and E. But it demonstrates that the same institutional actors engage in both legitimate anti-vilification litigation and coordinated campaigns to suppress political criticism of Israel — and that the line between the two depends on a judicial filter that proposed legislation would remove.

11. Recommendations Arising from This Analysis

42. The following recommendations arise specifically from the Wertheim v Haddad analysis and supplement Recommendations S1–S6 in the companion submission on coordinated campaigns:

Recommendation S7: Preserve the judicial distinction between antisemitism and political criticism

43. That the Commission recommend that any legislative measures to address antisemitism expressly incorporate the distinction drawn by Stewart J in Wertheim v Haddad — namely, that “political criticism of Israel, however inflammatory or adversarial, is not by its nature criticism of Jews in general or based on Jewish racial or ethnic identity” and that “disparagement of Zionism constitutes disparagement of a philosophy or ideology and not a race or ethnic group.” This distinction should be given statutory expression in any new or amended legislation, not left to administrative discretion.

Recommendation S8: Retain judicial oversight of antisemitism characterisation

44. That the Commission recommend against any legislative model that vests the power to characterise speech as antisemitic in a minister or regulation without judicial review. The Wertheim v Haddad judgment demonstrates that courts can and do distinguish between genuine racial vilification and political criticism. The judicial filter is essential to preventing the suppression of constitutionally protected political communication under the guise of combating antisemitism.

Recommendation S9: Address strategic over-pleading in anti-vilification proceedings

45. That the Commission consider recommending procedural reforms — such as costs penalties or preliminary hearing mechanisms — to discourage the practice of pleading political criticism as racial vilification in s 18C proceedings. The Wertheim v Haddad record demonstrates that applicants pleaded imputations across all five speeches, including two the Court found to be political in nature. While the judicial process ultimately drew the distinction, the respondent was subjected to 16 months of litigation from complaint to judgment on claims that were partially unfounded. This imposes a disproportionate burden on respondents and generates a chilling effect on political speech that persists regardless of outcome.

12. Conclusion

46. Wertheim v Haddad is a case that vindicates both sides of the proportionality balance. The Court rightly found that three of Haddad’s speeches constituted genuine racial vilification deploying classical antisemitic tropes. It equally rightly found that two of his speeches were political criticism of Israel that did not contravene s 18C.

47. The case demonstrates that Australia’s existing legal framework — s 18C read with s 18D, interpreted by an independent judiciary — is capable of drawing the line between antisemitism and political criticism. What it also demonstrates is that institutional actors will attempt to push that line outward, capturing political speech within the ambit of racial vilification. The judicial filter caught this. The proposed legislative reforms would not.

48. Commissioner Bell’s own jurisprudence teaches that proportionality requires not only the identification of legitimate purposes but the scrutiny of whether proposed measures are suitable, necessary, and proportionate to those purposes. Legislation that removes the judicial distinction drawn in Wertheim v Haddad — by vesting characterisation power in the executive — fails the necessity limb of that test. The existing framework works. It found genuine antisemitism and restrained it. It identified political criticism and protected it. Any reform should preserve, not dismantle, that capacity.

Sources and References

Court Documents — Wertheim v Haddad [2025] FCA 720 (Stewart J)

• Wertheim v Haddad [2025] FCA 720, Federal Court of Australia, General Division, NSW Registry (NSD1503/2024)
• Statement of Claim, filed 25 October 2024 (Deutsch Miller, solicitors for the Applicants)
• Defence, filed 10 February 2025 (Macquarie Law Group, solicitors for the Respondents)
• Notice of Constitutional Matter under s 78B Judiciary Act 1903, filed 10 February 2025
• Orders of Stewart J, 18 December 2024 (procedural directions)
• Applicants’ Opening Submissions, filed 30 May 2025
• Respondents’ Opening Submissions, filed 5 June 2025
• Applicants’ Closing Submissions, filed 13 June 2025
• Respondents’ Closing Submissions, filed 13 June 2025
• Applicants’ Submissions on Relief, filed 7 July 2025
• Respondents’ Submissions on Relief (referenced)
• Affidavit of Dr Andre Oboler, affirmed 8 April 2025 (expert report, applicants)
• Affidavit of Peter Wertheim AM, sworn 24 March 2025
• Affidavit of Robert Goot AO SC, sworn 24 March 2025
• Affidavit of William Haddad, sworn 9 May 2025
• Affidavit of Enver Neziroski, sworn 8 May 2025
• Affidavit of Poppy Kambas, affirmed 17 April 2025 and 7 July 2025
• Expert report of Sheikh Ibrahim (respondents’ expert)
• Expert report of Professor Gabriel Reynolds (applicants’ expert on Islamic studies)

Related Proceedings

• Lattouf v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (No 2) [2025] FCA 669 (Justice Rangiah, 25 June 2025) — identifying Robert Goot’s participation in the Lawyers for Israel WhatsApp group
• Sydney Morning Herald, “Secret WhatsApp messages show co-ordinated campaign to oust Antoinette Lattouf from ABC” (15–16 January 2024)

High Court Jurisprudence (Commissioner Bell’s Decisions)

• McCloy v NSW (2015) 257 CLR 178 (structured proportionality)
• Clubb v Edwards (2019) 267 CLR 171 (defence of proportionality framework)
• Comcare v Banerji (2019) 267 CLR 373 (institutional integrity)
• Brown v Tasmania (2017) 261 CLR 328 (necessity limb — protest laws)

Racial Discrimination Act Jurisprudence

• Eatock v Bolt (2011) 197 FCR 261 (Bromberg J)
• Faruqi v Hanson [2024] FCA 1264 (Stewart J — constitutionality of s 18C)
• Kaplan v State of Victoria (No 8) [2023] FCA 1092 (Mortimer CJ)
• Jones v Toben (2002) 71 ALD 629; Toben v Jones (2003) 129 FCR 515
• Jones v Scully (2002) 120 FCR 243
• Bropho v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (2004) 135 FCR 105
• Clarke v Nationwide News Pty Ltd (2012) 201 FCR 389

Constitutional

• Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520
• Babet v Commonwealth [2025] HCA 21 (structured proportionality not required in every case)
• Kruger v Commonwealth (1997) 190 CLR 1 (s 116 interpretation)
• Church of the New Faith v Commissioner for Pay-roll Tax (Vic) (1983) 154 CLR 120

IHRA

• IHRA Working Definition of Antisemitism (adopted by the Commission per the Letters Patent)

Coordinated Complaint Campaigns and Their Impact on Social Cohesion: Submission to the Royal Commission into Antisemitism and Social Cohesion

1. Executive Summary

1. This submission addresses Term of Reference (D) — strengthening social cohesion and countering ideologically and religiously motivated extremism — and Term of Reference (A) — the nature, prevalence, and key drivers of antisemitism — by presenting judicially documented evidence that coordinated complaint campaigns by pro-Israel advocacy organisations have systematically targeted journalists, academics, health professionals, and artists who express views critical of Israeli government policy.

2. The submission contends that these campaigns, far from strengthening social cohesion, have actively undermined it by suppressing legitimate political discourse, eroding institutional independence, and generating justified grievance among targeted communities — dynamics that, if left unaddressed, risk deepening the very polarisation this Commission is tasked with remedying.

3. The evidence presented is drawn primarily from Australian Federal Court findings, leaked primary source documents published by major metropolitan newspapers, official regulatory body records, and comparable international judicial proceedings. Every factual claim is sourced.

4. The submission proposes six concrete, implementable recommendations directed at restoring institutional resilience, protecting political discourse, and ensuring that Australia’s anti-discrimination framework is not weaponised to suppress legitimate speech.

2. Relevance to the Terms of Reference

5. The Letters Patent require the Commission to examine not only antisemitism in isolation but the broader challenge of “strengthening social cohesion.” Social cohesion is a reciprocal concept. It cannot be advanced by addressing threats faced by one community while ignoring the suppression of another’s right to political expression. As the High Court held in Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520 at 560, the freedom of political communication is an indispensable incident of the system of representative and responsible government established by the Constitution. Organised campaigns that successfully chill this communication damage the constitutional architecture Commissioner Bell has spent her career defending.

6. The Commission adopts the IHRA working definition of antisemitism, which expressly states that “criticism of Israel similar to that levelled against any other country cannot be regarded as antisemitic.” The evidence below demonstrates that coordinated campaigns have routinely conflated criticism of Israeli government policy with antisemitism — precisely the conflation the IHRA definition was drafted to prevent.

3. The Lattouf Case: Judicial Findings of Orchestrated Campaign

7. The most authoritative evidence of coordinated targeting is found in the judgment of Justice Darryl Rangiah of the Federal Court in Lattouf v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (No 2) [2025] FCA 669, delivered 25 June 2025.

8. The facts, as found by the Court, are as follows. Antoinette Lattouf, a journalist of Lebanese heritage, was engaged for a five-day fill-in presenting role on ABC Radio Sydney in December 2023. On her second day, she reposted on her personal Instagram a report by Human Rights Watch — one of the world’s foremost human rights organisations — titled “The Israeli Government is using starvation as a weapon of war in Gaza.” The ABC itself had published reporting on the same subject. By her third day, she was dismissed.

9. Leaked messages from a private WhatsApp group called “Lawyers for Israel” — comprising approximately 156 Australian lawyers, formed after October 7, 2023 — revealed the mechanics. The group’s administrator, Sydney solicitor Nicky Stein, posted daily “calls to action” directing members to write to ABC Chair Ita Buttrose, Managing Director David Anderson, the ombudsman, and the Federal Communications Minister. Her strategy was explicit:

“It is important ABC hears not just from individuals in the community but specifically lawyers so they feel there is an actual legal threat.”

(Leaked WhatsApp message, published Sydney Morning Herald, 15 January 2024)

10. Critically, Stein acknowledged within the group that the legal threat was illusory:

“There is probably no actionable offence against ABC but I didn’t say I would be taking one — just investigating one.”

(Leaked WhatsApp message, published Sydney Morning Herald, 15 January 2024)

11. Robert Goot, then deputy president of the Executive Council of Australian Jewry and a prominent Sydney barrister, was a key participant. On the morning of 20 December 2023, he told the group: “I understand she will be gone from morning radio from Friday.” When asked whether this was due to “her stance on Israel or other reasons,” Goot replied with a single word: “Israel.” He urged the group to “keep writing” (Sydney Morning Herald, 15 January 2024).

12. The ABC’s internal response was revealed in evidence at trial. Chair Buttrose, after receiving the coordinated complaints, emailed Managing Director Anderson:

“Has Antoinette been replaced? I’m over getting emails about her. Why can’t she come down with flu or COVID or a stomach upset? We owe her nothing.”

(ABC internal email, tendered in evidence, Lattouf v ABC [2025] FCA 669)

13. Justice Rangiah found:

The ABC terminated Lattouf “for reasons including that she held a political opinion opposing the Israeli military campaign in Gaza.”

(Lattouf v ABC [2025] FCA 669)

14. His Honour further found that ABC management had been thrown into “a state of panic” by the orchestrated campaign and decided to “appease the pro-Israel lobbyists who would inevitably escalate their complaints” (Lattouf v ABC [2025] FCA 669). The ABC was ordered to pay $70,000 in compensation and $150,000 in penalties — totalling $220,000 — after spending over $2 million in legal fees defending the action, having refused an $85,000 settlement offer.

15. The significance of this finding cannot be overstated. A Federal Court judge has formally characterised coordinated lobbying as the proximate cause of an unlawful employment action by Australia’s national public broadcaster. This is not allegation or inference; it is a judicial finding of fact, tested through adversarial proceedings with full evidentiary rigour.

4. A Broader Pattern of Documented Coordinated Targeting

The Kostakidis proceedings

16. Mary Kostakidis — who anchored SBS World News for two decades, making her one of Australia’s most recognised broadcast journalists — became the subject of a Section 18C complaint filed by the Zionist Federation of Australia (ZFA) in July 2024. The complaint, brought by ZFA CEO Alon Cassuto, targeted her social media commentary critical of Israel’s military campaign in Gaza. After conciliation failed at the Australian Human Rights Commission, the ZFA escalated to the Federal Court in April 2025. The amended claim cited 61 of Kostakidis’s social media posts spanning October 2023 to March 2025 (Federal Court of Australia, proceeding filed April 2025).

17. Kostakidis’s filed defence explicitly alleges the proceedings were:

“Instituted as part of a deliberate campaign to undermine and discredit the Respondent… in order to cause a chilling effect on her and others to silence them.”

(Defence filed December 2025, Federal Court of Australia)

18. The timing and coordination bear scrutiny. The ZFA held a press conference with its president Jeremy Leibler and representing law firm Arnold Bloch Leibler before even contacting Kostakidis. Exactly one week before the complaint was publicly announced, The Age published a feature characterising Kostakidis as a purveyor of “denial and disinformation” — a sequence Kostakidis has described as coordinated (The Age, July 2024).

Targeting of academics: Toltz v Riemer and Toltz v Keane

19. The most extensive academic targeting case is Toltz & Ors v Riemer & Anor (NSD950/2025) and Toltz & Ors v Keane & Anor (NSD951/2025), filed in the Federal Court on 13 June 2025 and heard by Justice Kennett. Four Jewish and Israeli staff and students — Dr Joseph Toltz, Professor Emeritus Suzanne Rutland OAM, Ariel Eisner (AUJS), and Yaniv Levy — sued Dr Nick Riemer (Senior Lecturer in Linguistics, former NTEU President, Head of Sydney Staff for BDS) and Professor John Keane (Professor of Politics, BDS proponent), together with the University of Sydney, under section 18C. The applicants are represented by Rotstein Commercial Lawyers (Melbourne), with counsel Adam Butt and pleadings settled by Saul Holt KC. The respondents are represented by Marque Lawyers (Michael Bradley) and Ashurst Australia (Stephen Woodbury).

19A. The Riemer proceeding alleges 14 impugned acts spanning October 2023 to May 2024, including X posts with over 320,000 views stating “No progressive should feel the need to publicly condemn any choices by the Palestinian resistance”; a speech declaring “there is no room for Zionism in our unions”; reposts calling Zionists “racists” (#ZionistFragility) and comparing them to Nazis; and an article in Overland accusing Zionists of “cheering on the antidemocratic suppression of protest” and having “let their masks slip.” The central legal proposition is at paragraph 87a of the ASOC: “References to Zionists are, properly understood, to be a reference to (at least) a majority of Jewish people and Israeli people in Australia.”

19B. The Keane proceeding alleges two acts: posting an image of five green Hamas flags on X the day after the October 7 attack, and publishing an internal email chain naming 17 mostly Jewish and Israeli academics, describing their letter as “self-righteous indignation of people convinced they are victims of non-humans (Palestinians) who imperil their Promised Land.” That post remained online for over six months despite immediate complaints to Vice Chancellor Mark Scott, the Provost, Chancellor, and Senate. The University classified Keane’s conduct as “Misconduct” under the Enterprise Agreement in April 2024 but did not secure removal until May 2024. Dr Loren Mowszowski resigned, citing the hostile environment and the doxing post as the most distressing incident. Associate Professor Andy Smidt also left the University.

19C. A SafeWork investigation found that the University of Sydney “prioritised free speech over psychosocial health and safety of its workers and students” and that “Jewish workers and students experienced antisemitism daily, creating a workplace of fear, anxiousness and a fear of retribution.” Vice Chancellor Scott publicly admitted “failing” Jewish students. The Hodgkinson Report (November 2024) by Bruce Hodgkinson AM SC acknowledged antisemitism at the University. These findings demonstrate genuine institutional failure — the University did not protect its Jewish staff and students from conduct that went beyond political speech into targeted personal attacks.

19D. However, the proceedings also reveal the contested nature of the claims. An open letter signed by 52 Jewish university staff and students, published in Overland on 29 May 2025, stated:

“As Jewish university staff and students we are appalled by the attempt to use racial vilification laws and the Australian Human Rights Commission complaints process to silence Dr Nick Riemer and Professor John Keane, who have exercised their right to free speech.”

“We repudiate the attempt by those making the complaint to conflate Zionism, a political ideology with Jewish and non-Jewish adherents, with Jewish identity. This implicates Jews all over the world in the Israeli Government’s current actions.”

“The attempt to silence Dr Riemer, Professor Keane and other academics who seek justice for Palestine forms part of concerted and coordinated efforts to silence critics of Israel across Australia’s university campuses and public squares, trammelling fundamental democratic rights.”

19E. The University’s own affidavit compiled submissions from multiple Jewish groups opposing the characterisation of anti-Zionist speech as racial vilification. Jews Against the Occupation ’48 stated: “There is no credible independently-sourced evidence of record levels of antisemitism on university campuses.” The Tzedek Collective warned of a “chilling effect, with staff and students around the country often already afraid to talk publicly about Israel’s actions.” The NSWCCL stated that “antisemitism has been weaponised by politicians and the media… through the incorrect and harmful conflation of Zionism and Judaism.”

19F. The University of Sydney’s own litigation position illustrates the institutional contradictions. In February 2025, it endorsed the Universities Australia definition of antisemitism, which states: “For most, but not all Jewish Australians, Zionism is a core part of their Jewish identity. Substituting the word ‘Zionist’ for ‘Jew’ does not eliminate the possibility of speech being antisemitic.” Yet in court, the University argued that the reaction of most Jewish Australians to anti-Zionist conduct should be treated as potentially “irrational” and that anti-Zionist speech cannot constitute racial discrimination. This contradiction — endorsing a definition that acknowledges the link while arguing in court that the link has no legal significance — encapsulates the incoherence this Commission must navigate.

19G. Justice Kennett delivered interlocutory rulings on 14 November 2025, striking out several paragraphs — including the cumulative assessment framework, certain historical context, and the attempt to bring representative proceedings for 13 named academics in the Keane case — but the core claims survived. The respondents’ applications were “otherwise dismissed.” Defences are due in March 2026. The proceedings will test whether the Wertheim v Haddad framework extends to anti-Zionist academic speech directed at specific Jewish and Israeli individuals — a question the courts have not yet resolved.

19H. The organisational infrastructure behind the proceedings warrants examination. The applicants formed the Australian Academic Alliance Against Antisemitism (5A Group) in January 2024, which has since filed submissions to multiple parliamentary inquiries. Professor Rutland (Second Applicant) is a lead author of multiple 5A reports and sits on the IHRA Committee. The Third Applicant (Ariel Eisner) is affiliated with AUJS/ECAJ. The respondents’ submissions described the McCoach affidavit evidence as running to 2,267 pages, comprising surveys, parliamentary submissions, school curricula, youth movement materials, and institutional reports — a scale of evidentiary assembly that suggests significant organisational and financial backing.

21. Macquarie University sociologist Dr Randa Abdel-Fattah faced sustained lobbying and adverse media coverage directed at her $870,000 ARC Future Fellowship for research into “Arab/Muslim Australian Social Movements since the 1970s.” Education Minister Jason Clare wrote to the ARC on 31 January 2025 directing an investigation “as a matter of priority.” The ARC suspended the grant entirely on 27 February 2025. Liberal Senator Sarah Henderson publicly lobbied for the suspension, calling it “a start but more needed to stamp out antisemitism” (Times Higher Education, February 2025). After a 10-month investigation by two independent internationally respected academics, Macquarie University announced on 23 December 2025 that there was “no basis for any further investigation” and the ARC restored funding (WSWS, 29 December 2025; ARC Grants Data Portal, grant FT220100427). The duration and severity of the disruption to her career and research, despite ultimate vindication, illustrates the effectiveness of coordinated pressure even when the underlying complaints lack merit. Notably, even after being cleared, Dr Abdel-Fattah was banned from an Australian writers’ festival in January 2026 — suggesting the campaign’s effects persist beyond formal exoneration (WSWS, 10 January 2026).

Targeting in universities: disciplinary action against students

21A. The University of Melbourne expelled two student activists and indefinitely suspended two more for participation in a 2024 pro-Palestine campus occupation. These are reportedly the first such severe punitive measures against Palestinian justice activists at an Australian university. Amnesty International demanded the university reverse the expulsions and suspensions (Amnesty International Australia, 2025). In February 2025, all 39 Universities Australia member institutions endorsed a “working definition of antisemitism” that critics argued would institutionalise the conflation of anti-Zionism with antisemitism and chill legitimate criticism of Israeli government policy on campuses (EduResearch Matters, 2025).

Targeting of health professionals

22. Between October 2023 and April 2024, the Australian Health Practitioner Regulation Agency (AHPRA) received 59 complaints against 39 health practitioners — the vast majority anonymous — for social media posts relating to the Israel-Gaza conflict (AHPRA official data, reported April 2024). The mechanism involved individuals infiltrating closed Facebook groups such as “Doctors for Palestine,” capturing screenshots, and disseminating them via doxxing Instagram accounts alongside practitioners’ personal and professional information. ZFA President Jeremy Leibler personally filed an AHPRA complaint against a Melbourne doctor. Medical indemnity insurer Avant issued warnings to members about social media activity.

23. The sheer volume and coordination of these complaints — 59 against 39 individuals within six months — is consistent with organised campaign activity rather than spontaneous individual grievance.

Targeting in media and the arts

24. Veteran cricket journalist Peter Lalor was dismissed by SEN Radio in early February 2025 — midway through Australia’s tour of Sri Lanka — for resharing news stories about Gaza. SEN CEO Craig Hutchison stated: “We’ve been in dialogue through the back half of the [1st] Test [in Sri Lanka] about some of the commentary on Peter’s private social media feed” (Mumbrella, February 2025). Lalor reported being told there were accusations he was antisemitic and that his retweeting was “not balanced.” The dismissal prompted a boycott from journalists and public support from Australian cricketer Usman Khawaja (Crikey, 5 February 2025).

25. On 13 February 2025, Creative Australia rescinded Lebanese-Australian artist Khaled Sabsabi’s invitation to represent Australia at the 2026 Venice Biennale, just days after the announcement, citing concerns that his inclusion posed “an unacceptable risk to public support for Australia’s artistic community.” Following an independent external review, Sabsabi was reinstated. On 3 July 2025, Creative Australia CEO Ben Enoch apologised on ABC Radio National for the “hurt and pain” caused, acknowledging that Sabsabi was an “incredibly peace-loving artist” whose works had been “mischaracterised” (Artsy, July 2025; The Art Newspaper, 3 April 2025). As with Dr Abdel-Fattah, the ultimate reversal confirms the complaint lacked justification while the initial capitulation demonstrates institutional vulnerability to orchestrated pressure.

5. The “J.E.W.I.S.H Creatives and Academics” Group

26. A second WhatsApp group — the “J.E.W.I.S.H creatives and academics” group of approximately 600 members including writers, artists, musicians, and academics — operated alongside the Lawyers for Israel group. Administered by Melbourne author Lee Kofman and formed after October 7, 2023, the group evolved from a support network into a coordination platform. Its leaked messages showed members participated in the campaign against Lattouf, discussed targeting literary journal Overland, called for complaints to Deakin University about pro-Palestinian academics, and sought to have funding withdrawn from arts organisations (Sydney Morning Herald, January 2024; leaked transcript published February 2024).

27. In February 2024, the full approximately 900-page transcript of this group was leaked, including names, occupations, and photographs of roughly 100 members. This leak prompted Prime Minister Anthony Albanese to fast-track anti-doxxing legislation. The submission does not condone the doxxing of private individuals. The exposure of private communications causes real harm. However, the content of those communications — insofar as it documents coordinated campaigns to suppress political expression — is a matter of legitimate public interest and falls squarely within Term of Reference (D).

6. AIJAC and Institutional Lobbying: Documented in Their Own Words

28. The Australia Israel & Jewish Affairs Council (AIJAC), chaired by tax lawyer Mark Leibler of Arnold Bloch Leibler, is Australia’s most established pro-Israel lobbying organisation. Its activities are documented not through leaked material but through its own public statements and submissions.

29. In a 2018 speech published by Michael West Media, Leibler provided extraordinary candid detail of AIJAC’s operations. He described personally lobbying to block an ABC correspondent’s appointment, claimed credit for “moderating” former ABC Middle East correspondent Sophie McNeill’s coverage through sustained pressure, and stated:

“Our representations, both public and private, undoubtedly moderated her behaviour because she knew she was being watched.”

(Mark Leibler, speech published by Michael West Media, 2018)

30. This is a frank acknowledgment that the purpose of AIJAC’s activity was to induce self-censorship in a journalist covering a matter of profound public interest. The mechanism is not engagement in public debate — which is legitimate and welcome — but surveillance and professional intimidation directed at an individual journalist’s livelihood.

31. AIJAC’s own submission to a Senate inquiry documented its systematic complaint-making to the ABC and ACMA. AIJAC runs the Rambam Israel Fellowship, which has sponsored trips to Israel for politicians including former Prime Ministers Turnbull, Gillard, Rudd, Abbott, Morrison, and Shorten (AIJAC publicly available program information).

7. International Parallels: Not Isolated but Systemic

32. The Australian evidence does not exist in isolation. Comparable patterns have been judicially documented in the United Kingdom, United States, and Canada, revealing a transnational ecosystem of complementary tactics.

United Kingdom

33. A Bristol Employment Tribunal ruled unanimously in February 2024 that Professor David Miller’s anti-Zionist beliefs constituted a protected philosophical belief and that his dismissal from the University of Bristol was discriminatory (Miller v University of Bristol [2024] ET). The tribunal heard evidence that the university had received a “significant volume of correspondence calling for it to take urgent disciplinary action” — language consistent with a coordinated campaign.

34. In 2025, the UK Charity Commission issued a remedial action plan to the Campaign Against Antisemitism (CAA) and opened an investigation into the UK Lawyers for Israel Charitable Trust (UK Charity Commission, 2025). A CAGE International report documented how UKLFI — founded by lawyers who attended a “conference on lawfare” in the Israeli settlement Ma’ale Adumim — had systematically targeted the General Medical Council, Solicitors’ Regulation Authority, Bar Standards Board, and Charity Commission with complaints against Palestine solidarity advocates (CAGE International, 2025).

United States

35. Canary Mission, a blacklisting website hosting over 5,000 profiles of students, professors, and activists, was revealed through investigative reporting by The Forward and Haaretz to be secretly operated out of Israel through a non-profit called Megamot Shalom, based in Beit Shemesh, receiving over 99% of its funding from the United States (The Forward, investigative series; Haaretz, reporting on Canary Mission).

36. In July 2025, during federal litigation brought by the American Association of University Professors (AAUP) and the Middle East Studies Association (MESA), senior ICE official Peter Hatch testified under oath that ICE assembled a “Tiger Team” in early 2025 to investigate student protestors, compiling over 100 reports based on a list of 5,000 people identified on the Canary Mission website. More than 75% of deportation referrals prepared by his unit were based on names first identified through Canary Mission profiles (Knight First Amendment Institute, reporting on sworn testimony, July 2025; Jewish Telegraphic Agency, 10 July 2025). US District Judge William G. Young — a Ronald Reagan appointee — subsequently ruled that foreign students enjoy the same First Amendment protections as American citizens, describing the government’s actions as “a full-throated assault on the First Amendment” (CNN, 30 September 2025). This constitutes the first judicial confirmation of direct government reliance on privately maintained blacklists originating from coordination infrastructure.

37. The Steven Salaita case at the University of Illinois (2014) produced documentary evidence through a FOIA lawsuit showing the university “acted in response to a coordinated campaign by Israel advocacy groups which mobilized donors and other influencers to threaten to withhold donations” (FOIA disclosures, Salaita litigation). The university paid an $875,000 settlement in November 2015.

Canada

38. Ricochet Media’s 2025 five-part podcast investigation documented Canary Mission’s targeting of 128 Canadian academics and activists. Targets reported being denied rental housing, receiving calls to workplaces, and being denied entry to the United States based on their profiles (Ricochet Media, 2025).

8. Analysis Through the Structured Proportionality Framework

39. Commissioner Bell’s jurisprudence establishes structured proportionality — suitability, necessity, and adequacy of balance — as the appropriate framework for evaluating measures that burden the constitutionally implied freedom of political communication (McCloy v NSW (2015) 257 CLR 178; Clubb v Edwards (2019) 267 CLR 171). This framework is equally applicable to assessing the conduct documented above and the Commission’s potential recommendations.

The competing interests

40. Two legitimate interests are engaged. First, the interest of Jewish Australians in being free from antisemitism — a serious and documented phenomenon that causes real harm and that this Commission is rightly constituted to address. Second, the interest of all Australians in the freedom of political communication, particularly on matters of foreign policy, military conduct, and human rights — matters that lie at the very heart of the constitutionally protected discourse on which representative government depends (Lange at 560).

41. These interests are not inherently opposed. The vast majority of criticism of Israeli government policy is not antisemitic, as the IHRA definition itself acknowledges. The difficulty arises when organised campaigns conflate the two, deploying anti-discrimination mechanisms and institutional complaint processes to suppress political speech that is, on any reasonable assessment, within the bounds of legitimate political discourse.

Suitability

42. Coordinated complaint campaigns are not suitable means of combating genuine antisemitism. The Lattouf case demonstrates this starkly: the journalist’s reposted content was a Human Rights Watch report — material of unimpeachable public interest that the ABC itself had covered. The AHPRA complaints targeted health professionals for membership of closed discussion groups. The ZFA’s 61-tweet claim against Kostakidis encompasses a breadth of political commentary that, taken as a whole, constitutes sustained engagement with matters of public policy rather than racial vilification. The Toltz proceedings present a more nuanced case — some of the impugned conduct (such as Keane’s public naming of 17 Jewish academics) goes beyond political speech into targeted personal attacks — but even there, 52 Jewish academics publicly rejected the use of section 18C to address it. The pattern across all cases is the deployment of legal mechanisms as instruments of political suppression rather than protection from genuine racial hatred.

43. Where coordinated campaigns succeed in silencing critics, they do not reduce antisemitism. Instead, they generate justified grievance among the communities whose voices are suppressed — particularly Arab, Muslim, and Palestinian Australians — and risk fuelling the very radicalisation dynamics this Commission is tasked with understanding under Term of Reference (A).

Necessity

44. Less restrictive means exist to address genuine antisemitism without suppressing political discourse. These include: robust enforcement of existing criminal law provisions against incitement and threats; properly resourced community education programs; institutional guidelines that clearly distinguish between antisemitism and legitimate policy criticism (consistent with the IHRA definition’s own caveat); and good-faith public engagement in debate.

45. The current pattern — in which anti-discrimination law is used as an instrument of strategic litigation, professional regulatory bodies are overwhelmed with mass-coordinated complaints, and institutional decision-makers capitulate to orchestrated pressure — is not the least restrictive means. It is not a proportionate response at all.

Adequacy of balance

46. The burden imposed by these campaigns falls disproportionately on individuals with the least institutional protection: freelance journalists, early-career academics, individual health practitioners, and artists dependent on government funding. The Lattouf case — in which a fill-in radio presenter was dismissed within 72 hours of a coordinated campaign by 156 lawyers — exemplifies the asymmetry. The AHPRA complaints — 59 against 39 individual practitioners — represent a systematic attempt to make professional engagement with political issues carry career-ending risk.

47. The balance is not adequate. The harm to political communication, institutional independence, and social cohesion substantially outweighs any benefit to combating genuine antisemitism — particularly when the conduct targeted is, in the assessment of the Federal Court, the holding of a political opinion (Lattouf v ABC [2025] FCA 669).

9. Recommendations

48. The Commission should consider the following concrete and implementable recommendations:

Recommendation S1: Institutional complaint-handling reform

49. That the Australian Government work with AHPRA, ACMA, the ABC, and university governing bodies to develop guidelines for identifying and appropriately managing coordinated complaint campaigns — including mass-coordinated, template-based, or orchestrated complaints — as a distinct category requiring institutional-level assessment rather than individual adjudication. This would restore the capacity of institutional complaint mechanisms to function as intended rather than as instruments of political pressure.

Recommendation S2: Explicit adoption of the IHRA caveat in regulatory guidance

50. That all Commonwealth regulatory bodies required to assess allegations of antisemitism be directed to apply the IHRA working definition in full, including its express statement that “criticism of Israel similar to that levelled against any other country cannot be regarded as antisemitic.” Regulatory guidance should provide concrete examples of the distinction between antisemitism and legitimate political criticism to assist decision-makers.

Recommendation S3: Anti-SLAPP protections for political communication

51. That the Australian Government introduce federal anti-SLAPP (Strategic Litigation Against Public Participation) legislation, modelled on the protections available in Canadian provinces and US states, to provide an expedited mechanism for dismissing legal proceedings that are brought to suppress legitimate political expression rather than to vindicate genuine legal rights. Kostakidis’s filed defence — alleging proceedings “instituted as part of a deliberate campaign… to cause a chilling effect” — illustrates the need.

Recommendation S4: Transparency requirements for coordinated lobbying

52. That lobbying transparency legislation be amended to require disclosure when coordinated campaigns target individual public servants, journalists, or academics through regulatory complaint mechanisms. The Lawyers for Israel WhatsApp group operated entirely in private, with participants acknowledging the absence of genuine legal claims while deliberately creating the impression of legal threat. Transparency requirements would not restrict legitimate advocacy but would ensure accountability for organised campaigns directed at individuals.

Recommendation S5: Protection of editorial independence at the ABC

53. That the ABC Act be amended to strengthen protections for editorial independence against external pressure campaigns, including a statutory prohibition on editorial decisions made in response to coordinated lobbying rather than genuine editorial standards assessments. The Lattouf judgment found the ABC “abjectly surrendered” its editorial independence. Legislative reform should ensure this cannot recur.

Recommendation S6: Addressing the social cohesion impact

54. That the Commission explicitly find, in its final report, that coordinated campaigns to suppress legitimate political discourse — regardless of which community initiates them — are harmful to social cohesion and inconsistent with the constitutional system of representative government. Such a finding would provide authoritative guidance to institutions facing similar pressure in future and affirm that social cohesion requires the protection of political discourse, not its suppression.

10. Conclusion

55. The evidence before this Commission is not speculative. It is judicially determined, documented in primary sources, and confirmed across multiple independent proceedings. A Federal Court has found that Australia’s national broadcaster unlawfully dismissed a journalist because she held a political opinion, acting in capitulation to an orchestrated campaign. Dozens of health professionals, academics, journalists, and artists have been subjected to coordinated regulatory complaints, strategic litigation, and professional pressure for expressing views on a matter of legitimate public concern.

56. Commissioner Bell observed in her Morrison Ministries Inquiry Report that conduct undermining institutional integrity is “corrosive of trust in government” (Bell, Report of the Inquiry into the Appointment to Administer Multiple Departments, November 2022). The same principle applies here. When institutional complaint mechanisms are captured by coordinated campaigns, when anti-discrimination law is deployed as a tool of political suppression, and when editorial independence is surrendered to organised pressure, public trust in the impartiality and integrity of those institutions is corroded.

57. Social cohesion is not served by silencing dissent. It is served by ensuring that all Australians — including those who hold views critical of any government’s policies — can participate in political discourse without fear of coordinated professional, legal, and regulatory retaliation. The recommendations in this submission are directed at restoring that capacity.

Sources and References

Australian Court Judgments and Legal Proceedings

• Lattouf v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (No 2) [2025] FCA 669 (Justice Rangiah, 25 June 2025). Full judgment: en.wikisource.org/wiki/Lattouf_v_Australian_Broadcasting_Corporation_(No_2)_(2025,_FCA). Analysis: Hunt & Hunt Lawyers, hunthunt.com.au/insights/federal-court-confirms-political-opinion-is-a-protected-attribute-in-dismissal-lattouf-v-abc-2025-fca-669/
• Cassuto v Kostakidis, Federal Court of Australia (filed April 2025, ongoing). ZFA announcement: zfa.com.au/zfa-ceo-alon-cassuto-to-file-18c-complaint-against-mary-kostakidis/. Defence filed December 2025. PEN Melbourne statement: penmelbourne.org/israel-lobbys-attack-on-kostakidis-threatens-everyones-right-to-free-speech/
• Toltz & Ors v Riemer & Anor (NSD950/2025) and Toltz & Ors v Keane & Anor (NSD951/2025), Federal Court of Australia, Human Rights Division, NSW Registry (filed 13 June 2025, interlocutory rulings 14 November 2025, defences due March 2026). Judge: Kennett J. Honi Soit: honisoit.com/2025/10/linguistics-on-trial/
• Cassuto v Kostakidis [2025] FCA 1226, Federal Court of Australia (Justice McDonald, interlocutory ruling on the scope of Wertheim v Haddad)

Australian Government and Regulatory Documents

• Letters Patent establishing the Royal Commission into Antisemitism and Social Cohesion, 9 January 2026 (ag.gov.au)
• IHRA Working Definition of Antisemitism (adopted by the Commission per the Letters Patent)
• AHPRA official data: 59 complaints against 39 health practitioners (reported April 2024). Updated social media guidelines: Wotton Kearney, wottonkearney.com/update-to-ahpras-social-media-guidelines/
• Australian Research Council, reinstatement of Dr Randa Abdel-Fattah’s fellowship, 23 December 2025. ARC Grants Data Portal: dataportal.arc.gov.au/NCGP/Web/Grant/Grant/FT220100427
• Creative Australia, governance review and reinstatement of Khaled Sabsabi, 3 July 2025. Artsy: artsy.net/article/artsy-editorial-khaled-sabsabi-reselected-represent-australia-2026-venice-biennale-controversy
• Bell, Virginia AC SC, Report of the Inquiry into the Appointment to Administer Multiple Departments (November 2022)
• Amnesty International Australia, statement on University of Melbourne expulsions and suspensions (2025): amnesty.org.au/amnesty-demands-university-of-melbourne-reverse-expulsions-and-suspensions-over-palestine-protests/

High Court Jurisprudence

• Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520
• McCloy v NSW (2015) 257 CLR 178
• Clubb v Edwards (2019) 267 CLR 171
• Comcare v Banerji (2019) 267 CLR 373
• Brown v Tasmania (2017) 261 CLR 328

Australian Media Reporting

• Sydney Morning Herald, “Secret WhatsApp messages show co-ordinated campaign to oust Antoinette Lattouf from ABC” (15–16 January 2024)
• The Conversation, “Antoinette Lattouf’s unfair dismissal win shows ABC must be more courageous in defending its journalists” (June 2025): theconversation.com/antoinette-lattoufs-unfair-dismissal-win-shows-abc-must-be-more-courageous-in-defending-its-journalists-259445
• The Conversation, “The Jewish creatives’ WhatsApp leak was more whistleblowing than doxing. Here’s why” (February 2024): theconversation.com/the-jewish-creatives-whatsapp-leak-was-more-whistleblowing-than-doxing-heres-why-223552
• The Age, feature on Mary Kostakidis (July 2024)
• Michael West Media, “Israel, Gaza and Australian politics: master lobbyist Mark Leibler reveals how power really works” (2018): michaelwest.com.au/israel-gaza-and-australian-politics-master-lobbyist-mark-leibler-reveals-how-power-really-works/
• Crikey, “Journalists boycott SEN after sacking of pro-Palestine Peter Lalor” (5 February 2025): crikey.com.au/2025/02/05/peter-lalor-pro-palestine-posts-journalists-boycott/
• Mumbrella, “Peter Lalor dumped by SEN over Palestine posts” (February 2025): mumbrella.com.au/peter-lalor-dumped-by-sen-over-palestine-posts-863127
• Times Higher Education, “Randa Abdel-Fattah: ARC grant suspension ‘about probity, not politics’” (February 2025)
• Overland, “Open letter on academic freedom, in solidarity with Randa Abdel-Fattah” (February 2025): overland.org.au/2025/02/open-letter-on-academic-freedom-in-solidarity-with-randa-abdel-fattah/
• WSWS, “Australian academic Randa Abdel-Fattah finally cleared of Zionist-instigated allegations” (29 December 2025): wsws.org/en/articles/2025/12/29/ptjw-d29.html
• The Art Newspaper, “In a rare interview, Khaled Sabsabi speaks of his ‘devastation’ after being dropped” (3 April 2025): theartnewspaper.com/2025/04/03/interview-khaled-sabsabi-dropped-australia-representative-2026-venice-biennale
• Michael West Media, “Zionist lobby class action over vexatious complaints after years of vexatious complaining”: michaelwest.com.au/zionist-lobby-class-action-over-vexatious-complaints-after-years-of-vexatious-complaints
• Honi Soit, “Linguistics on Trial: First Major Hearing of the Claims Against USyd Academics Keane and Riemer” (October 2025): honisoit.com/2025/10/linguistics-on-trial/

International Judicial and Regulatory Proceedings

• Miller v University of Bristol, Case No 1400780/2022, Employment Tribunals (ruling 5 February 2024). Full judgment: judiciary.uk/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/Miller-judgment-1400780.2022-JDT.pdf. Analysis: Oxford Academic, Industrial Law Journal, “Anti-Zionism as ‘Protected Belief’: The Case of David Miller” (2024): academic.oup.com/ilj/advance-article/doi/10.1093/indlaw/dwaf048/8339654
• AAUP/MESA v. DHS federal litigation, US District Court (2025). Testimony of Peter Hatch: Knight First Amendment Institute, “DHS ‘Tiger Team’ Scrutinizing Student Protesters Was Told to Investigate 5,000 Names Listed by Canary Mission, ICE Official Testifies” (July 2025): knightcolumbia.org/content/dhs-tiger-team-scrutinizing-student-protesters-was-told-to-investigate-5000-names-listed-by-canary-mission-ice-official-testifies. Jewish Telegraphic Agency, 10 July 2025: jta.org/2025/07/10/politics/deportation-filing-confirms-that-trump-officials-used-canary-mission-list-to-target-students. CNN, 30 September 2025: cnn.com/2025/09/30/politics/first-amendment-judge-young-donald-trump-deportation-pro-palestinian-protesters
• Salaita v Kennedy et al., settlement November 2015. Center for Constitutional Rights: ccrjustice.org/home/what-we-do/our-cases/salaita-v-kennedy-et-al
• UK Charity Commission, remedial action plan re Campaign Against Antisemitism (2025)
• UK Charity Commission, investigation into UKLFI Charitable Trust (2025)

Investigative Journalism and International Reports

• Haaretz, “Revealed: Canary Mission Blacklist Is Secretly Bankrolled by Major Jewish Federation” (3 October 2018): haaretz.com/us-news/2018-10-03/ty-article/revealed-canary-mission-blacklist-is-secretly-bankrolled-by-major-jewish-federation/
• The Forward, “Second Major Jewish Charity Admits Funding Group Tied To Canary Mission Blacklist” (2018): forward.com/news/411895/second-major-jewish-charity-admits-funding-canary-mission-blacklist/
• Al Jazeera Investigative Unit, The Lobby (documentary, January 2017): ajiunit.com/investigation/the-lobby/
• CAGE International, report on UKLFI activities (2025)
• Ricochet Media, five-part podcast on Canary Mission targeting of Canadians (2025)
• Academics for Palestine WA, “A Climate of Fear: Quantifying the Suppression of Speech on Palestine in Australia”: academicsforpalestinewa.substack.com/p/a-climate-of-fear-an-empirical-report
• Open letter by 52 Jewish university staff, students, and alumni, published in Overland (29 May 2025)
• SafeWork Investigation Findings, University of Sydney (September 2024)
• Hodgkinson Report: External review of University of Sydney’s handling of antisemitism (November 2024), by Bruce Hodgkinson AM SC
• Universities Australia, “Working Definition on Combatting Antisemitism” (February 2025)

Academic and Practitioner Texts

• Jacobi, Chad SC, and Sarah Newman, Royal Commissions: Law and Practice (Thomson Reuters, 2022)
• Donaghue, Stephen, Royal Commissions and Permanent Commissions of Inquiry (Butterworths, 2001)
• ALRC, Report 111: Making Inquiries — A New Statutory Framework (2009)
• EduResearch Matters, “These are deeply disturbing patterns of censorship across Australian universities” (2025): blog.aare.edu.au/these-are-deeply-disturbing-patterns-of-censorship-across-australian-universities/

Structural Conflicts of Interest in Advocacy Representation Before the Commission

Arnold Bloch Leibler: A Case Study

Supplementary submission to the Royal Commission into Antisemitism and Social Cohesion

1. Introduction

1. When a single law firm’s partners simultaneously hold leadership positions in the advocacy organisations they represent, instruct litigation on behalf of those organisations, and provide pro bono legal services to politicians from both major parties, the regulatory framework for managing conflicts of interest is engaged. This is so regardless of which community or cause is involved, and regardless of the quality of the legal work performed.

2. Concentrated advocacy-law firm structures exist across Australian public life. While specific comparators are not documented in detail here, the regulatory concern applies wherever a law firm’s partners simultaneously hold leadership positions in the organisations that firm represents: mining companies retaining firms whose partners sit on industry lobby boards; gambling interests represented by firms whose partners lead industry associations; religious institutions instructing firms whose senior partners hold leadership roles in the same denominations. In each case, the structural question is the same: whether the existing professional conduct rules adequately address conflicts arising from the concurrent holding of advocacy leadership and legal representation roles. This submission examines one such case study — not because it is unique, but because it is the case before this Commission.

3. On 24 February 2026, the Executive Council of Australian Jewry announced that seven peak Jewish organisations — ECAJ, AIJAC, the Zionist Federation of Australia, the NSW Jewish Board of Deputies, the Jewish Community Council of Victoria, the National Council of Jewish Women, and the Dor Foundation — had jointly appointed Arnold Bloch Leibler (“ABL”) to represent them before this Commission on a pro bono basis.

4. ABL is not simply a law firm that has been retained by community organisations. The following concurrent roles are documented in this submission:

• ABL’s senior partner, Mark Leibler AC, is the National Chairman of AIJAC — one of the seven organisations ABL now represents before the Commission.
• ABL partner Jeremy Leibler is the President of the Zionist Federation of Australia — another of the seven organisations.
• ABL partners Leon Zwier and Raphael Leibler are the solicitors on the record in Cassuto v Kostakidis, litigation brought by the ZFA’s CEO against an Australian journalist.
• ABL has provided pro bono legal services to politicians from both major parties, including Peter Dutton and Bill Shorten.
• Mark Leibler, through his chairmanship of AIJAC, oversees the Rambam Israel Fellowship — the single largest private sponsor of parliamentary trips to Israel.

5. This submission does not criticise ABL for representing Jewish community organisations. Pro bono representation of community bodies is commendable. What it documents is a structural concentration of roles that the existing regulatory framework does not adequately address — and that, as §2 explains, ultimately endangers the community it purports to serve.

2. Why This Matters for Antisemitism — and for Jewish Australians

6. This submission documents the structural concentration set out below not to target a firm or a community, but because the concentration itself is a driver of the antisemitism the Commission is tasked with addressing. The Commission should consider this framing before reading the detailed factual recitation in the sections that follow.

7. The concentration of advocacy, litigation, political, and institutional roles documented in this submission creates a structural appearance problem. When a small number of individuals hold concurrent leadership positions across advocacy organisations, a law firm, and related litigation, the public is invited to draw inferences of coordination that may or may not reflect reality. That appearance problem — the perception that community institutions act as a single coordinated bloc — is itself a driver of the conflation between Jewish Australians and the political positions of particular organisations. It is this conflation that the Commission is examining.

8. That conclusion is false. It is false because 52 Jewish academics signed an open letter rejecting the conflation. It is false because the Jewish Council of Australia — representing over 1,300 Jewish signatories — explicitly states: “We reject the assertion that Jews and the State of Israel are one and the same.” It is false because Jewish Women for Peace, the Australian Jewish Democratic Society, the Tzedek Collective, Jews Against the Occupation ’48, and Jewish Voices of Inner Sydney have all told this Commission, or the courts, or parliamentary inquiries, that they do not support the equation. At least 30% of Australian Jews do not identify as Zionist (Gen17 Australian Jewish Community Survey, 2017).

9. But the structural concentration documented in this submission makes the conclusion appear true. And when it appears true — when the same individuals hold concurrent roles across multiple institutions — it produces precisely the conditions in which antisemitism flourishes. As Sarah Schwartz of the Jewish Council of Australia has stated: “The conflation by the pro-Israel lobby and some Jewish organisations can fuel and lead to people making a conflation themselves, to blame all Jewish people for Israel’s crimes — which is antisemitic” (Jewish Council of Australia, Senate inquiry submission, 2024).

10. Brian Klug of Oxford put it most precisely: “When antisemitism is everywhere, it is nowhere. And when every anti-Zionist is an antisemite, we no longer know how to recognise the real thing” (Brian Klug, “The Collective Jew: Israel and the New Antisemitism,” Patterns of Prejudice, vol. 37, no. 2, 2003).

11. The structural concentration documented in this submission does not protect Jewish Australians. It endangers them — by collapsing the distinction between a diverse community and a foreign state’s political interests, and by ensuring that every act of legal aggression against a critic of Israel is read, by the public, as an act committed in the name of all Jews. The Commission should address these structural conflicts because doing so protects both the integrity of its proceedings and the Jewish community’s interest in not being identified with a single political position.

3. The Structural Concentration

3.1 Mark Leibler AC — Senior Partner, ABL

12. Mark Leibler AC has been a partner of Arnold Bloch Leibler since 1969 and remains its senior partner. He holds the following positions simultaneously:

• National Chairman of AIJAC — since 1996
• Life Chairman of the United Israel Appeal of Australia
• Chair of the World Board of Trustees of Keren Hayesod
• Member of the Board of Governors and Executive of the Jewish Agency for Israel — since 1992
• Executive of the World Zionist Organization
• Governor of the Australia-Israel Chamber of Commerce
• Governor of Tel Aviv University
• Former President of the Zionist Federation of Australia — approximately ten years

13. In a candid 2018 speech published by Michael West Media, Leibler described AIJAC’s approach to media criticism of Israel. Speaking of former ABC Middle East correspondent Sophie McNeill, he stated: “Our representations, both public and private, undoubtedly moderated her behaviour because she knew she was being watched.” Media monitoring and making representations to broadcasters is a normal part of advocacy activity, and organisations across the political spectrum engage in it. The structural concern is not the activity itself but whether the concentration of advocacy leadership, legal representation, and political access documented in this submission gives disproportionate leverage to such representations.

13A. The question of whose interests ABL’s senior partner represents is further illustrated by a February 2025 incident. Mark Leibler paid to promote a tweet calling anti-Zionist Jews “repulsive and revolting human beings” and “vicious antisemites” — a post that reached approximately 400,000 views. Six Melbourne Jews filed an AHRC complaint. Leibler subsequently apologised, acknowledging the language was “intemperate.” The Commission should consider what it means for the claim of community representation when the senior partner of the firm representing peak Jewish organisations before a Royal Commission into antisemitism publicly denounces dissenting Jews in these terms.

3.2 Jeremy Leibler — Partner, ABL; President, ZFA

14. Jeremy Leibler is a partner at Arnold Bloch Leibler and simultaneously the President of the Zionist Federation of Australia. This dual role — president of an advocacy organisation and partner at the firm that represents it — is the structural conflict this submission examines. It was the ZFA, under Jeremy Leibler’s presidency, that announced the Section 18C complaint against Mary Kostakidis in July 2024. On 14 July 2024 — the same day the AHRC complaint was filed — the ZFA held a press conference attended by Jeremy Leibler to publicise the complaint. The Applicant has admitted this fact in court filings (Reply, para 5(b)(i)). Kostakidis had not been contacted before the press conference.

15. Jeremy Leibler’s activist role extends beyond the ZFA’s litigation. On 24 October 2023 — just seventeen days after October 7 — he personally filed a complaint with the Australian Health Practitioner Regulation Agency (AHPRA) against a Melbourne doctor over social media posts about Gaza. He was not alone. Publicly reported figures indicate that between October 2023 and mid-2025, an estimated 188 complaints were lodged against 95 health practitioners with AHPRA — the vast majority anonymous. The method involved individuals joining closed Facebook groups like “Doctors for Palestine,” capturing screenshots, and posting them to accounts such as “notmydoctor48” on Instagram alongside practitioners’ personal details. The ZFA president personally participating in this regulatory pressure campaign, while simultaneously holding a partnership at the firm litigating on behalf of the ZFA, illustrates the structural concentration this submission documents.

16. The complaint was then prosecuted in the Federal Court as Cassuto v Kostakidis (VID404/2025). The solicitors on the record: Leon Zwier and Raphael Leibler of Arnold Bloch Leibler. The applicant: Alon Cassuto, CEO of the Zionist Federation of Australia — the organisation whose president is a partner at the firm providing the legal representation. Notably, Cassuto’s role as CEO of the ZFA was not disclosed in the original Statement of Claim filed 31 March 2025, which described him only as “Jewish and a dual Australian-Israeli citizen.” His ZFA position was added only in the Amended Statement of Claim filed 8 May 2025.

3.3 The ABL Partners in the Kostakidis Litigation

17. Leon Zwier is the head of ABL’s dispute resolution practice. Raphael Leibler became an ABL partner in 2023. Together, they act for Cassuto in proceedings that seek declarations that Kostakidis’s social media posts — including a pure repost with no words of her own — contravene section 18C of the Racial Discrimination Act. ABL’s involvement predates the court proceedings: Lauren Winn of ABL lodged the AHRC complaint, with Cassuto’s contact address listed as “C/O Arnold Bloch Leibler Level 21, 333 Collins Street.” The authority to act authorises Raphael Leibler specifically.

18. The demand letter sent to Kostakidis on 8 July 2024 required her not only to remove the two posts but to remove “other antisemitic materials” from her account and to undertake not to “repeat the same or similar conduct in the future” — a forward-looking restriction that, had it been agreed to, would have operated as a de facto ongoing injunction against similar speech. She was given four days to comply. A further letter repeated the same terms on 17 July 2024.

19. The formal claim sues on only two posts. But the Further Amended Statement of Claim deploys 61 of Kostakidis’s posts spanning October 2023 to March 2025 as contextual evidence. As the Defence notes, 52 of those 61 posts post-date the conduct actually sued upon. The breadth of the contextual material — ranging from political commentary about Gaza to shared articles about the IHRA definition — illustrates the scope of speech the litigation seeks to characterise as unlawful.

3.4 Robert Goot AO SC — ECAJ Deputy President

20. Robert Goot AO SC is not an ABL partner, but his role illustrates how overlapping positions operate across the cases this Commission will examine. He is the Deputy President of the Executive Council of Australian Jewry and its immediate past president (having served as President from 2007 to 2010 and 2013 to 2016). He practised as a barrister from 1980 to 2024, taking silk in 2000. His communal leadership roles extend to the international level: he is a Vice President of the World Jewish Congress, a member of its Executive Committee and Governing Board, and since 2015 Co-Chair of the WJC Policy Council. He has been an Honorary Life Member of the NSW Jewish Board of Deputies since 1986.

21. Goot was a co-applicant in Wertheim & Goot v Haddad [2025] FCA 720 — the case in which Justice Stewart drew the line between antisemitism and political criticism of Israel. His affidavit in those proceedings, sworn 24 March 2025, presents him as a distressed community elder who “never personally experienced antisemitism” until after October 7, 2023, and who now feels that Australia is “largely unrecognisable” as a safe place for Jews. The affidavit does not address the matters set out in the following paragraphs.

22. Goot was an active participant in the “Lawyers for Israel” WhatsApp group — approximately 157 Australian lawyers, formed after October 7, 2023. In Lattouf v ABC [2025] FCA 669, Justice Rangiah found that the ABC had unlawfully terminated journalist Antoinette Lattouf “for reasons including that she held a political opinion opposing the Israeli military campaign in Gaza” and partly “to appease pro-Israel lobbyists.” The Lawyers for Israel group coordinated the campaign. On the morning of 20 December 2023, Goot told the group: “I understand she will be gone from morning radio from Friday.” When asked whether the termination was about “her stance on Israel or other reasons,” Goot replied with a single word: “Israel.”

23. The group’s administrator, solicitor Nicky Stein, had explained the strategy: “It is important ABC hears not just from individuals in the community but specifically lawyers so they feel there is an actual legal threat.” She simultaneously acknowledged the threat was illusory: “I know there is probably no actionable offence against ABC but I didn’t say I would be taking one — just investigating one.”

24. The Lawyers for Israel group was not the only WhatsApp group coordinating activity against critics of Israel. The Defence in Cassuto v Kostakidis (para 29(g)), settled by Sheryn Omeri KC, pleads that a separate “Creative WhatsApp Group” — a private group of approximately 600 Jewish creatives and academics — also coordinated responses to Kostakidis’s posts. The Defence documents a sequence of referrals from this group to the legal proceedings that ABL now prosecutes:

• 6 December 2023: The Defence pleads that after Kostakidis made a post on X, a Creative WhatsApp Group member wrote: “what can we do!?”, to which another replied: “Perhaps this is suitable for lawyers group, [mobile telephone number]?” The phone number is included in the Defence filing.
• 14 January 2024: According to the Defence filing, after the 13 January Post, a Creative WhatsApp Group member wrote: “Is there no legal avenue against her.”
• 8 July 2024: The Defence pleads that Arnold Bloch Leibler sent Kostakidis the demand letter described in paragraph 18.
• 14 July 2024: According to the Defence filing, ABL’s Lauren Winn lodged the AHRC complaint on behalf of Alon Cassuto. The Defence pleads that the ZFA held a press conference the same day with President Jeremy Leibler — a partner at ABL — publicising the complaint before Kostakidis had been contacted.
• 31 March 2025: The Defence pleads that ABL filed in the Federal Court. Leon Zwier and Raphael Leibler signed the originating application.

Note: The above timeline is drawn entirely from the respondent’s Defence filing in Cassuto v Kostakidis. These are untested allegations that have not been the subject of cross-examination or judicial findings. They are included here because the structural pattern they describe, if established, is relevant to this submission’s analysis.

The Defence characterises this sequence as evidence that “the proceeding has been instituted as part of a deliberate campaign to undermine and discredit the Respondent… in order to cause a chilling effect on her and others.” The Defence states that further particulars of the connection between the WhatsApp referral and the subsequent proceedings will be provided following discovery.

25. Eight or nine members of the Lawyers for Israel group obtained a 10-year suppression order over their identities at the start of the Lattouf trial. Those members, represented by Sue Chrysanthou SC, subsequently brought contempt proceedings against Nine Entertainment journalists who had published details from the WhatsApp messages. Justice Rangiah dismissed the contempt application, finding that Nine could not reasonably have known which of the 157 group members were covered by the suppression order. At least one member has been publicly identified through her own conduct: solicitor Deborah Wiener, who posted the word “Traiter!” [sic] in the group in response to news of its exposure.

26. The Commission should note a structural gap in the regulatory framework. The existing rules governing affidavit evidence do not require deponents to disclose their involvement in related proceedings or campaigns. As a result, a court considering an affidavit in one proceeding may receive an incomplete picture of the deponent’s concurrent advocacy activities in other forums. In Goot’s case, the affidavit in Wertheim v Haddad presents him as a recipient of distress from antisemitic speech. The regulatory framework did not require disclosure of his concurrent participation in the WhatsApp campaign that the Federal Court, in Lattouf v ABC, found was part of an unlawful termination. No single tribunal had both sets of information before it.

3.5 Peter Wertheim AM — Co-CEO, ECAJ

27. Peter Wertheim AM is the Co-Chief Executive Officer of ECAJ and the first applicant in Wertheim & Goot v Haddad. He was previously a lawyer for 32 years and has extensive personal experience in section 18C proceedings. His affidavit, sworn 24 March 2025, details his involvement as instructing solicitor in a series of racial vilification cases dating from the 1990s, including Jones v Toben [2002] FCA 1150, Jones v Scully [2002] FCA 1080, and complaints against An Nahar and El Telegraph. He was President of the NSW Jewish Board of Deputies from 1996 to 2000, a statutory board member of the NSW Anti-Discrimination Board from 2004 to 2015, and a member of the Australian Multicultural Advisory Council from 2010 to 2013.

28. Like Goot’s affidavit, Wertheim’s presents its deponent as a passive recipient of distress — a community leader who “never encountered antisemitism or discrimination growing up or in my adult life in Australia” until Haddad’s speeches. The affidavit does not address that ECAJ, the organisation of which Wertheim is Co-CEO, publicly supported the complaints against Antoinette Lattouf — complaints that the Federal Court subsequently found were part of an unlawful campaign to terminate a journalist for her political opinions. Nor does it address that ECAJ is one of the seven organisations that has jointly retained ABL to appear before this Commission.

29. Wertheim’s active advocacy role extends beyond the Lattouf matter. The Statement of Claim in Toltz v Keane (NSD951/2025) records that on 1 December 2023, “Peter Wertheim of the Executive Council of Australian Jewry and Mark Scott discussed concerns of Jewish staff and students including their unanswered complaints regarding Professor Keane’s email.” This places the ECAJ’s Co-CEO in direct advocacy with the Vice Chancellor of the University of Sydney about the complaints that would later become the Toltz litigation — another proceeding in which ECAJ’s institutional resources and data are deployed as evidence.

30. In Wertheim v Haddad itself, the respondents challenged ECAJ’s institutional role in the proceedings. They noted that none of the applicants’ witnesses — except one — had viewed any of the speeches in full “until they were provided to them by the Applicants’ solicitors or a researcher from the Executive Council of Australian Jewry” (Respondents’ Closing Submissions, para 29). The respondents further observed that witnesses “were either approached by one of the Applicants or a representative of the Executive Council of Australian Jewry personally, or put their name forward to give evidence upon hearing about a prospective case about alleged ‘hate speech’” — a process that would “tend to result in the presentation of witnesses whose perspective aligns with that of the Applicants regardless of the extent to which it is representative of the broader community” (para 36). Wertheim and Goot sued in their personal capacity, but the institutional resources of ECAJ were deployed throughout.

31. The Commission should consider what it means that both applicants in Wertheim v Haddad — a case about the boundaries of permissible speech — presented themselves to the Federal Court as concerned community elders and victims of hate speech, while withholding their active roles in campaigns that the same court, in other proceedings, characterised as suppression of political speech. No single court saw the full picture. This is the structural problem this submission documents: the same individuals present different aspects of their engagement in different forums, and the absence of cross-proceeding disclosure requirements means that no single tribunal has the information necessary to assess concurrent advocacy activities.

3.6 Pro Bono Services to Politicians

32. ABL has provided pro bono legal services to senior politicians from both major parties:

• Peter Dutton — disclosed 23 December 2024 that ABL provided pro bono legal advice (parliamentary register of interests, disclosed 23 December 2024)
• Bill Shorten — represented by Leon Zwier during the 2015 Trade Union Royal Commission (parliamentary register of interests)
• Josh Frydenberg — represented in his 2017 citizenship challenge (parliamentary register of interests; per media reporting, costs reportedly exceeded $410,000 — Australian Financial Review)
• Tony Abbott — represented in defamation proceedings (parliamentary register of interests)
• Arthur Sinodinos and Jason Falinski — represented in the dual citizenship crisis (parliamentary registers of interests)

33. These services are provided while the firm’s senior partner chairs AIJAC, which — through the Rambam Israel Fellowship — is the single largest private sponsor of parliamentary trips to Israel. Between 2010 and 2018, AIJAC sponsored 102 trips — more than any other country program, including China (63) and the United States (49) (parliamentary trip disclosures, compiled by Crikey). The same firm that provides free legal services to Australia’s political leaders also oversees the program that flies those leaders to Israel. Geoffrey Watson SC of the Centre for Public Integrity observed that such arrangements warrant scrutiny because “commercial law firms can receive government contracts.”

4. The Cases: Overlapping Roles Across Multiple Proceedings

34. The Commission will examine multiple legal proceedings arising from the post-October 7 period. The same individuals and organisations appear across them. The following table documents the structural relationships:

35. The table above documents the pattern. The relevant point is not merely that the same law firm appears across proceedings, but that the same individuals hold simultaneous leadership positions in the advocacy organisations, the law firm, and the cases — and that the firm now represents the peak organisations before the Commission that will assess those cases.

36. The cases also form an interlocking set of legal precedents. The applicants in Toltz v Riemer cite Cassuto v Kostakidis [2025] FCA 1226 as authority that anti-Zionist speech can contravene section 18C. The respondents in Toltz and the Defence in Cassuto cite Wertheim v Haddad [2025] FCA 720 for the opposite proposition — that criticism of Zionism is criticism of a political ideology, not racial vilification. The Defence in Cassuto also cites Toltz v Keane [2025] FCA 1386 and Toltz v Riemer [2025] FCA 1385. The same legal theory — that “Zionist” is a proxy for “Jewish” for the purposes of section 18C — is being advanced across all three proceedings, with each case generating precedent that the others cite. The structural concentration of roles documented in this submission is mirrored by a structural concentration of legal argument: the same organisations, through different solicitors but overlapping leadership, are building an interlocking body of precedent on the question that goes to the heart of the Commission’s mandate.

5. The Regulatory Gap

37. Australian solicitors’ conduct rules do not specifically address the scenario documented above. The Australian Solicitors’ Conduct Rules require lawyers to avoid conflicts of interest (Rules 10-12) and to act in the interests of the client rather than the lawyer’s own interest (Rule 4.1.4). But where the lawyer is the leader of the client organisation, the conventional conflict framework breaks down. There is no external client whose interests might diverge from the lawyer’s own.

38. In Mitchell v Burrell [2008] NSWSC 772 at [34]–[38], the court considered when a solicitor’s personal stake in proceedings creates a conflict. The relevant principle is that a solicitor who has “a personal stake in the outcome of the proceedings or in their conduct, beyond the recovery of proper fees” — a stake that “may not necessarily be financial, but involves the personal or reputational interest of the solicitor” — faces a conflict that the court may address.

39. The UK Solicitors Regulation Authority’s Rule 6.1 provides a clearer standard: solicitors must not act where there is a “significant risk” that the solicitor’s duty to act in the best interests of the client may be adversely affected by “your own financial or personal interests.” In the UK framework, the simultaneous holding of a ZFA presidency and a partnership at the firm litigating for the ZFA would plainly engage scrutiny.

40. In Australia, no regulatory body has examined the arrangement. The Legal Services Commissioner has not been asked to consider whether the structural concentration of advocacy leadership and legal representation roles documented above engages the conflict of interest provisions of the profession’s regulatory framework.

6. The Foreign Influence Dimension

41. The structural concentration extends beyond domestic advocacy. Mark Leibler has served on the Board of Governors and Executive of the Jewish Agency for Israel since 1992 — an Israeli statutory body. He has served as Chair of the World Board of Trustees of Keren Hayesod — the principal fundraising arm of the State of Israel. The United Israel Appeal of Australia, of which Leibler is Life Chairman, has remitted $376 million to Israel via Keren Hayesod since 2013, with $50.9 million in tax-deductible donations received in 2024 alone.

42. Engagement with international bodies is not inherently improper. Australians hold positions on foreign statutory bodies across many sectors — trade, sport, religion, and cultural diplomacy. The regulatory question is whether such engagement, combined with domestic advocacy and litigation roles, triggers obligations under the Foreign Influence Transparency Scheme (“FITS”) that Parliament has enacted but not enforced.

43. No advocacy organisation in Australia whose leadership holds concurrent positions on foreign statutory bodies appears to have been required to register under FITS. The Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security’s review of FITS found “significant flaws” and an “abject failure of enforcement.” The Commission should consider whether any Australian advocacy organisation whose leadership holds concurrent positions on foreign statutory bodies — including but not limited to the Jewish Agency for Israel, Keren Hayesod, and the World Zionist Organization — should be assessed for registration under the foreign influence framework.

44. The gap between foreign influence frameworks and their enforcement is not unique to any one community. In Australia, the PJCIS review noted that FITS enforcement failures extended across multiple sectors. In Canada, the Canada Revenue Agency has revoked the charitable status of organisations linked to foreign states, including the Jewish National Fund in August 2024 after finding it had used tax-deductible donations on Israeli military bases and occupied territory projects. The Australian FITS framework itself has not been applied to any advocacy organisation whose leadership holds concurrent positions on foreign statutory bodies — whether linked to Israel, China, Turkey, or any other foreign government. These cases illustrate a systemic regulatory gap, not a problem specific to any one national or ethnic community.

7. The Commission’s Own Proceeding

45. Commissioner Bell observed at the opening hearing that “criticism of the policies that may be pursued by the government of Israel from time to time is not of itself antisemitic.” This is the principle that Justice Stewart established in Wertheim v Haddad and that the Federal Court has applied in every subsequent case.

46. ABL is now the firm representing seven organisations before this Commission. ABL is simultaneously the firm prosecuting Cassuto v Kostakidis — a case that depends on the proposition that criticism of Israel is racial vilification. The Commission is being asked to receive submissions from a firm that is, in another courtroom, advancing a legal theory on which the Federal Court authorities are divided and that the Commissioner herself has implicitly disclaimed.

47. The Federal Court has already spoken clearly about the consequences of the kind of campaign this structural concentration facilitates. In the penalty judgment in Lattouf v ABC [2025] FCA 1174, Justice Rangiah found that “the ABC let down the Australian public badly when it abjectly surrendered the rights of its employee Ms Lattouf to appease a lobby group” (at [68]). His Honour observed that the purpose of section 772(1) of the Fair Work Act is “to prevent employers from dismissing an employee for their political opinion in the face of demands by governments, political parties, lobbyists and other actors” (at [69]), and warned that “the capacity of contemporary society to engage in mass communication through social media has given lobby groups from all sides of the political spectrum increasing power to engage in campaigns of boycotting, public shaming and cancelling” (at [70]). The Lattouf campaign — in which ECAJ’s deputy president was an active participant — is precisely the kind of organised pressure that the structural concentration documented in this submission enables.

48. As documented in paragraphs 26 and 31, the affidavit evidence in Wertheim v Haddad did not disclose the deponents’ concurrent roles in campaigns to suppress speech critical of Israel. The Commission should weigh this when assessing submissions from the organisations these individuals lead. This is not a submission about the merits of Wertheim v Haddad — the Haddad speeches were, on any view, egregious. But the question of frankness matters because the same individuals who presented an incomplete picture of their engagement with speech regulation to one court are now, through the organisations they lead, presenting submissions to this Commission.

49. This submission does not ask the Commission to refuse ABL’s representation. The organisations are entitled to counsel of their choice. But the Commission should receive ABL’s submissions with full awareness of the structural interests the firm represents — interests that include both the wellbeing of Jewish Australians and the institutional and litigation positions of the organisations its partners lead.

8. Recommendations

50. Recommendation S10: Disclosure. That the Commission require any legal representative appearing before it on behalf of advocacy organisations to disclose: (a) whether any partner of the firm holds a leadership position in the organisation being represented; (b) whether the firm is concurrently instructed in litigation advancing or defending positions relevant to the Commission’s terms of reference; and (c) whether the firm has provided pro bono legal services to any elected official or political appointee within the preceding five years.

51. Recommendation S11: Regulatory referral. That the Commission refer to the Legal Services Commissioner the question of whether the concurrent holding of senior law firm partnerships and leadership positions in advocacy organisations that instruct the same firm in litigation engages the conflict of interest provisions of the Australian Solicitors’ Conduct Rules.

52. Recommendation S12: FITS enforcement. That the Commission recommend the Attorney-General direct an investigation into whether any Australian advocacy organisation whose leadership holds concurrent positions on boards of foreign statutory bodies is required to register under the Foreign Influence Transparency Scheme. This should encompass organisations with links to all foreign governments, including but not limited to Israel, China, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates, consistent with the PJCIS finding that FITS enforcement failures are systemic.

53. Recommendation S13: Independent data. That the Commission recommend the establishment of an independent government body to collect and verify antisemitism data, removing the current dependence on data produced by organisations that are simultaneously litigants, lobbyists, and advocacy bodies with a direct interest in the findings. (This recommendation is also addressed in Section 2 of the final submission, which examines the data methodology concerns in detail.)

9. Conclusion

54. This submission has documented a structural concentration of roles in which the same individuals serve simultaneously as senior partners of a law firm, presidents and chairs of the advocacy organisations that firm represents, instructing solicitors in litigation brought by those organisations, and now as representatives before this Commission. The same concentration extends to pro bono political services and concurrent positions on foreign statutory bodies.

55. The structural concentration is this submission’s concern. The Commission should address it — not because it implicates a particular firm or community, but because unaddressed conflicts of interest undermine the integrity of proceedings, and because the conflation of a diverse Jewish community with a single political position is itself a driver of antisemitism. Addressing these structural conflicts protects both the Commission’s work and the community it seeks to serve.

Sources

Court Proceedings

• Cassuto v Kostakidis, VID404/2025, Federal Court of Australia (ongoing). Solicitors: Leon Zwier and Raphael Leibler, Arnold Bloch Leibler. Originating Application (31 March 2025); Amended Statement of Claim (8 May 2025); Further Amended Statement of Claim (31 October 2025); Defence; Reply.
• Cassuto v Kostakidis [2025] FCA 1226 (interlocutory judgment).
• Lattouf v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (No 2) [2025] FCA 669 (Justice Rangiah, 25 June 2025).
• Lattouf v Australian Broadcasting Corporation [2025] FCA 1174 (penalty judgment, Justice Rangiah).
• Contempt proceedings by suppressed Lawyers for Israel WhatsApp group members against Nine Entertainment (dismissed by Justice Rangiah).
• Wertheim & Goot v Haddad [2025] FCA 720 (Justice Stewart, 2025). Applicants’ Closing Submissions; Respondents’ Closing Submissions.
• Affidavit of Robert M Goot AO SC, sworn 24 March 2025, filed in Wertheim & Goot v Haddad (NSD1503/2024).
• Affidavit of Peter Wertheim AM, sworn 24 March 2025, filed in Wertheim & Goot v Haddad (NSD1503/2024).
• Toltz & Ors v Riemer & Anor (NSD950/2025) and Toltz & Ors v Keane & Anor (NSD951/2025), Federal Court of Australia (ongoing). Statement of Claim; Applicants’ Submissions in Reply.
• Toltz v Keane [2025] FCA 1386; Toltz v Riemer [2025] FCA 1385.
• Mitchell v Burrell [2008] NSWSC 772.

Organisational Statements

• ECAJ, “Key Jewish organisations together appoint Arnold Bloch Leibler to represent them at the Royal Commission” (24 February 2026).
• Open letter by 52 Jewish university staff and students, Overland (29 May 2025).
• Jewish Council of Australia, founding statement and core principles (2023); Senate inquiry submission (2024).

Regulatory Complaints

• AHPRA complaints data: 188 complaints against 95 health practitioners (October 2023 – mid-2025).
• Jeremy Leibler, personal AHPRA complaint filed 24 October 2023.
• Mark Leibler promoted tweet (February 2025); AHRC complaint by six Melbourne Jews; subsequent apology.

Media and Academic Sources

• Michael West Media, “Israel, Gaza and Australian politics: master lobbyist Mark Leibler reveals how power really works” (2018).
• Sydney Morning Herald, “Secret WhatsApp messages show co-ordinated campaign to oust Antoinette Lattouf from ABC” (15–16 January 2024).
• Geoffrey Watson SC, Centre for Public Integrity, on disclosure of pro bono political services.
• Crikey, parliamentary trip disclosures and Rambam Fellowship data.
• Brian Klug, “The Collective Jew: Israel and the New Antisemitism,” Patterns of Prejudice, vol. 37, no. 2 (2003).
• Gen17 Australian Jewish Community Survey (2017), on Jewish identification and Zionism.

Regulatory and Legal Framework

• Australian Solicitors’ Conduct Rules, Rules 4.1.4, 10, 11, 12.
• Legal Profession Uniform Law (NSW/Victoria).
• UK Solicitors Regulation Authority, Rule 6.1.
• Foreign Influence Transparency Scheme Act 2018 (Cth).
• PJCIS Review of FITS (findings on enforcement failures).
• Canada Revenue Agency, revocation of JNF Canada charitable status (August 2024).

Section 4: The Conflation That Endangers Jews

Terms of Reference 1 (drivers of antisemitism) and 4 (social cohesion)

114. The preceding sections have documented a pattern: legal proceedings that conflate criticism of Israel with antisemitism, data systems that classify pro-Palestinian speech as ideologically motivated hatred, and legislation that criminalises political slogans while exempting scriptural territorial claims. This section examines the underlying dynamic — the institutional conflation of Jewish identity with the State of Israel — and presents the academic evidence that this conflation does not protect Jewish Australians but exposes them to greater danger.

4.1 The Organisations Say It Themselves

115. The claim that pro-Israel advocacy organisations conflate Jewish identity with Israel is not an inference drawn from behaviour. It is stated in their own charters, mission statements, and public communications.

116. The Zionist Federation of Australia declares on its website that “the centrality of Israel to Jewish identity” is a core organisational value and that “Zionism is not just a political movement, but a cornerstone of Jewish peoplehood.” The ECAJ’s constitution includes among its objects “to support and strengthen the connection of Australian Jewry with the State of Israel.” AIJAC, which describes itself as “the premier public affairs organisation for the Australian Jewish community,” has published commentary asserting that separating Zionism from Jewish identity is itself an act of aggression — framing criticism of Zionism as inherently wounding to Jews.[^134]

Finding sought [Direct]: The Commission should find that the Zionist Federation of Australia, ECAJ, and AIJAC state in their own charters and public communications that Israel is central to Jewish identity, and that this conflation is a policy choice, not an inherent feature of Jewish identity. (ToR 1, ToR 4)

116A. The danger of this conflation is demonstrated by the Bondi attack itself. Wissam Haddad — whose network produced the attackers — explicitly rejected the Zionism/Judaism distinction. The Applicants’ Closing Submissions in Wertheim record that Haddad referred to “the Jews” no fewer than 169 times across his speeches without qualification, and stated: “There was no Zionists at the time of the Prophet, it was Jews, Yahud … don’t be fooled to think [ultra-Orthodox Jews] are still your friends.” He was “abundantly clear that in his view there was no difference between ultra-Orthodox religious Jews, who are not Zionists, and other Jews.”[^138] The institutional conflation examined in this section and the extremist conflation that motivated the Bondi attack are structurally identical propositions: both assert that Jewish identity and the State of Israel are inseparable. When advocacy organisations insist on the conflation and extremists accept it, the result is that political anger at Israel is channelled — by the extremists’ own logic — toward Jews. The organisations do not intend this outcome. But the mechanism operates regardless of intent.

Finding sought [Inference]: On the basis of the Wertheim record showing Haddad’s explicit rejection of the Zionism/Judaism distinction (169 unqualified references to “the Jews”), and the advocacy organisations’ own statements that Israel is central to Jewish identity, the Commission should find that the institutional conflation of Jewish identity with the State of Israel and the extremist conflation that motivated the Bondi attack share the same structural premise — that Jews and Israel are inseparable — and that this convergence widens the channel through which political anger at Israel reaches Jewish Australians. (ToR 1, ToR 4)

117. The pattern is not uniquely Australian. The Board of Deputies of British Jews under president Marie van der Zyl pledged to “defend Israel’s legitimacy and its centrality to Jewish identity.” ADL director Jonathan Greenblatt declared in 2022 that “Zionism and Jewishness are inseparable” and told dissenting staff that if they could not accept this equation, “maybe this isn’t the place for you.”[^135] Israel’s own government has legislated the conflation: the 2018 Nation-State Law states that “the right to exercise national self-determination in the State of Israel is unique to the Jewish people” and commits the state to “strengthen the affinity between the state and members of the Jewish people” in the diaspora.[^136] Benjamin Netanyahu has repeatedly claimed to speak for all Jews globally, stating before his 2015 US Congress address: “I went to Paris not just as the prime minister of Israel but as a representative of the entire Jewish people.”

118. The conflation is not merely rhetorical. It shapes data collection and institutional frameworks. The ADL broadened its antisemitism tracking methodology in 2023 to include rallies featuring “anti-Zionist chants and slogans,” accounting for approximately 1,317 of its 8,873 tallied incidents that year. Jewish-led peace rallies organised by Jewish Voice for Peace and IfNotNow were classified as “anti-Israel incidents” in the ADL’s database — an act that former ADL staff described as “defaming” Jewish people. The IHRA Working Definition of Antisemitism — which this Commission adopts as its reference framework — includes seven Israel-related illustrative examples out of eleven. As noted in Section 3, this submission does not challenge the Commission’s use of the definition for analytical purposes. The concern is its downstream application as a legal or regulatory instrument, which its lead drafter Kenneth Stern has testified amounts to “weaponising” the definition “to suppress legitimate political speech.”[^9]

119. In Australia, the same dynamic operates through the data systems examined in Section 2. When ECAJ and JCCV classify protest activity as antisemitic and attribute it to “far-left” ideology, they are operationalising the conflation — treating political criticism of a foreign government as evidence of racial hatred against a religious and ethnic group. The 53.4% “far-left” finding[^10] is not a measurement of ideological antisemitism. It is a measurement of how effectively the conflation framework has been embedded in data collection methodology.

4.1A The Definitional Gap — What Zionism Requires and What It Does Not

120. The preceding paragraphs establish that organisations conflate Jewish identity with the State of Israel. The natural next question is whether Zionism actually requires what these organisations defend. The Anti-Defamation League itself defines Zionism as “the movement for the self-determination and statehood for the Jewish people in their ancestral homeland” and states: “Zionism does not preclude support for Palestinian self-determination and statehood.”[^116] If this is so — if Zionism does not preclude Palestinian statehood — then advocacy for Palestinian statehood, including across the entirety of historic Palestine, cannot logically be anti-Zionist on the ADL’s own terms. The organisations insisting that pro-Palestinian advocacy is inherently anti-Zionist are contradicted by the definition of Zionism advanced by the world’s most prominent Jewish advocacy organisation.

121. The historical record deepens this contradiction. The Basel Programme of 1897, adopted at the First Zionist Congress, stated: “Zionism strives for the establishment of a publicly and legally secured home in Palestine for the Jewish people.” The word used was Heimstätte — home — not Staat — state. The deliberate ambiguity was a compromise. Herzl privately understood it as a state; his diary entry of 3 September 1897 reads: “At Basel I founded the Jewish State. If I said this out loud today I would be greeted by universal laughter.” But the formal programme left room for alternative visions — and those alternative visions were pursued by some of the most significant figures in the Zionist movement.[^117]

122. Ahad Ha’am (Asher Zvi Hirsch Ginsberg, 1856–1927), the founder of cultural Zionism, advocated for a Jewish “spiritual centre” in Eretz Israel — a model community serving as a cultural and moral focal point for the worldwide diaspora. He was not primarily interested in political sovereignty. He split from the Zionist movement after the First Congress because he considered Herzl’s programme impractical and morally insufficient. In his 1891 essay “Truth from Eretz Israel,” he “confuted the notion that Palestine was ‘empty’ or ‘abandoned,’ credited the Arabs with a collective identity that others had ignored, and condemned overbearing and sometimes violent Jewish behaviour toward Arabs.”[^118]

123. Martin Buber, Ahad Ha’am’s intellectual successor, argued that “Zionism should not aspire to create a Jewish nation-state, as such an arrangement would deny full equality to Palestinians and likely provoke war.” In May 1948, as Israel’s War of Independence raged, Buber published an essay titled “Zionism and ‘Zionism’” — with the nation-state model placed in scare quotes as a distorted, false ideology. Brit Shalom, founded in 1925 by Buber and others, called for “a binational state, in which the two peoples will enjoy totally equal rights as befits the two elements shaping the country’s destiny, irrespective of which of them is the majority.” Hugo Bergmann, writing in its journal, stated: “It is not a state to which we aspire, but a homeland.” Judah Magnes, a leading figure in the group, put it plainly: “What is Zionism? Immigration, settlement of the land, Hebrew life and culture. If you can guarantee these for me, I should be willing to yield the Jewish state and the Jewish majority.”[^119]

124. The logical consequence is significant. Binationalism, prior to the creation of the state, was not considered anti-Zionist. It was a strand within Zionism. If these figures — Ahad Ha’am, Buber, Magnes, Bergmann — were Zionists, and they were, then Zionism does not require a Jewish-majority state with exclusive Jewish sovereignty. It is compatible, on its own historical terms, with any political arrangement that allows Jews to live freely in the Levant — including a democratic state with equal rights for all inhabitants, including under Palestinian sovereignty.

Finding sought [Direct]: The Commission should find that significant figures within the Zionist movement — including Ahad Ha’am, Martin Buber, and Judah Magnes — advocated for models of Jewish presence in the Levant that did not require exclusive Jewish sovereignty, and that binationalism was a strand within Zionism, not a rejection of it. (ToR 1)

125. The Palestinian solidarity movement opposes none of what Zionism, in its minimal definition, requires. The BDS movement, launched on 9 July 2005 by over 170 Palestinian civil society organisations, makes three specific demands: ending the occupation and colonisation of all Arab lands occupied in June 1967 and dismantling the separation wall; recognising the fundamental rights of Arab-Palestinian citizens of Israel to full equality; and respecting, protecting, and promoting the rights of Palestinian refugees to return to their homes as stipulated in UN Resolution 194. Each demand is grounded in specific provisions of international law and existing UN resolutions. None requires the elimination of Jewish presence in the region. The demand for equal rights explicitly seeks equality for all, not exclusion of any group.[^120] What the movement actually targets are the over 65 Israeli laws documented by Adalah — the Legal Centre for Arab Minority Rights in Israel — that discriminate against Palestinian citizens, including the Absentees’ Property Law (which expropriated an estimated 40–60 per cent of Palestinian citizens’ land), the Citizenship and Entry into Israel Law (which denies family reunification to Palestinians from the occupied territories), and the Admissions Committees Law (which allows approximately 700 communities to filter out Palestinian citizens on grounds of “social unsuitability”).[^121] These are the actual targets of opposition — not Zionism in any minimal sense.

126. The gap between the minimal and maximal definitions of Zionism is the mechanism by which political criticism is transmuted into racial hatred. When invoked defensively — to rebut accusations of antisemitism — Zionism is defined minimally as the belief in Jewish connection to the ancestral homeland. When invoked offensively — to defend a political project from criticism — Zionism encompasses the occupation, the settlements, the siege of Gaza, and the Nation-State Law’s declaration that self-determination is “unique to the Jewish people.” These cannot both be true simultaneously. If Zionism means only that Jews should live freely in the Levant, then the Palestinian solidarity movement, which opposes none of those things, is not anti-Zionist at all. If Zionism means the occupation, the settlements, and the Nation-State Law, then opposition to it is political criticism of a specific political programme — which courts across multiple jurisdictions have consistently recognised as protected expression.

127. The historical record provides a further corrective. Jewish communities in Jerusalem, Hebron, Safed, and Tiberias — the Old Yishuv — maintained continuous presence under Ottoman rule for centuries, predating political Zionism entirely. By the 1860s and 1870s, Jews had become the majority population in Jerusalem, decades before the First Zionist Congress and without any sovereign Jewish state. These communities were emphatically not Zionist in any political sense. They were religiously motivated, sustained by the halukka system of diaspora financial support, and organised under the Ottoman millet system of communal autonomy. The Old Yishuv actively opposed Herzl’s movement. Jewish presence in the Levant does not depend on political Zionism — and to claim otherwise is to erase the history of Jewish communities that predated it by centuries.[^122]

4.2 The Academic Evidence on the Mechanism

128. The empirical correlation between Israeli military operations and spikes in diaspora antisemitism is among the most robustly documented patterns in hate-crime research. The UK Community Security Trust recorded 4,103 antisemitic incidents in 2023 — the highest annual total in its history — with 66% occurring after October 7. In the final quarter of 2023 alone, incidents rose 589% over the same period in 2022. Australia’s ECAJ documented 2,062 incidents in its October 2023–September 2024 reporting year, a 316% increase, with physical assaults surging 491% from 11 to 65. The ADL recorded 8,873 US incidents in 2023 (up 140%) and 9,354 in 2024. France saw a 284% increase; Germany’s RIAS recorded its highest-ever total of 8,627 incidents in 2024. The pattern held across every country with a significant Jewish population.

129. The academic debate centres not on whether these spikes correlate with conflict — they do, without exception — but on the mechanism through which conflict translates into antisemitism against diaspora communities. This is the question the Commission must address under Term of Reference 1, because the mechanism determines the appropriate intervention.

130. The most rigorous quantitative work on this mechanism is Ayal Feinberg’s research at Gratz College (formerly Texas A&M University-Commerce). Using FBI antisemitic hate crime data from 2001 to 2014 with fixed-effects negative binomial regression on weekly data, Feinberg found that Israeli military operations and the number of active hate groups are the two most important factors explaining variation in antisemitic incidents in the United States. Specifically, violent Israeli military engagements increase the likelihood of antisemitic hate crimes characterised as violent or intimidating by nearly 35%.[^70] The mechanism Feinberg identifies is explicit: latent antisemitism that motivates hate crimes is “activated” during particularly violent Israeli military conflicts. The prejudice pre-exists. The conflict activates it. The question is what mediates the activation — and this is where the conflation thesis gains its force.

Finding sought [Direct]: The Commission should find that quantitative research by Feinberg (2020) using FBI hate crime data found that Israeli military operations increase the likelihood of violent antisemitic hate crimes in the United States by nearly 35%, and that the mechanism is the “activation” of latent antisemitic attitudes by conflict triggers, not the creation of new prejudice. (ToR 1)

131. Dov Waxman, in Trouble in the Tribe (Princeton University Press, 2016), demonstrated empirically how Jewish communal organisations in the United States enforced a conflation of Jewish identity with pro-Israel solidarity, documenting how “dissenting Jews are routinely condemned by leaders of organizations who believe that dissent demonstrates disunity.”[^71] Neve Gordon, in Middle East Critique (2024), analysed the IHRA definition itself as an instrument of this conflation, arguing it “operates on an affective level interpolating people who identify as Jews to also identify with Israel and Zionism” and functions as a “counterinsurgency tool” shielding Israel from accusations of racial governance.[^72] Johannes Due Enstad, in Social Forces (Oxford University Press, 2025), based on a survey of 16,400 Jews across 12 EU countries, found a negative correlation at the country level between antisemitic incidents and public opinion — meaning countries with higher incident rates do not necessarily have higher antisemitic attitudes. This supports the distinction between incidents (behavioural mobilisation) and attitudes (stable prejudice) that is central to understanding the mechanism.[^73]

132. Scholars aligned with the conflation thesis — David Feldman of Birkbeck, University of London; Antony Lerman, former director of the Institute for Jewish Policy Research; and Peter Beinart of the City University of New York — argue that the institutional equation of Israel with Jewishness creates a conceptual bridge enabling anger at Israeli government actions to become hostility toward Jews. Beinart has stated directly: “If you say [supporting Israel] is an inherent part of what it means to be a Jew, you’re actually contributing to exactly the conflation that makes Jews in the US and in other parts of the world less safe.”

133. Lerman’s 2022 book Whatever Happened to Antisemitism? traces a thirty-year political project to redefine antisemitism around the concept of the “collective Jew” — treating Israel as “the persecuted collective Jew.” He argues this reduces Jews to a singularity (itself an antisemitic trope) while placing the state beyond criticism. The redefinition has been institutionalised through the IHRA definition and its adoption by governments worldwide, creating a framework in which political criticism of a state’s military actions is reclassified as racial hatred against a people.

134. A 2025 study published in the journal Religions (MDPI) found that while antisemitic incidents surged dramatically after October 7, antisemitic attitudes in European public opinion remained relatively stable. This finding is significant for the Commission’s work. It suggests the spike reflects the mobilisation of pre-existing prejudice by a triggering event rather than a fundamental shift in how populations view Jews. This aligns with Feinberg’s 2020 finding that Israeli military operations “activate” latent antisemitic attitudes rather than creating them de novo.[^74]

Finding sought [Direct]: The Commission should find that while antisemitic incidents surged dramatically after October 7, antisemitic attitudes in European public opinion remained relatively stable — supporting the interpretation that the spike reflects mobilisation of pre-existing prejudice rather than a fundamental shift in how populations view Jews. (ToR 1)

135. The activation mechanism is where the conflation thesis gains its explanatory force. If a small number of individuals with latent antisemitic attitudes are activated by conflict triggers, the institutional equation of Israel with all Jews widens the channel through which that activation reaches diaspora communities. When mainstream Jewish organisations declare that Israel is central to Jewish identity, and when a foreign government claims to act in the name of all Jews, they provide a cognitive framework that allows prejudiced individuals to redirect anger at military actions toward their Jewish neighbours. The organisations do not intend this outcome. But the evidence suggests they produce it.

136. The counter-thesis, articulated most rigorously by Dave Rich of the UK Community Security Trust, holds that anti-Zionism does not “slide into” antisemitism but is, in certain formulations, antisemitic from inception. Rich argues that denying Jewish national self-determination “cuts to the heart of British Jews’ sense of who they are.” This position has genuine analytical force. Crucially, however, CST data reveals that the largest single-week spike in October 2023 occurred before Israel had launched any significant ground operation in Gaza — 416 incidents in the first week, driven by celebration of the Hamas attack rather than outrage at an Israeli military response.[^75] This complicates any simple narrative that Israeli military actions, mediated by conflation, produce antisemitism. The Tel Aviv University annual report noted that “antisemitism reared its head at the moment when the Jewish state appeared weaker than ever.”

137. The Commission should note that both dynamics can operate simultaneously. Pre-existing antisemitism is activated by conflict triggers, and the institutional conflation of Israel with Jewish identity widens the channel through which that activation reaches diaspora communities. The question is not whether conflation is the sole cause — it is not — but whether it is an amplifying factor. The post-October 7 data, showing record antisemitism despite record advocacy, suggests that whatever protective function the conflation strategy was intended to serve has not been vindicated by events.

4.3 The Global Uniformity Problem

138. The strongest challenge to the conflation thesis is the global uniformity of the data. Antisemitism spiked in countries with radically different advocacy strategies, legal frameworks, IHRA adoption levels, and political environments. The UK, US, Canada, Australia, France, Germany, the Netherlands, South Africa, Brazil, and Argentina all experienced comparable surges. If the conflation thesis were the primary explanation, one would expect variation correlated with advocacy intensity — yet the spike was essentially universal.

139. This supports the interpretation that armed conflict involving Israel is the single most powerful driver of diaspora antisemitism, operating through mechanisms deeper than any single lobby’s communications strategy. However, the conflation thesis does not require that advocacy is the sole cause — only that it amplifies an existing mechanism. The question is whether, when a conflict trigger activates latent antisemitism, the institutional equation of Israel with all Jews makes the resulting backlash worse.

140. The global data cannot easily resolve this question because there is no control case — no major Jewish diaspora community where mainstream organisations have fully decoupled Jewish identity from Israel. Professor Eitan Hersh of Tufts University has studied the relationship between campus advocacy and antisemitism and found the narrative that campus protest drives antisemitism does not match the evidence.[^29] The Institute for Jewish Policy Research in the UK found that “levels of antisemitism among those on the left-wing of the political spectrum, including the far-left, are indistinguishable from those found in the general population,” while “the most antisemitic group on the political spectrum consists of those who identify as very right-wing.”[^30]

141. Independent Jewish Voices Canada commissioned polling showing that Canadians most likely to view criticism of Israel as legitimate were also the most sensitive to antisemitic statements — directly contradicting the claim that anti-Israel views correlate with antisemitism. This finding inverts the assumed causal relationship: people who distinguish between a state and a people are more attuned to antisemitism, not less.

4.4 The Jewish Organisations That Reject the Equation

142. A growing network of Jewish organisations explicitly rejects the conflation of Israel with Jewish identity and argues that it makes Jews less safe. Their existence is directly relevant to the Commission’s work, because it demonstrates that the conflation is a political choice, not an inherent feature of Jewish identity.

143. The Jewish Council of Australia, founded in late 2023 as a direct counterweight to ECAJ, states: “We reject the assertion that Jews and the State of Israel are one and the same. Pro-Israel Jewish organisations, that do not recognise the diversity of views among Australian Jews, do not speak for us.” The JCA described ECAJ-backed advocacy as “not a genuine antisemitism strategy — it is a political project aimed at shielding Israel from criticism.” Over 1,300 Jewish Australians signed onto its core principles, and a broader petition gathered 60,000 signatures.[^42]

144. In the United States, Jewish Voice for Peace — 32,000 dues-paying members, the largest anti-Zionist Jewish organisation in the country — argues that “conflating antisemitism with opposition to the Israeli government’s policies or ideology is especially dangerous” and that Zionism was “a false and failed answer to the desperately real question of how to protect Jewish lives.” IfNotNow frames the issue as structural: “Far too often, American public officials respond to the threat of antisemitism by invoking their unconditional support for Israel, implying that the safety of Jews and the political interests of the Israeli government are one and the same.”

145. The dissent extends beyond formal organisations. Over 500 Jewish Australians took a full-page advertisement in the Sydney Morning Herald and The Age opposing ethnic cleansing in Gaza. The Australian Jewish Democratic Society and Jewish Women for Peace joined the JCA in a coalition opposing the Segal antisemitism plan. These are not marginal voices. They represent a significant and growing segment of Jewish Australians who argue that the conflation strategy endangers rather than protects them — because it ties their safety, in the public mind, to the conduct of a foreign government over which they have no control.

146. In the UK, Independent Jewish Voices was founded specifically “out of frustration with the widespread misconception that the Jews of this country speak with one voice — and that this voice supports the Israeli government’s policies.” Israeli organisations add another dimension. B’Tselem’s executive director Hagai El-Ad described antisemitism accusations as “a propaganda line by the Israeli government deployed systematically as a silencing tool.” Breaking the Silence, founded by IDF veterans, signed letters urging the UN to reject the IHRA definition.

147. The Jerusalem Declaration on Antisemitism, endorsed by over 350 scholars in Jewish Studies and Antisemitism Studies in March 2021, provides an alternative framework. It defines antisemitism as “discrimination, prejudice, hostility or violence against Jews as Jews” while explicitly stating that BDS, criticism of Zionism, and comparisons of Israel to other historical cases are “on the face of it, not antisemitic.” The Jerusalem Declaration was drafted precisely because its authors — many of them Jewish, many of them leading scholars of antisemitism — concluded that the IHRA definition was being used to suppress legitimate political speech rather than combat genuine hatred.

148. These organisations remain institutionally smaller than ECAJ, which represents roughly 200 affiliated organisations across Australia’s approximately 120,000-strong Jewish community. The JCA has a few thousand active supporters. But the evidence adduced in the Toltz v Riemer and Toltz v Keane proceedings (paragraphs 135A–135D above) demonstrates that intra-communal dissent on this question is substantive and growing. The 52 Jewish university staff and alumni who signed the Overland open letter stated the complainants “do not speak for us as Jewish people” and repudiated “the attempt by those making the complaint to conflate Zionism, a political ideology with Jewish and non-Jewish adherents, with Jewish identity.” The Tzedek Collective warned of a “chilling effect, with staff and students around the country often already afraid to talk publicly about Israel’s actions.” Jewish Voices of Inner Sydney stated plainly: “Our members do not feel unsafe living in Inner Sydney… They do not feel unsafe attending pro-Palestine demonstrations.” A significant minority of Australian Jews do not identify as Zionist.[^43] The Commission should not treat the conflation of Jewish identity with Israel as reflecting a communal consensus. It reflects a political position — contested within the community it claims to represent.

Finding sought [Direct]: The Commission should find that a significant and growing minority of Australian Jews — including the Jewish Council of Australia (over 1,300 signatories), the Australian Jewish Democratic Society, Jewish Women for Peace, Jews Against the Occupation ’48, and 52 Jewish university staff who signed the Overland open letter in the Toltz proceedings — reject the conflation of Jewish identity with the State of Israel and argue that this conflation endangers rather than protects Jewish Australians. (ToR 4)

Finding sought [Direct]: The Commission should find, on the basis of the JCA founding statement (over 1,300 signatories), the Overland open letter (52 Jewish university staff), the AJDS and JW4P public positions, and parliamentary testimony from Cunio and Sinanian, that peak Jewish organisations do not represent a communal consensus on the equation of Zionism with Jewish identity, and that the Commission should hear from dissenting Jewish voices before endorsing institutional strategies premised on that equation. (ToR 4)

149. The human cost of this intra-communal contest deserves the Commission’s attention. The conflation does not only expose Jewish Australians to external hostility. It imposes a specific burden on Jewish Australians who dissent. When peak organisations declare that Israel is central to Jewish identity, Jews who oppose Israel’s military conduct are placed in an impossible position: they must either suppress their political convictions to remain within communal institutions, or express those convictions and be treated as traitors to their own people. The 52 Jewish academics who signed the Overland open letter in the Toltz proceedings did so knowing they would face social consequences within their own community. The Jewish Council of Australia’s founders describe being ostracised from synagogues, excluded from communal events, and told they are not “real Jews.” Jewish Voice for Peace members in the United States report being called kapos — a term for concentration camp prisoners who collaborated with the Nazis — for opposing Israeli government policy. This is not an abstraction. It is the lived experience of Jewish Australians whose dignity is diminished not by antisemites but by their own communal leadership, in the name of a political project they did not choose and do not support.

150. The Commission should understand that the conflation creates two categories of Jewish Australian: those whose political views align with the institutional position, who are welcomed and protected; and those whose views do not, who are cast out and silenced. This internal hierarchy — enforced through social exclusion, public denunciation, and the threat of being labelled a self-hating Jew — is itself a threat to social cohesion within the Jewish community. When the Commission hears testimony from peak bodies claiming to speak for all Jewish Australians, it should consider whether that claim accurately represents a community that contains within it deep, principled, and growing disagreement about the very equation those bodies promote.

151. The internal cost of this intra-communal hierarchy was documented in sworn parliamentary testimony. Stephanie Cunio of Jewish Women 4 Peace described the phenomenon as “lateral violence”: “There is a situation where people that would like to speak out cannot. They fear losing their jobs. There’s splits in their families. They fear having to move their kids out of Jewish day schools if they speak out about human rights and the deaths that are occurring. This is despicable, and it is lateral violence.”[^76] Hagai Sinanian of the Tzedek Collective testified that the antisemitism he experienced came from within the community: “The second and more surprising group that I have experienced antisemitism from… have been right wing Zionist supporters of the State of Israel. My Jewish heritage is frequently brought into question and denied… I am called an un-Jew, a fake Jew, a secret Arab or Muslim.”[^77] This testimony was given under oath in a parliamentary proceeding — not in media commentary or advocacy materials. When Jewish Australians testify before Parliament that the most significant antisemitism they experience comes not from pro-Palestinian protesters but from within their own communal structures, the Commission should consider whether the institutional strategy it is being asked to endorse is itself generating the harm it purports to address.

Finding sought [Direct]: The Commission should find that sworn parliamentary testimony from Jewish Australians — Stephanie Cunio (Jewish Women 4 Peace) and Hagai Sinanian (Tzedek Collective) — described “lateral violence” within the Jewish community, including fear of job loss, family splits, exclusion from communal institutions, and being called “un-Jew” or “fake Jew” for dissenting from the institutional equation of Jewish identity with Israel. (ToR 4)

4.5 The Australian Evidence: Record Advocacy, Record Antisemitism

152. The Australian data provides the most direct test of whether the conflation strategy protects Jewish Australians. Since October 2023, ECAJ, AIJAC, and the Zionist Federation of Australia have pursued the most intensive advocacy campaign in Australian Jewish institutional history: nine major legal proceedings, 47 documented targeting cases, legislative lobbying that produced emergency legislation in three jurisdictions, the appointment of a Special Envoy, over 500 sponsored trips for decision-makers, and sustained media engagement. By any measure, the advocacy infrastructure has operated at maximum capacity.

153. The result: ECAJ’s own data shows incidents rising from an annual average of roughly 342 (2013–2023) to 2,062 in 2024, declining only to 1,654 in 2025 — still nearly five times the historical baseline. Physical assaults surged 491%. The Bondi Beach attack killed fifteen people at a Hanukkah celebration — the deadliest antisemitic attack in Australian history. The Adass Israel Synagogue was firebombed. Lewis Continental Kitchen was set on fire. Jewish Australians report fear at levels without precedent.

154. Record advocacy. Record antisemitism. The protective thesis has not been vindicated by events. This does not establish that the advocacy caused the antisemitism — correlation is not causation, and the conflict itself is the primary driver. It is possible that the advocacy strategy was overwhelmed by the sheer intensity of the post-October 7 conflict, and that antisemitism would have been even worse without it. But the burden of that argument lies with those advancing it. The observable outcome is that the most intensive advocacy campaign in Australian Jewish institutional history coincided with the worst antisemitism in Australian history. At minimum, this establishes that the strategy has not achieved its stated objective of making Jewish Australians safer. It may be that no advocacy strategy could have succeeded against a conflict trigger of this magnitude. But if the strategy has not worked, the Commission should ask whether continuing it — or intensifying it through legislation — is the right response.

Finding sought [Direct]: The Commission should find that the most intensive period of pro-Israel advocacy in Australian history — nine major legal proceedings, 47 targeting cases, emergency legislation in three jurisdictions, appointment of a Special Envoy, over 500 sponsored trips — coincided with the worst antisemitism in Australian history, including the Bondi attack, the Adass Israel firebombing, and a five-fold increase in reported incidents. (ToR 1, ToR 4)

Finding sought [Inference]: On the basis of the ECAJ’s own data showing 2,062 incidents in 2024 — the worst year on record — coinciding with the most intensive advocacy period in Australian history, the Commission should find that the institutional conflation strategy has not achieved its stated objective of making Jewish Australians safer. Whether it has actively amplified the threat — by widening the channel through which conflict-activated prejudice reaches diaspora communities — is a question the evidence strongly suggests but cannot conclusively resolve. The Commission should investigate this hypothesis under Term of Reference 1. (ToR 1, ToR 4)

155. The evidence is consistent with a stronger inference, though this submission advances it as a hypothesis warranting investigation rather than a demonstrated finding. If the conflation of Jewish identity with Israel amplifies the channel through which conflict-activated prejudice reaches diaspora communities, then advocacy that insists on this conflation during a period of unprecedented conflict intensity would be expected to produce exactly the pattern the data shows: record advocacy coinciding with record incidents. The hypothesis is that the advocacy reinforces a cognitive framework — the equation of a state with a people — that enables individuals with latent prejudice to direct hostility at their Jewish neighbours when that state is in the news. This hypothesis cannot be definitively tested with Australian data alone, because there is no control case — no comparable Jewish diaspora community where mainstream organisations have fully decoupled Jewish identity from Israel. What the data can establish is that the current strategy has not worked. The amplification hypothesis is consistent with the evidence. The protective hypothesis is contradicted by it.

156. The Commission is not being asked to adjudicate a theoretical debate. It is being asked to identify drivers of antisemitism under Term of Reference 1 and recommend effective responses. The evidence presented in this section — from organisational charters, academic research, international comparison, intra-communal dissent, and Australia’s own post-October 7 data — converges on a finding that the Commission can make with confidence: the institutional conflation of Jewish identity with Israel is, at minimum, not reducing antisemitism. Whether it is actively amplifying it is a question the evidence strongly suggests but cannot conclusively resolve. What the evidence does resolve is the policy question. An effective response requires educating Australians that criticising a foreign government’s policies is not the same as hating a people, and that Jewish Australians are Australians with diverse political views, not representatives of a foreign state. This is the decoupling that the academic literature, the intra-communal dissent, and the court record all point toward — and it is the opposite of the conflation strategy currently being pursued.

4.6 Counterarguments the Commission Should Consider

157. Intellectual honesty requires acknowledging the strongest counterarguments. First, antisemitism is millennia-old. It vastly predates both Zionism and Israel. The blood libel, the Protocols, the pogroms, and the Shoah all occurred before Israel existed. Any argument that attributes antisemitism primarily to modern advocacy strategy is historically incomplete.

158. Second, the CST finding that the October 2023 spike preceded Israeli military operations suggests the trigger is conflict involving Jews, not specifically Israeli government actions.[^75] Some of the earliest post-October 7 incidents involved celebration of the Hamas attack — hostility directed at Jews because they were perceived as connected to Israel, before Israel had responded militarily. This complicates the claim that advocacy-driven conflation is the primary transmission mechanism, though it is equally consistent with the proposition that the conflation has been so deeply embedded that it activates even in response to attacks on Israel.

159. Third, a significant portion of post-October 7 incidents employed classical antisemitic tropes — Holocaust glorification, “dirty Jew” slurs, conspiracy theories — alongside anti-Israel rhetoric, suggesting these are intertwined rather than neatly separable. CST data shows 955 incidents in 2023 referenced Hitler, Nazis, or the Holocaust. The presence of classical antisemitism within conflict-activated incidents demonstrates that the phenomenon is not purely political.

160. Fourth, Dave Rich’s “practical consequences” argument has force: if anti-Zionism were fully realised, it would require the dissolution of a state where roughly half the world’s Jews live, with potentially catastrophic implications regardless of intent. However, the Commission should note that if Zionism historically encompasses binationalism — as Section 4.1A above demonstrates — then dissolution of exclusive Jewish sovereignty is not equivalent to dissolution of Jewish presence. The cultural Zionists, the Brit Shalom binationalists, and the Old Yishuv all maintained Jewish life in the Levant without exclusive Jewish sovereignty. Rich’s argument assumes that the maximal definition of Zionism is the only one — the very conflation this section identifies as the problem.

161. Fifth, the scholarly defence of the IHRA definition is substantive and should not be dismissed. David Hirsh, in Contemporary Left Antisemitism (Routledge, 2018), develops the concept of the “Livingstone Formulation” — the accusation that Jews raise antisemitism in bad faith to silence criticism of Israel — and argues this formulation is itself a form of antisemitism that the IHRA definition is designed to identify.[^78] Bernard Harrison, in Res Publica and Journal of Contemporary Antisemitism (2022), acknowledges the IHRA definition has “formal definitional defects” but defends it as a necessary practical tool, arguing that the demand for a philosophically watertight definition is misconceived — the examples work by identifying overlapping features rather than necessary and sufficient conditions.[^79] L. Daniel Staetsky’s landmark 2017 JPR study (5,466 observations) found that while anti-Israel attitudes and antisemitic attitudes are not identical, “the greater the intensity of anti-Israel attitudes, the more likely they are accompanied by antisemitism” — an “elastic” relationship that provides genuine empirical support for the concern that intense hostility to Israel can shade into hostility to Jews.[^80] These are serious scholars making serious arguments. The Commission should engage with them.

161A. Sixth, the Vorchheimer v Tayeh decision (paragraphs 67A–67D above) provides the strongest judicial support for the proposition that anti-Zionist expression can, in context, constitute racial and religious vilification against Jewish people. Judge Tran found that although “Zionist does not mean Jew,” the association is sufficiently strong that labelling “All Zionists” as terrorists, in a rally context that included explicitly antisemitic conduct, crossed the line into incitement of hatred against Jewish people. Tran rejected the argument that Zionism can be neatly isolated as a “detached political ideology,” finding “no absolute dichotomy between a political belief and a religious belief.” This reasoning has genuine analytical force. It demonstrates that the line between political criticism and racial vilification is not always where this submission’s analysis might suggest — and that context, manner, and audience are determinative. The Commission should give this decision serious weight.

162. The Commission should weigh these counterarguments seriously. But it should also note what they do not establish. They do not establish that the conflation strategy is effective — Australia’s own data refutes that claim. They do not establish that political criticism of Israel constitutes antisemitism — Australian courts have consistently held otherwise, and even Vorchheimer, which found against the respondent, expressly held that “Zionist does not mean Jew.”[^8] And they do not establish that suppressing political speech about the conflict will reduce antisemitic incidents — twenty years of evidence on anti-vilification law effectiveness suggests otherwise.[^81] The counterarguments explain why the problem is complex. They do not justify the current approach, which has coincided with the worst antisemitism in Australian history.

Recommendation 8A: The Commission should examine whether the institutional conflation of Jewish identity with the State of Israel — as practised by ECAJ, AIJAC, the ZFA, and international equivalents — constitutes a driver of antisemitism under Term of Reference 1, by amplifying the channel through which conflict-activated prejudice reaches Australian Jewish communities.

Recommendation 8B: The Commission should recommend that government-funded programs to combat antisemitism include education that explicitly distinguishes between the State of Israel and Jewish Australians, consistent with Justice Stewart’s finding in Wertheim v Haddad that “political criticism of Israel, however inflammatory or adversarial, is not by its nature criticism of Jews in general.”

Recommendation 8C: The Commission should consider the Jerusalem Declaration on Antisemitism as an alternative framework to the IHRA definition — one endorsed by over 350 scholars in Jewish Studies and Antisemitism Studies, which defines antisemitism as hostility toward Jews as Jews while preserving the distinction between racial hatred and political criticism that Australian courts have already drawn.

Section 5: The Policy Response

Terms of Reference 2 (law enforcement) and 4 (social cohesion)

163. The Commission’s terms of reference require examination of both law enforcement responses and social cohesion. This section examines the legislative response to antisemitism since Bondi — not to question whether parliaments should act, but to assess whether the specific measures adopted will achieve their stated aims and survive constitutional scrutiny. The analysis that follows applies the structured proportionality framework established in McCloy v NSW (2015) and applied in Brown v Tasmania (2017) and Clubb v Edwards (2019): whether each measure is suitable (rationally connected to its protective purpose), necessary (no less restrictive means reasonably available), and adequate in balance (the burden on political communication is not disproportionate to the purpose served).

164. This submission acknowledges at the outset that the protective purpose of this legislation is legitimate and weighty. Jewish Australians have been murdered at a religious celebration. Their synagogues have been firebombed. They face harassment, intimidation, and fear in their daily lives. The desire to protect them — through law, through institutions, through the full weight of the state — is not merely understandable. It is a proper object of legislative action. The question is not whether parliaments should act to protect Jewish Australians. They should. The question is whether the specific measures enacted since Bondi are rationally connected to that protective purpose, or whether they burden political communication without achieving the protection they promise. Legislation that is struck down as unconstitutional does not protect anyone. Legislation that misdirects resources toward political speech while leaving the actual radicalisation pathways unaddressed leaves the community it purports to protect more exposed, not less.

5.1 The Legislation Under Scrutiny

165. The legislative response did not arise in a vacuum. ECAJ and affiliated organisations have made at least 30 formal submissions to federal and state parliamentary inquiries since 2020, targeting hate speech, vilification, and hate symbol prohibition laws. The NSWJBD and JCCV are the most active at the state level. The advocacy consistently sought to expand the scope of prohibited conduct — from “inciting” to “promoting” hatred — lower evidentiary thresholds for prosecution, and remove “good faith” defences. This advocacy has produced legislation in every Australian state and territory: Nazi symbol bans, strengthened vilification offences, the Crimes Amendment (Places of Worship) Act 2025 (partially invalidated), and the Combatting Antisemitism, Hate and Extremism Act 2026. The JCCV’s 10-Point Plan (late 2025) explicitly advocates for protest permit systems and restrictions on protests near locations with “demonstrable risk to safety” — the most direct call for protest restrictions from any of the identified organisations.[^82] The Jewish Council of Australia and Jews Against the Occupation 48 actively opposed several of these measures, including the Places of Worship Act, demonstrating that Jewish communal positions are not monolithic on the question of whether expanding speech restrictions enhances security.

166. The submissions to this Commission and the preceding NSW inquiries by the very organisations advocating for expanded speech restrictions contain admissions that undermine their own case. ECAJ’s Submission 142 to the Royal Commission acknowledges that four decades of hate speech legislation have produced a situation of “relative impunity” — its own characterisation. ASECA (the Association of Sephardi, Eastern and Central Australian Jews), in Submission 144, relies entirely on ECAJ’s data infrastructure and proposes strict liability for hate speech offences — removing the requirement that a speaker intend or know their words would cause harm. ASECA’s submission extends so far as to argue that a seven-year-old child’s chant at a protest should be actionable. Neither ECAJ nor ASECA mentions the Al Madina Dawah Centre, Wissam Haddad, the intelligence failures documented in Section 1.2, or the actual radicalisation pathway that produced the Bondi attack. The organisations asking this Commission to recommend new speech laws have nothing to say about why the existing laws — which they helped draft — were not used against the most prominent inciter in the country.[^83]

167. The internal contradictions among the advocacy organisations are equally revealing. The NSW Jewish Board of Deputies (Submission 146 to the slogans inquiry) and the Jewish Centre for Law and Justice (Submission 147) filed submissions on the same day advocating diametrically opposed approaches. JBD proposed a “hateful phrase” offence built around a static list of eight proscribed phrases, with strict liability and a mechanism to add further phrases by regulation. JCLJ explicitly warned against static lists, arguing they “would be practically unworkable” and that enforcement “may not be realistic.” JBD compiled its academic evidence using generative AI. JCLJ’s Submission 147 contains a citation dated “27 February 2027” — a date that had not yet occurred at the time of filing — and JCLJ’s own submission acknowledges that despite the doxxing provisions it advocated for, “no charges have been brought for doxxing.”[^84] The organisations most vigorously demanding new laws cannot agree among themselves on what those laws should look like, deploy unreliable research methods, and acknowledge that existing provisions they supported have produced no enforcement. This is not a basis for confident legislative action.

168. Three legislative responses require examination. The Combatting Antisemitism, Hate and Extremism Bill 2026 (Cth) grants the Home Affairs Minister power to ban organisations without any member being convicted of a crime. Attorney-General Michelle Rowland confirmed that statements such as “Israel is engaged in genocide” could fall within scope. The government’s own Statement of Public Interest acknowledged the bill was “developed rapidly in direct response to lessons from the Bondi attack” and that “given its urgency, there has been limited opportunity to consider alternative policies and mechanisms.” No formal public consultation was conducted beyond a two-day period. The legislation passed the House 116–7. Professor Anne Twomey, Emerita Professor of Constitutional Law at the University of Sydney, warned the laws “could be challenged in the High Court.”[^85]

Finding sought [Direct]: The Commission should find that the Combatting Antisemitism, Hate and Extremism Act 2026 was developed rapidly with no formal public consultation beyond a two-day period; that the government’s own Statement of Public Interest acknowledged limited opportunity to consider alternative policies; and that Attorney-General Rowland confirmed the statement “Israel is engaged in genocide” could fall within scope. (ToR 2, ToR 4)

169. Queensland is criminalising two specific phrases: “from the river to the sea, Palestine will be free” and “globalise the intifada.” The word “intifada” (Arabic: انتفاضة) means “uprising” or “shaking off” — a standard Arabic term applied to popular uprisings in at least 14 countries.[^86] The penalty: two years imprisonment. NSW banned “globalise the intifada” in an emergency parliamentary session and introduced 90-day protest bans, warrantless stop-and-search powers, and powers to require removal of face coverings.[^87]

170. The federal bill creates a defence for conduct consisting of “directly quoting from, or otherwise referencing, a religious text for the purpose of religious teaching or discussion.” This produces an asymmetry: a preacher can cite Genesis 15:18 to claim the entire Middle East belongs to Israel — that is protected religious expression. An Australian can say “from the river to the sea” at a protest in Brisbane — that is two years in prison under Queensland’s proposed legislation. The scriptural claim and the political challenge to it receive opposite legal treatment.

171. In 1977, Israel’s Likud party — the party of current Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu — published a manifesto stating: “Between the sea and the Jordan there will only be Israeli sovereignty.” The 1999 Likud platform reiterated: “The Jordan river will be the permanent eastern border of the State of Israel” and “The Government of Israel flatly rejects the establishment of a Palestinian Arab state west of the Jordan river.” These platforms have never been formally rescinded. Likud has governed Israel for most of the past 45 years.[^88]

172. The language is not historical. Multiple serving Israeli ministers have used identical river-to-sea formulations. Uri Ariel (Minister of Agriculture, 2016): “Between the river and the sea will only be the State of Israel.” Naftali Bennett (then Prime Minister, 2022): “There is no room for another state between the sea and the Jordan.” Shlomo Karhi (Communications Minister, 2024): “We will never allow another state to be established between Jordan and the sea.” On 20 January 2024, Prime Minister Netanyahu posted publicly: “I will not compromise on full Israeli security control over all the territory west of Jordan — and this is contrary to a Palestinian state.” The 2022 Netanyahu coalition guiding principles went further still: “The Jewish people have an exclusive and inalienable right to all parts of the Land of Israel.” This is not a defunct party platform. It is the current, operative position of the governing party of a state with which Australia maintains diplomatic relations, backed by Israel’s Basic Law: Israel as the Nation-State of the Jewish People (2018), which constitutionally declares that “exercising the right to national self-determination in the State of Israel is unique to the Jewish people.”[^125]

173. The double standard is precise and measurable. The Palestinian version of a territorial aspiration — expressed in a protest chant, without military force behind it — would attract two years’ imprisonment in Queensland. The Israeli version of the identical territorial aspiration — which, unlike the Palestinian version, is backed by military force, settlement infrastructure, constitutional law, and the world’s fourth-largest arms exporter — attracts no sanction in any jurisdiction worldwide. No comparable democracy has criminalised the Likud formulation. No Israeli politician has ever faced legal consequences for using this language. When a Commission tasked with protecting social cohesion is asked to recommend measures that criminalise one side of a territorial claim while leaving the identical claim on the other side not merely legal but constitutionally enshrined, it should consider what message that asymmetry sends to the 813,000 Muslim Australians, the 350,000 Arab Australians, and the uncounted Australians of all backgrounds who regard the Palestinian cause as a matter of justice.

Finding sought [Direct]: The Commission should find that the proposed legislation criminalises the Palestinian articulation of a territorial aspiration (“from the river to the sea”) while leaving the identical Israeli articulation — expressed by Likud platforms since 1977, by multiple serving Israeli ministers, and by the current Prime Minister — entirely legal, and that no comparable democracy has criminalised the Likud formulation. (ToR 4)

Finding sought [Inference]: On the basis of the legislative text of the Combatting Antisemitism, Hate and Extremism Act 2026 and the Likud platforms documented at paragraph 171, the Commission should find that criminalising one side of a territorial aspiration while leaving the identical aspiration on the other side legal sends a message to Muslim, Arab, and other Australians that the law does not apply to them equally — a message that undermines the social cohesion the Commission is charged with protecting. (ToR 4)

5.2 Suitability: Is There a Rational Connection?

174. The first limb of proportionality asks whether the legislative measure is rationally connected to its protective purpose. The stated purpose of the post-Bondi legislation is to prevent antisemitic violence and protect Jewish Australians. The question is whether criminalising protest slogans and banning political organisations bears a rational connection to that purpose.

175. The evidence presented in Section 1 of this submission establishes that the Bondi attack was perpetrated by a man radicalised through an ISIS-aligned network — a network that operated through mosque-based indoctrination, street dawah recruitment, prison correspondence, and encrypted online communications. ASIO identified Naveed Akram’s connections to this network in 2019 — four years before the Opera House protests, five years before the university encampments. His radicalisation pathway had nothing to do with protest slogans. The legislation addresses a phenomenon — public political speech — that the evidence does not connect to the attack it was enacted to address.

176. The suitability question is sharpened by the enforcement record on existing laws. As documented in Section 1.2, section 93Z of the NSW Crimes Act — which criminalises public threats or incitement of violence on religious grounds — has produced no sustained convictions since its introduction in 2018. The NSW Parliamentary inquiry into the Crimes Amendment (Display of Nazi Symbols) Bill confirmed that no charge has ever been brought under section 93Z for antisemitism, and that the DPP declined prosecution in six separate instances.[^89] Deputy Commissioner Hudson testified that the DPP consent requirement “can be a barrier to prosecution and consequently the police may charge individuals under other applicable laws that do not require DPP approval.” The enforcement gap is not a failure of the law’s scope — it is a failure of prosecutorial will. Wissam Haddad preached that Jews are “descendants of apes and pigs” and that stones and trees would call on Muslims to kill them. He was not prosecuted under existing law. He was sued by a private party under section 18C. The government is now creating new speech offences while the existing ones sit unused. The rational connection between creating additional speech restrictions and preventing terrorism is further undermined when the state has not exhausted — or even meaningfully attempted — the tools already available to it.

Finding sought [Direct]: The Commission should find that section 93Z of the NSW Crimes Act has produced no sustained convictions for antisemitism since its introduction in 2018; that the DPP declined prosecution in six separate instances; and that Wissam Haddad — who preached that Jews are “descendants of apes and pigs” — was not prosecuted under existing criminal law but was instead sued by a private party under section 18C. Existing speech offences are unused. New speech offences are being created. (ToR 2)

177. The NSW Legislative Assembly Committee on Law and Safety inquiry into slogans — the inquiry that recommended banning “globalise the intifada” — itself undermines the suitability of the measure it recommended. The inquiry (Report 3/58, “Measures to prohibit slogans that incite hatred,” tabled 30 January 2026) was referred on 22 December 2025, given a submission window over Christmas and New Year, received over 700 submissions, held no public hearings whatsoever, and reported in 47 pages five weeks later. No witness was heard. No expert was cross-examined. The committee’s own report acknowledged that the phrase had “diverse meanings and uses” and that it was “rarely used in Australia before the proposal to proscribe its use.” Most significantly, the committee acknowledged that “there was no clear evidence to connect the phrase ‘globalise the intifada’ to the events at Bondi, and no evidence that banning it would help protect NSW communities.”[^90] The vote to adopt the report was 4–2, with former Deputy Premier Paul Toole and Adjunct Professor Tamara Smith dissenting. Toole — a former leader of the NSW Nationals — supported Smith’s amendment that the inquiry’s “timeline and absence of formal oral hearings have inhibited transparent, measured, and nuanced community and expert engagement.” When a five-week inquiry with no hearings, producing a recommendation to ban a phrase it acknowledged was rarely used and bore no demonstrated connection to the Bondi attack, passes by a 4–2 margin with the former Deputy Premier dissenting, the suitability of the resulting legislation is doubtful on its own terms.

Finding sought [Direct]: The Commission should find that the NSW Legislative Assembly inquiry that recommended banning “globalise the intifada” was given a submission window over Christmas, held no public hearings, and its own report acknowledged “there was no clear evidence to connect the phrase ‘globalise the intifada’ to the events at Bondi, and no evidence that banning it would help protect NSW communities.” The recommendation passed 4–2, with the former Deputy Premier dissenting. (ToR 2, ToR 4)

178. The inquiry’s own acknowledgment that “intifada” has “diverse meanings and uses” warrants examination. The word (Arabic: انتفاضة) derives from the root n-f-d (ن-ف-ض), meaning “a shaking off” or “uprising.” It is a standard Arabic term applied to popular uprisings in at least 14 countries: the Iraqi Intifada (1952), the Zemla Intifada and subsequent Sahrawi Intifadas against Moroccan occupation of Western Sahara, the 1977 Egyptian bread riots, the Bahraini uprising, and across the Arab Spring. In Arabic-language texts, the word is used for uprisings with no connection to Israel-Palestine: the 1916 Easter Rising (انتفاضة الفصح), the 1943 Warsaw Ghetto Uprising (انتفاضة غيتو وارسو), and the 1949 Jeju uprising in South Korea (انتفاضة جيجو). The NSW Council for Civil Liberties described the term as denoting a “largely civilian-led uprising” and noted that the First Intifada (1987–1993) — the event most directly associated with the term — was characterised by grassroots nonviolent tactics: demonstrations, strikes, tax refusal, civil disobedience, and economic boycotts, led by community organisers, youth, and women. Criminalising the word “intifada” in a political slogan is criminalising a standard Arabic political term that describes — among many other things — the Warsaw Ghetto uprising.[^91]

179. The same linguistic analysis applies to “from the river to the sea.” The Arabic original — min al-nahr ila al-bahr, Filastin satatharrar — translates as “from the river to the sea, Palestine will be liberated.” The operative word is tahrir (liberation), not destruction. The English rhyming couplet (“sea”/“free”) is a product of Western solidarity movements from at least the 1990s and does not exist in the Arabic original. Professor Elliott Colla of Georgetown University, having conducted extensive research into Palestinian revolutionary media from the 1960s and 1970s, found the phrase absent from those sources, absent from the Palestinian National Charters of 1964 and 1968, and absent from the Hamas Charter of 1988. His research traces the modern form to the Oslo era, where it emerged as a critique of Palestinian leadership that had, in some activists’ view, “surrendered claims over historic Palestine.” The 1964 PLO Palestinian National Charter called for “the recovery of the usurped homeland in its entirety” but explicitly stated that “Jews who are of Palestinian origin shall be considered Palestinians if they are willing to live peacefully and loyally in Palestine.” The phrase articulates a political vision about territory and freedom; it specifies neither the means nor the constitutional arrangement by which that freedom would be achieved.[^123]

180. Professors Amos Goldberg (Holocaust History, Hebrew University of Jerusalem) and Alon Confino (History and Jewish Studies, University of Massachusetts Amherst) have applied what they call a “symmetry test”: if the Palestinian slogan implies ethnic cleansing, then anyone who has ever supported Greater Israel — from the poet Nathan Alterman to the current government — “actually supports the annihilation or expulsion of the Palestinians. But this too would be inaccurate.” The Jerusalem Declaration on Antisemitism, drafted by over 200 scholars specialising in antisemitism, the Holocaust, and Jewish studies, explicitly states that the phrase “between the river and the sea” is not antisemitic. The symmetry test is directly relevant to the proportionality analysis: the Queensland bill would criminalise the Palestinian articulation of a territorial aspiration while leaving the identical Israeli articulation — backed by military force, settlement infrastructure, and constitutional law — entirely legal.[^124]

181. The expert evidence submitted to the inquiry directly contradicted the committee’s recommendation. Professor Ben Saul, UN Special Rapporteur on counterterrorism and human rights, warned that blanket bans on expressions with multiple interpretations “may have directly or indirectly discriminatory effects” and “silence legitimate dissent.” Professor Saul has since intervened as amicus curiae in Jarrett v State of New South Wales (NSWCA 2026/44249), where his submissions to the Court of Appeal apply the ICCPR Article 21 framework directly: blanket restrictions on peaceful assemblies are “presumptively disproportionate” and the Rabat Plan of Action requires a six-part test — context, speaker, intent, content, extent of dissemination, and likelihood of harm — before any expression can be restricted on public order grounds.[^133] Dr Nick Reimer of the University of Sydney, a linguist, demonstrated that the phrase’s meaning is context-dependent, not inherent: “If ‘globalise the intifada’ inherently has these meanings, then this must mean that it has them on every occasion that it is expressed. Otherwise, the meaning is not inherent, but context-dependent.” Dr David Brophy, a historian at the University of Sydney, traced the slogan to the early 2000s anti-war and anti-globalisation movements, where it “recognised, and sought to build, links between Palestinian resistance and campaigns for justice elsewhere.” Sheryn Omeri KC described the proposed ban as “one of the most significant attacks — if not the most significant attack — on freedom of expression in Australia.” Professor Anne Twomey warned that “the political communication is the direct target of the law” and that “a law that prohibits the use of political slogans or chants will burden the implied freedom of political communication.” Twomey further observed that “a purpose of protecting the community from offence, hurt feelings, insult, and the damage to social cohesion that may be caused by disagreement and debate, is not a legitimate purpose, as it would prevent robust political communication.”[^92]

182. The Palestine Action Group — the primary organiser of pro-Palestine protests in Sydney — stated it had “not itself led the chant ‘globalise the intifada’ at rallies it had organised since October 2023.” The phrase’s centrality to the legislative response cannot be explained by its prominence at actual protests. The proposal to ban it achieved what the phrase itself had not: national attention. Before December 2025, the slogan was marginal at Australian demonstrations. After the Premier announced his intention to criminalise it, it became a national controversy, discussed in every major newspaper and debated in three parliaments. The phrase was “rarely used in Australia before the proposal to proscribe its use” — a finding from the committee’s own report that raises the question of whether the legislative response created the phenomenon it purported to address.[^93]

183. The Queensland approach is even more constitutionally exposed. The Fighting Antisemitism and Keeping Guns Out of the Hands of Terrorists Bill 2026 (Qld) criminalises the “public distribution, publication, public display or public recitation of a prescribed phrase” to cause menace, harassment, or offence, with a maximum penalty of two years’ imprisonment. The bill does not name the prohibited phrases in its text — it grants the Attorney-General power to designate prohibited phrases by regulation, enabling expansion without further parliamentary debate. The public was given seven days to make submissions. The Queensland Council for Civil Liberties described the bill’s Statement of Compatibility with human rights as “woefully inadequate” and warned that “legal challenges are not just possible but likely.” The Commonwealth Act (Combatting Antisemitism, Hate and Extremism Act 2026), passed in a late-night sitting on 20 January 2026, does not ban specific phrases but establishes a general framework criminalising conduct intended to “promote or incite hatred” — whether specific slogans violate the Act will be determined case-by-case by courts. The constitutional vulnerability identified by Twomey — and demonstrated by Lees v NSW — applies to all three instruments.[^94]

184. The NSW Parliamentary inquiry that most directly examined the evidence — Portfolio Committee No. 5’s inquiry into antisemitism (Report 64, February 2026) — declined to produce findings or recommendations at all. The committee, chaired by the Hon. Robert Borsak MLC, heard four days of testimony from Jewish community organisations, dissenting Jewish groups, Muslim community representatives, police, and the Australian Human Rights Commission. After considering that evidence, the committee “decided not to produce its intended inquiry report with commentary, findings and recommendations” on the basis that “the Royal Commission, as Australia’s highest form of inquiry, is best placed to comprehensively investigate these matters.”[^95] A parliamentary committee that heard the full range of evidence concluded it could not make findings. Other committees, working on shorter timelines with less evidence, produced recommendations to ban specific phrases and expand criminal liability. The Commission should consider which approach better reflects the complexity of the evidence.

185. Two NSW anti-protest laws have already been struck down as unconstitutional in three years, and a third is under active constitutional challenge. In Kvelde v State of New South Wales [2023] NSWSC 1560, provisions criminalising climate protests were declared invalid.[^96] In Lees v NSW (2025), laws targeting demonstrations near places of worship failed because they captured protected political communication. Justice Mitchelmore held that “protest inherently involves disruption — noise, assembly, and mobilising public awareness — and this is constitutionally protected.”[^37] In Jarrett v State of New South Wales (NSWCA 2026/44249), three plaintiffs — represented by David Hooke SC — challenge the PARD scheme that enabled blanket protest bans covering 5.2 million people; the case is pending before the Court of Appeal. The constitutional principles are established. The implied freedom of political communication has been settled law since Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997). Yet the Commonwealth passed the Combatting Antisemitism Bill with Professor Twomey’s warning on the public record. The rational connection between criminalising political speech and preventing ISIS-inspired terrorism has not been demonstrated.

Finding sought [Direct]: The Commission should find that two NSW anti-protest laws have been struck down as unconstitutional in three years (Kvelde in 2023; Lees in 2025), and that the Commonwealth passed the Combatting Antisemitism Bill despite constitutional scholars warning of likely challenge. (ToR 2)

186. The suitability analysis is further undermined by the organised crime and state-sponsored dimensions documented in Section 2.3. Deputy Commissioner Hudson’s finding that “none of the individuals we have arrested have displayed any form of antisemitic ideology”[^18] and ASIO’s assessment that the IRGC directed at least two attacks using criminal proxies[^19] establish that the most serious post-October 7 attacks on Jewish targets were not driven by political speech at all. They were driven by foreign state direction and organised crime exploitation. Banning protest slogans bears no rational connection to preventing IRGC-directed firebombings.

5.3 Necessity: Are Less Restrictive Means Available?

187. The second limb asks whether the protective purpose could be achieved through less restrictive means. The answer is unambiguously yes, and those means are documented in Section 6 of this submission.

188. The Bondi attack was enabled by specific, identifiable failures: ASIO’s records were not cross-referenced with the firearms registry when Sajid Akram applied for a weapons licence in 2020. A month-long trip to a terrorism hotspot in Mindanao triggered no intelligence alerts. Continuing Detention Orders were not applied to released terrorists because applications were filed too late or not at all. A risk assessment tool used in CDO proceedings was found to perform “no better than flipping a coin”[^97] — and the finding was suppressed. An AFP surveillance team mandated to monitor released terrorists was disbanded for funding shortfalls weeks before Bondi.[^98]

189. Each of these failures could be addressed through measures that impose no burden on political communication: automatic database cross-referencing between ASIO, the firearms registry, and Border Force travel records; CDO applications commenced 12 months before scheduled release; validated risk assessment tools; adequately funded post-release surveillance; prison communications audits. The cross-referencing gap is a product of statutory siloing: ASIO’s intelligence holdings are governed by Part IV of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth), which restricts disclosure to purposes connected with the performance of ASIO’s functions; the NSW Firearms Registry operates under the Firearms Act 1996 (NSW) with no statutory mechanism for automated intelligence agency consultation on licence applications; and Border Force travel records are held under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) with separate disclosure regimes. These barriers are legislative, not technical — they can be addressed through interoperability provisions without compromising operational security or creating mass surveillance infrastructure. The measures address the actual pathway that produced the attack. They are less restrictive than criminalising political speech. They are more effective. Their availability means the speech-restrictive measures fail the necessity limb of proportionality.

190. Even the firearms reforms enacted after Bondi — the Terrorism and Other Legislation Amendment Bill 2025 (NSW), assented 24 December 2025 — illustrate the pattern of misdirected response. The legislation reclassified straight-pull rifles to Category C and reduced permitted magazine capacities to 5 and 10 rounds. But the magazines used in the attack were already 5-round (rifle) and held standard shotgun capacity — the new limits are the same sizes as the weapons that killed 15 people. The new 4-firearm limit per permit would not have prevented the attack: three weapons were used, with a fourth left in the vehicle. The only provision that directly addresses the root cause — a prohibition on firearm permits for persons associated with terrorism — was, as security analysts noted, “quite literally, an afterthought.”[^99] The firearms that enabled the Bondi attack were legally held for approximately a decade. The failure was not in the firearms laws. It was in the failure to cross-reference ASIO’s identification of Naveed Akram in 2019 with his father’s firearms licence. No new firearms legislation addresses that database gap.

Finding sought [Direct]: The Commission should find that the post-Bondi firearms reforms — reducing magazine capacities and imposing a 4-firearm limit — would not have prevented the attack, because the magazines used were already within the new limits and three weapons were used (below the new cap), and that the only provision addressing the root cause — a prohibition on firearms permits for persons associated with terrorism — was treated as an afterthought rather than the centrepiece. (ToR 3, ToR 2)

191. The contrast between Clubb v Edwards and the present case is instructive. In Clubb, safe access zone laws around abortion clinics were upheld because they addressed a specific, demonstrated harm — targeted harassment of vulnerable individuals at the point of accessing healthcare — through a narrowly tailored measure (a geographic exclusion zone) that left the substance of the political communication unaffected. The post-Bondi legislation does the opposite: it targets the substance of political communication (specific phrases, specific political positions) without demonstrating a connection between that communication and the harm it purports to prevent. Clubb succeeded because the restriction was narrowly connected to a demonstrated harm. The post-Bondi legislation fails because the connection between protest slogans and ISIS-inspired terrorism has not been established.

5.4 Adequacy of Balance: Is the Burden Proportionate?

192. The third limb asks whether the burden on political communication is proportionate to the protective purpose served. Even if the measures were suitable and necessary — which the evidence above suggests they are not — the burden they impose on the implied freedom of political communication is severe.

193. The 90-day protest ban power — the PARD scheme — enables the Police Commissioner to prohibit political assemblies for three months across an entire police region. As documented in the court submissions filed in Jarrett v State of New South Wales (NSWCA 2026/44249), the PARD issued on 24 December 2025 covered Greater Sydney’s three Metropolitan Police Regions — an area of 5.2 million people. It restricted all public assemblies, not merely those connected to the Bondi attack: “Invasion Day” protests, demonstrations about Venezuela, Indigenous deaths in custody, and — as the plaintiffs noted — even protests calling for a Royal Commission into the Bondi attack itself were captured. The State defended this breadth on “social cohesion” grounds, confirming the legislation targets political communication. Warrantless stop-and-search powers expand police authority over anyone suspected of the relevant offences. The power to ban organisations without criminal conviction of any member extends executive discretion into territory the High Court has historically guarded. Attorney-General Rowland’s confirmation that the statement “Israel is engaged in genocide” could fall within scope means the legislation captures communication on government and political matters that lies at the core of the implied freedom. The UN Special Rapporteur on Counter-Terrorism, intervening in Jarrett, found the PARD “presumptively disproportionate” under international law and noted that the Commissioner’s public statement that the ban was imposed “not only to ensure community safety, but also to ensure the community feels safe” exceeds both statutory authority and ICCPR Article 21.[^133]

194. The Meta Oversight Board, in its ruling on “from the river to the sea,” found the phrase lacks a single meaning and that “a blanket ban would hinder protected political speech in unacceptable ways.”[^100] When Meta — a private platform under no constitutional obligation to protect political speech — declines to ban a phrase, but Australian criminal law imposes two years imprisonment for it, the proportionality of the response warrants scrutiny. The Australian proposals go further than even social media companies have been willing to go.

5.4A International Court Treatment of the Slogan

195. The treatment of “from the river to the sea” across comparable jurisdictions demonstrates a consistent pattern: where independent judicial reasoning has been applied, courts have found the phrase to constitute protected political expression. In Germany — which maintains among the strictest hate speech regimes in Europe, criminalising Holocaust denial, incitement to hatred (Volksverhetzung), and online hate speech (NetzDG) — courts have been divided but the trend at appellate level favours protection. The Hesse Administrative Court in Kassel (Case No. 8 B 560/24, 22 March 2024) ruled that the slogan expresses “the desire for a free Palestine from the Jordan river to the Mediterranean — including the territory of Israel within its current borders” and found it “extremely doubtful” that it constitutes a punishable offence, noting that “various political ways and means are conceivable to achieve this abstract goal, for example through international treaties, a two-state solution, a unified state with equal civil rights for Israelis and Palestinians or by means of armed struggle.” The Mannheim Regional Court declined to convict, finding the phrase “not a Hamas symbol” and open to multiple interpretations. The Duisburg Regional Court overturned a first-instance conviction, ruling the chants “not punishable by law.” Prior to October 2023, German prosecutors regarded the phrase as legal and covered by freedom of expression.[^126]

196. In the United Kingdom, the Crown Prosecution Service has consistently declined to prosecute. Metropolitan Police Commissioner Sir Mark Rowley stated publicly: “We have repeatedly gone to the CPS to say, ‘Can we prosecute in this circumstance?’ and the answer is always no… whilst to some people it means the obliteration of Israel and Jews, to other people it has different meanings. So that ambiguity means you cannot convict beyond reasonable doubt.” No prosecution has been brought in the United Kingdom for use of the phrase alone. The UK has hate speech provisions under the Public Order Act 1986, incitement to racial hatred offences, and a dedicated police counter-extremism infrastructure — yet its prosecutorial authorities have consistently concluded that the phrase cannot sustain a criminal conviction.[^127]

197. The European Court of Human Rights, while not ruling specifically on this phrase, has established through Handyside v United Kingdom (1976) that Article 10 of the Convention protects speech that may “offend, shock or disturb.” In Gül and Others v Turkey (2010), the Court found that conviction for shouting slogans in support of an armed, illegal organisation at a demonstration violated Article 10 where there was no “clear and imminent danger.” This sets a high bar for criminalising protest slogans — higher than any of the Australian legislative proposals satisfy. The international free expression organisation ARTICLE 19, in its analysis of the phrase, concluded: “There is no indication that the slogan constitutes a call to violence or a call for exclusion of any particular group.”[^128]

198. The comparative finding is significant for the proportionality analysis. No comparable democracy has successfully criminalised this phrase at appellate level. Australian legislation imposing two years’ imprisonment goes further than any jurisdiction examined — including Germany, which bans Holocaust denial; the United Kingdom, which prosecutes incitement to racial hatred; and the European Convention system, which permits restriction of speech only where a “pressing social need” is demonstrated. When Germany cannot sustain convictions for the phrase, and when the United Kingdom’s prosecutorial authorities consistently decline to bring charges, the proportionality of Australia’s approach is doubtful. The Commission should consider what it means for Australia to be an outlier among democracies on this question — and whether that outlier status reflects a more rigorous analysis of the threat or a less rigorous analysis of the constitutional cost.[^129]

Finding sought [Direct]: The Commission should find that no comparable democracy has criminalised “from the river to the sea” at appellate level — including Germany (strictest hate speech regime in Europe), the United Kingdom (CPS consistently declined to prosecute), and the European Convention system — and that Australia’s proposed two-year imprisonment goes further than any jurisdiction examined. (ToR 4)

199. The most comprehensive Australian research — examining 20 years of anti-vilification law operation — found the laws produced “little to no change in hate speech incidence in public places.” Less than 2% of complaints reached binding determinations. Deborah Lipstadt, the former US Special Envoy to Monitor and Combat Antisemitism and author of Denying the Holocaust, has stated:

“I don’t think that these laws are efficacious… I think they turn whatever is being outlawed into forbidden fruit.”[^81]

200. Research consistently shows banned content migrates to encrypted channels and alternative platforms. Restrictions reduce mainstream reach while concentrating radicalised communities in less-monitored spaces where they are harder to detect and counter. Germany has banned Holocaust denial for decades. The AfD has grown to become the country’s second-largest party. France has some of the strictest hate speech laws in Europe. The National Rally won the most first-round votes in the 2024 legislative elections before finishing third in seats. The New Zealand Royal Commission — investigating 51 deaths in a terrorist attack motivated by explicit racial hatred — concluded that its own hate speech law was “not fit for purpose” because its low threshold “unacceptably impinges on the right of freedom of expression” and recommended narrowing the offence, not expanding it (see Section 5B below).[^101] The burden on political communication is severe. The protective benefit is, on the evidence, negligible or counterproductive. The measures fail the adequacy of balance limb.

201. The pattern raises a final question the Commission should address: why do Australian parliaments continue to pass legislation that is clearly vulnerable to constitutional challenge? The Lees decision followed Kvelde by two years. The constitutional principles were established. If the post-Bondi legislation is struck down — as constitutional scholars have predicted — the result will be another precedent expanding the protection of protest speech, further constraining future legislative options. The political benefit of being seen to act appears to outweigh the legal cost of acting unconstitutionally. This approach expends institutional credibility and produces binding precedent that makes effective regulation harder, not easier. Legislation that fails proportionality review does not protect Jewish Australians. It creates the appearance of protection while leaving the actual threats unaddressed — and it expends the institutional capital that could be deployed toward measures that work.

5.5 The Perth Comparison

202. On Australia Day 2026, a man allegedly threw a homemade bomb containing ball bearings, screws, nails, and volatile chemicals into a crowd of 2,500 at an Indigenous rally in Perth. WA Premier Roger Cook said the device, had it detonated, would have been “a mass casualty event.” The incident was formally declared a terrorist attack after nine days.

203. No emergency legislation was introduced. No parliament was recalled. No royal commission was established. No foreign head of state was invited in solidarity with Indigenous Australians. Katie Kiss, the National Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner at the Australian Human Rights Commission, observed: “If this happened at any other event, we’d call it terrorism.”[^102]

204. A significant difference must be acknowledged: the Bondi attack killed fifteen people; the Perth device failed to detonate and caused injuries but no deaths. The scale of casualties is relevant to the intensity of institutional response. However, the disparity extends well beyond what casualty differential alone explains. Both attacks targeted gatherings of identifiable communities. Both involved premeditated planning and weapons designed for mass casualties. Both were formally classified as terrorist attacks. WA Premier Cook confirmed the Perth device, had it detonated, would have been “a mass casualty event” — the difference in outcome was a matter of detonation failure, not intent. One produced emergency legislation, a recalled parliament, a $91 million royal commission, and a state visit by a foreign head of state. The other produced condolences and a nine-day delay in classification. Even accounting for the difference in casualties, the disparity in institutional response — the absence of any legislative response, any commission, any systemic review for Perth — suggests political salience, not threat severity alone, as the driver of policy. If the Commission is to make recommendations about social cohesion, this disparity warrants direct examination.

Finding sought [Direct]: The Commission should find that the Bondi attack (14 December 2025) and the Perth attack (26 January 2026) — both premeditated attacks targeting identifiable communities, both formally classified as terrorist attacks — received dramatically different institutional responses: emergency legislation, a recalled parliament, a $91 million royal commission, and a state visit for Bondi; condolences and a nine-day classification delay for Perth. (ToR 4)

Finding sought [Inference]: On the basis of the comparative public record — emergency legislation, recalled parliament, $91 million royal commission, and state visit for Bondi; condolences and a nine-day classification delay for Perth — the Commission should find that the disparity in institutional response between Bondi and Perth reveals political salience, not threat severity, as the driver of policy, and that this selective application of emergency counter-terrorism responses itself undermines the social cohesion the Commission is charged with protecting. (ToR 4)

5.6 What Works

205. Academic research shows casual interfaith interaction can actually increase prejudice. Only deep, sustained relationships reduce negative attitudes. The Corrymeela Community in Northern Ireland and the Nigerian Interfaith Mediation Centre took decades to build. The Drumlanrig Accord—signed by eleven Muslim and Jewish denominations and presented to King Charles in February 2025—demonstrates what is possible even amid conflict.

206. After the Lindt Cafe siege, #IllRideWithYou trended worldwide—ordinary Australians offering to sit with Muslim commuters so they would not travel alone. No legislation produced that result. No royal commission designed it. Australians built social cohesion organically, from the ground up. Australia has navigated existential challenges before without importing foreign ideological frameworks: the Communist Party dissolution case, native title, Port Arthur.[^103] Each time, the institutions held because Australians trusted the process.

207. Both Jewish and Muslim communities have experienced surges in hatred since October 2023. The Islamophobia Register documented a 530% increase in reports.[^104] When Muslim Australians see their community blamed for the actions of ISIS-aligned terrorists—a group that considers Palestinian nationalism heresy—they feel targeted. When Jewish Australians see mass murder at a Hanukkah celebration, they feel unsafe. Both responses are valid. Neither community should have to choose between safety and political voice. These are not competing claims. They are parallel crises requiring shared solutions, and the Commission is well placed to recommend frameworks that address both simultaneously.

Recommendation 9: The Commission should not recommend criminalising protest slogans. The constitutional vulnerabilities are significant, the evidentiary base for effectiveness is absent, and such measures risk further constitutional defeats.

Recommendation 10: The Commission should recommend investment in evidence-based community engagement programs, modelled on international examples, and funded at levels commensurate with the scale of the problem. The Safer Communities Fund has awarded 699 grants totalling over $186 million — $54 million to Jewish community projects, $39 million to First Nations, $24 million to Muslim communities, and $28 million to Turkish communities — but effective deradicalisation programs such as Exit Australia, which has deradicalised hundreds of Australians, operates without Commonwealth funding and relies on state grants and philanthropy.[^105] The “Safe and Together Community Grants Program” was discontinued after its first year despite being budgeted for three. Resources should be redirected from symbolic legislation toward programs with demonstrated outcomes.

Recommendation 11: The Commission should recommend that counter-terrorism responses be applied consistently regardless of the community targeted by the attack.

Section 5A: The Social Cohesion Cost

Terms of Reference 1 (drivers) and 4 (social cohesion)

208. The Letters Patent mandate is conjunctive — the Commissioner is charged with examining antisemitism and social cohesion. Any recommendation that addresses one while degrading the other fails the Commission’s own terms. The preceding section demonstrated that the current legislative response fails proportionality analysis. This section demonstrates that it also fails the Commission’s social cohesion mandate. The tension is made explicit in the State of New South Wales’ own submissions in Jarrett v State of NSW: the State defends the PARD scheme on the basis that “social cohesion can be seen to be a precondition to the full participation in civic life” (DS [61]) — a formulation that treats the suppression of political assembly as a contribution to social cohesion. The Commission should note that the government entity responsible for the most far-reaching post-Bondi protest restriction has placed its defence squarely within the Commission’s own terms of reference.[^133]

209. Senior Counsel Assisting, Mr Lancaster SC, articulated the correct framework at the opening hearing on 24 February 2026: the social cohesion to which the Letters Patent refer “is not a uniformity of opinion” and “does not require or involve the suppression of fair criticism and debate.” Rather, it is “a consensus that a diverse multicultural society can subsist and thrive only by mutual acceptance of our respective democratic freedoms exercised according to law.” Lancaster further stated that “social cohesion begins with empathy.” This framework — cohesion through mutual acceptance, not enforced uniformity — should guide the Commission’s assessment of whether the current institutional strategy strengthens or weakens the civic fabric.

210. The Islamophobia in Australia Report 2023–24, produced by researchers at Monash University, documented that incidents of anti-Muslim and anti-Palestinian racism surged following October 7 in a pattern mirroring the antisemitism spike — the same “spark event” driving hostility against both communities simultaneously. The Cheikh Husain analysis (Overland, 2025) documents how “social cohesion” has been weaponised to enforce political silence on Muslim Australians: Victoria codified bans on Palestinian symbols in healthcare settings; NSW Police sought court orders to ban protests; universities expelled students and used Wi-Fi surveillance to monitor activists. The same conflict that generates antisemitic incidents also generates anti-Muslim hatred. A response that addresses one while ignoring — or actively exacerbating — the other is not a social cohesion strategy. It is a factional strategy wearing the language of cohesion.

211. The current institutional strategy communicates to approximately 813,000 Muslim Australians, approximately 350,000 Arab Australians, and an uncounted number of non-Arab, non-Muslim Australians that political expression on matters of international significance will expose them to legal proceedings, loss of employment, or institutional sanction. When one community’s safety is pursued through the suppression of another community’s political expression, the result is not cohesion but fracture. The evidence before this Commission establishes that fracture.

212. During the 14 months preceding the Bondi attack, institutional energy was directed overwhelmingly toward suppressing political speech: the Kostakidis complaint (July 2024), the Lattouf proceedings (throughout 2024–25), the Abdel-Fattah suspension (February 2025), the PJCHR university inquiry, the Segal Plan, the Universities Australia IHRA adoption. During this same period, the actual threat — later attributed by ASIO to Iranian state direction — escalated from arson attacks on a kosher restaurant and a synagogue through an organised criminal exploitation of antisemitic sentiment to a mass-casualty terrorist attack. The advocacy strategy generated institutional noise around political expression that may have obscured the intelligence signal that mattered.

213. Ahmed al-Ahmed, a Muslim man originally from Syria, was shot while tackling one of the Bondi attackers, preventing further deaths. He was hospitalised from his injuries and widely recognised as an Australian hero. His act embodies the social cohesion this Commission is charged with protecting. His act of heroism refutes the premise that intercommunal solidarity requires the suppression of political difference. It demonstrates that Australians of all backgrounds will defend one another from genuine threats when the civic fabric holds. The question for this Commission is whether the institutional strategy it is being asked to endorse strengthens or weakens that fabric.

Section 5B: The New Zealand Royal Commission Precedent

Terms of Reference 1 (drivers), 2 (law enforcement), and 4 (social cohesion)

214. The New Zealand Royal Commission of Inquiry into the Christchurch mosque attack (Ko tō tātou kāinga tēnei, 26 November 2020) is the closest international precedent for this Commission. It investigated 51 deaths in a mass-casualty terrorist attack, examined the relationship between social environment, political expression, and terrorism over four volumes and 44 recommendations, and had full access to classified intelligence material. Its findings are directly relevant because it addressed the same structural questions this Commission faces — intelligence failures, radicalisation pathways, hate speech law, social cohesion, and freedom of expression — and reached conclusions that differ markedly from the direction of Australian policy.

Intelligence failure

215. On the intelligence failure, the NZ Commission found “a systemic failure to recognise that there was a threat of extreme right-wing domestic terrorism that was not understood” and that “the allocation of counter-terrorism resources almost completely to Islamist extremist terrorism was not the result of a considered system-wide decision” but rather “was not based on an informed assessment of the threats of terrorism associated with other ideologies” and was “therefore inappropriate.”[^106] As at 11 March 2019, every one of the 32 subjects on the NZSIS watch list was assessed as an Islamist extremist. Zero right-wing extremism investigations were active. The NZ Commission explicitly cited the 2015 Review of Australia’s Counter-Terrorism Machinery — which assessed the threat environment exclusively in terms of Islamist extremist terrorism — as an example of the same structural bias. Despite this systemic failure, the Commission found that “given the operational security that the individual maintained… there was no plausible way he could have been detected except by chance.” The systemic failure was real. It did not cause the detection failure. Both propositions can be true simultaneously. The same analytical discipline should be applied to the Bondi attack.

Environment and radicalisation

216. On the environment question — whether general social attitudes cause terrorism — the NZ Commission’s findings are particularly significant. It explicitly rejected the attacker’s own account of what radicalised him as “an exercise in propaganda.” It found radicalisation driven by online immersion and social isolation, not by the New Zealand political or protest environment. It stated that “having extreme beliefs does not automatically lead to violence and the majority of those who subscribe to an extremist ideology do not commit acts of violence,” that radicalisation “is not a linear process,” and that among those who express support for violence, “most are ‘talkers’ and very few are actually committed to following through on, or materially supporting, extremist violence or terrorism.” Most significantly, the NZ Commission explicitly warned that “describing behaviours that do not involve violence or the threat of violence as extremist and seeking to discourage or impose legal or social sanctions on them have presented challenges (for instance, complaints that rights to freedom of speech and democratic debate are being limited) and, in this way, exacerbated polarisation.”[^107]

Social cohesion and securitisation

217. On social cohesion, the NZ Commission drew a distinction that this Commission should adopt. It found that “social cohesion can contribute to preventing or countering extremism” but that “social cohesion should be pursued separately from New Zealand’s counter-terrorism efforts as it is important in itself” and that “undertaking social cohesion activities as a tool to counter extremism may have the effect of stigmatising and alienating some members of communities, thereby undermining the aims of social cohesion work.” The Commission formally adopted the concept of “securitisation” — defined as occurring “when a group of people or communities are seen primarily as a potential security threat” — and identified it as counterproductive to both security and cohesion objectives.[^108] Muslim communities told the Commission: “Even now, we are still being engaged with like we are the threat.” The NZ Commission found this approach degraded social licence, reduced community cooperation, and made effective counter-terrorism harder.

Hate speech law

218. On hate speech law, the NZ Commission — which investigated a mass casualty attack motivated by explicit racial hatred — concluded that the existing hate speech provision was “not fit for purpose” because “the section as written unacceptably impinges on the right of freedom of expression” and that its low liability threshold had “resulted in considerable uncertainty” and did “not provide a credible foundation for prosecution.” It recommended narrowing the offence to require intent to “stir up, maintain or normalise hatred, through threatening, abusive or insulting communications” — a higher threshold than the provision it replaced.[^101] A Royal Commission that examined 51 deaths in a terrorist attack concluded that definitional overreach in hate speech law was counterproductive. The Australian response to Bondi is moving in the opposite direction.

Finding sought [Direct]: The Commission should find that the New Zealand Royal Commission — which investigated 51 deaths in a mass-casualty terrorist attack motivated by explicit racial hatred — concluded that its own hate speech law was “not fit for purpose” because its low threshold “unacceptably impinges on the right of freedom of expression,” and recommended narrowing the offence, not expanding it. The Australian response to Bondi is moving in the opposite direction. (ToR 2, ToR 4)

Freedom of expression and intelligence action

219. On freedom of expression and intelligence action, section 19 of New Zealand’s Intelligence and Security Act 2017 provides that the exercise of the right of freedom of expression — explicitly including “the right to advocate, protest or dissent” — “does not of itself justify an intelligence and security agency taking any action.” The NZ Commission analysed this provision in detail and found that monitoring people for ideological proximity to extremism, without evidence of support for violence, was “at risk of being seen to contravene section 19.” It recommended Parliament urgently address the tension between effective counter-terrorism and freedom of expression, rather than pretending it does not exist.[^109] Australia has no equivalent statutory protection. The absence is conspicuous.

The parallel

220. The parallels between Christchurch and Bondi are structural. In both cases, an intelligence agency failed to detect a threat because its resource allocation reflected institutional assumptions rather than evidence-based assessment. In both cases, the attacker operated with sufficient security awareness to evade detection. In both cases, the political response focused on speech regulation rather than intelligence reform. The NZ Commission’s conclusion — that systemic intelligence failures, not insufficient speech restrictions, were the root cause — applies with equal force to the Bondi attack. Commissioner Bell is uniquely positioned to draw on the Christchurch precedent: as a former Justice of the High Court, she brings the same institutional authority that the NZ Commission’s chair, Sir William Young, brought to that inquiry. The NZ Commission produced 44 recommendations. Not one proposed banning a political slogan.

Finding sought [Inference]: On the basis of the New Zealand Royal Commission report Ko tō tātou kāinga tēnei (26 November 2020), the Commission should find that the parallels between Christchurch and Bondi are structural: in both cases, an intelligence agency failed to detect a threat because its resource allocation reflected institutional assumptions rather than evidence-based assessment; and in both cases, the political response focused on speech regulation rather than intelligence reform. The NZ Commission produced 44 recommendations. Not one proposed banning a political slogan. (ToR 2, ToR 3)

Section 5C: The Structural Deficit — Australia’s Absence of Pre-Enactment Constitutional Review

Placement: Section 5C, following Section 5B (New Zealand Royal Commission Precedent)

Terms of Reference 3 (legislative and regulatory frameworks) and 4 (social cohesion)

Section 5C: The Structural Deficit — Pre-Enactment Constitutional Review

Terms of Reference 3 (legislative and regulatory frameworks) and 4 (social cohesion)

180AA. The Commission may consider this recommendation outside its specific mandate. But the Commission’s terms of reference include the adequacy of legislative and regulatory frameworks (Term of Reference 3), and the structural deficit identified here is the reason the post-Bondi legislation was enacted without the constitutional scrutiny that every comparable democracy would have required. The Commission is uniquely positioned to make this recommendation precisely because the antisemitism legislation illustrates the problem with particular clarity: legislation enacted in haste, without constitutional advice, producing judicial defeats that left Jewish Australians with neither the protections Parliament promised nor the legal certainty effective protection requires. A pre-enactment review mechanism would benefit all Australians — including Jewish Australians, who deserve legislation that is constitutionally durable rather than legislation that generates years of uncertainty before being struck down.

180A. The preceding sections have demonstrated that the post-October 7 legislative response fails proportionality analysis (Section 5), degrades social cohesion (Section 5A), and diverges from international best practice (Section 5B). This section examines a structural reason these outcomes were foreseeable. The structured proportionality framework that Commissioner Bell helped to build in McCloy and Brown provides clear criteria against which proposed legislation can be assessed — yet no mechanism required, or even facilitated, that assessment before the laws were enacted. The constitutional defeats in Lees v State of NSW [2025] NSWSC 1209 and Kvelde v State of NSW [2023] NSWSC 1560 were predictable. This section identifies a structural deficiency in Australia’s constitutional architecture that allowed legislation to suppress political communication for months before judicial correction, and that will allow it to happen again unless the Commission recommends reform.

180B. Australia is the only established democracy in the common law world that lacks any formal mechanism for assessing the constitutional validity of legislation before it is enacted. Every comparable democracy has such a mechanism. France’s Conseil Constitutionnel, established under Article 61 of the 1958 Constitution, reviews legislation before promulgation; a referral by 60 members of the National Assembly or 60 Senators triggers mandatory review within one month, and a provision declared unconstitutional “shall be neither promulgated nor implemented.” In 2020, the Conseil struck down core provisions of the Loi Avia (online hate speech law) as disproportionate restrictions on freedom of expression — before the law could take effect, before any citizen was prosecuted, before any community organisation bore the cost of a post-enactment challenge. Canada’s section 53 of the Supreme Court Act empowers reference of proposed legislation to the Supreme Court; in Reference re Securities Act (2011), draft legislation was submitted and ruled unconstitutional before enactment. New Zealand’s section 7 of the Bill of Rights Act 1990 requires the Attorney-General to report to Parliament any provision that appears inconsistent with protected rights — 58 such reports had been tabled by 2012. The United Kingdom’s section 19 of the Human Rights Act 1998 requires a ministerial statement of compatibility with Convention rights for every bill; in over 25 years, the government has declined to make such a statement fewer than five times. Ireland’s Article 26 empowers the President to refer any bill to the Supreme Court; of 16 references since 1937, the Court has struck down bills on seven occasions.¹

180C. Australia’s existing mechanisms do not fill this gap. The Human Rights (Parliamentary Scrutiny) Act 2011 (Cth) requires statements of compatibility with international treaty obligations — the ICCPR, ICESCR, CERD, and four other treaties — but not with the implied freedom of political communication. The implied freedom is a constitutional doctrine derived from the structure of representative government, not an international treaty right. It falls entirely outside the Act’s scope. The mechanism is purely advisory: statements of compatibility are “not binding on any court or tribunal,” and a failure to provide one does not affect the validity of the resulting Act. Reynolds and Williams found that in 65 per cent of instances where the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights made an adverse finding about a bill, the conclusion had no impact on the legislation.² State and territory human rights Acts — Victoria’s Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006, the ACT’s Human Rights Act 2004, and Queensland’s Human Rights Act 2019 — are ordinary statutes that can be overridden by the enacting parliament. They cannot protect the constitutional implied freedom. The Solicitor-General provides expert constitutional advice, but only on request, in confidence, and without binding effect — and the fragility of this arrangement was exposed in the 2016 Brandis–Gleeson affair, when the Attorney-General issued a direction controlling when the Solicitor-General could give independent advice. The Senate Standing Committee for the Scrutiny of Bills has no specific constitutional review mandate and operates under severe time constraints. None of these mechanisms requires a systematic pre-enactment assessment of whether proposed legislation satisfies the McCloy structured proportionality test.³

180D. The 2025–2026 antisemitism legislation demonstrates the structural problem with particular clarity. The federal Combatting Antisemitism Bill was introduced with a public consultation period of approximately 72 hours — exposure draft released 12 January 2026, submissions closing at 4:00 pm on 15 January. Parliament was recalled on 19–20 January and the legislation passed both houses in a late-night sitting, reportedly introduced only three hours before the final vote. The Law Council of Australia stated: “Given the limited timeframe for response, it has not been possible for the Law Council and its constituent bodies to review the draft Bill in detail.” Liberty Victoria and the NSW Council for Civil Liberties described the process as “a charade of consultation.” The Australian Human Rights Commission stated that “allowing only three days for this inquiry to review and report on this significant draft legislation is insufficient.”⁴ The Queensland Fighting Antisemitism Bill followed with a seven-day consultation period — described by the Queensland Council for Civil Liberties as effectively three working days — and only “senior members of Queensland’s Jewish community” were consulted during drafting. No other community groups, civil liberties organisations, universities, or affected communities were consulted. The QCCL’s vice-president Terry O’Gorman compared the legislation to Bjelke-Petersen’s street march bans of 1977.⁵ The NSW amendments passed overnight on 21 February 2025 with “targeted” consultation confined to faith institutions and government agencies.

180E. The constitutional concerns raised by experts were serious and specific. Professor Anne Twomey of the University of Sydney warned that the federal bill could criminalise the honest public description of war or violence perpetrated by persons of a specific national origin — using the example of displaying Picasso’s Guernica, which depicts German war crimes, as potentially contravening provisions that could be deemed to “promote anti-German hatred” — and noted there is no truth-based defence. The Institute of Public Affairs observed that nothing in any of these bills would have prevented the Bondi massacre — collapsing the proportionality argument at the necessity limb. Professor Katharine Gelber noted the federal bill’s use of “promote” rather than “incite” “lowers the threshold for criminality considerably.” The UN Special Rapporteur on Counter-Terrorism, Professor Ben Saul, warned that “hasty law-making is prone to lead to over-reach, unintended consequences, and violations of human rights law.”⁶ Had Australia possessed a pre-enactment review mechanism comparable to any of the five countries described above, these questions — suitability, necessity, adequacy in balance — would have been formally addressed before enactment. They were not.

180F. The cost of correcting unconstitutional legislation falls entirely on private parties. A constitutional challenge in the High Court conservatively costs $150,000 to $500,000 in legal fees; complex matters exceed $1 million. Filing fees alone range from $4,050 to $12,220. Senior Counsel appear at rates of $8,000 to $14,000 per day. The general rule that costs follow the event means a failed challenge exposes the applicant to adverse costs of hundreds of thousands of dollars. The temporal burden is equally severe: constitutional challenges take one to six years from enactment to High Court resolution. During this period, the law remains in full force. People are arrested, charged, and potentially imprisoned for political speech. Others self-censor. In Brown v Tasmania, anti-protest laws suppressed environmental activism for three years before being struck down. In Coleman v Power [2004] HCA 39, a provision criminalising insulting words was used to prosecute political speech for 73 years before being read down. The pattern is consistent: the unconstitutional law achieves its political purpose — the suppression of disfavoured speech — for the entire duration of its operational life. The constitutional correction arrives too late for the communication that never occurred.⁷

180G. The comparison with France is instructive. When the French Parliament enacted the Loi Avia restricting online speech in 2020, 60 Senators referred it to the Conseil Constitutionnel. The Conseil struck down the offending provisions before the law took effect. No citizen was prosecuted. No community organisation bore the cost of a post-enactment challenge. The constitutional defect was identified, the law was corrected, and democracy was protected — all before any harm occurred. In Australia, the equivalent legislation — the Combatting Antisemitism Act 2026, the Fighting Antisemitism Bill 2026, and the Places of Worship Amendment Act 2025 — is in force. Where constitutional challenges have been brought, they have succeeded (Lees, Kvelde). Where they have not yet been brought, the laws operate unchecked. The implied freedom of political communication — the only constitutional protection Australians have for political speech — is rendered hollow if it can only be enforced after years of litigation costing hundreds of thousands of dollars, during which time the unconstitutional law operates in full force.

180H. The Commission is uniquely placed to address this structural deficit. Commissioner Bell’s twelve-year contribution to the implied freedom jurisprudence — documented in Section 3A — means she understands, from the inside, the constitutional standard that post-enactment litigation enforces at such cost and delay. The reform needed is narrower and more specific than the broader human rights act debate. What is required is a mechanism that specifically addresses the implied freedom of political communication before legislation is enacted, not after it has caused harm. The options are well-established in comparative law: a statement of constitutional compatibility requirement extending the existing Human Rights (Parliamentary Scrutiny) Act 2011 to cover constitutional doctrines; an Attorney-General or Solicitor-General reporting obligation modelled on New Zealand’s section 7; a parliamentary reference mechanism enabling a specified number of parliamentarians to refer a bill for an advisory opinion on constitutional validity; or enhanced parliamentary committee scrutiny with an express mandate to assess constitutional validity and adequate time to do so. None of these models would compromise parliamentary sovereignty. All would ensure that Parliament makes decisions about legislation that burdens political communication with full knowledge of the constitutional risks.⁸

Recommendation S14: The Commission should recommend the establishment of a pre-enactment constitutional review mechanism — whether through an expanded statement of compatibility requirement, a reporting obligation on the Attorney-General or Solicitor-General, or a parliamentary reference procedure — that specifically addresses the implied freedom of political communication. The 2025–2026 antisemitism legislation demonstrates that existing scrutiny mechanisms are inadequate: legislation with consultation periods of 72 hours to seven days, over the objections of constitutional scholars, civil liberties organisations, the Australian Human Rights Commission, and the UN Special Rapporteur on Counter-Terrorism, was enacted without any formal assessment of its compatibility with the constitutional framework established in McCloy v NSW, Brown v Tasmania, and Lees v State of NSW. Every comparable democracy provides this safeguard. Australia should too.

Footnotes

Section 6: Actual Security Fixes

Terms of Reference 2 (law enforcement) and 3 (Bondi)

221. The Richardson Review — Dennis Richardson AC’s independent review of federal law enforcement and intelligence agencies — has been incorporated into this Commission. The Commissioner therefore has access to classified intelligence material and internal agency assessments that are not available to this submission.

222. The Commissioner noted at the opening hearing on 24 February 2026 that delays in obtaining and assessing material — associated with public interest immunity, statutory non-disclosure provisions, and legal professional privilege — have constrained the Commission’s access to classified material. Mr Richardson continues his work as special adviser. His review will in due course provide the classified intelligence picture. The recommendations below, first set out in the interim submission of 13 March 2026, are based on the public record alone. They are reproduced here in summary form. The full argumentative case for each recommendation appears in the interim submission.

223. The Bondi attack was enabled by specific, identifiable, fixable failures in the systems designed to prevent it. None of those failures would have been addressed by restricting political speech. The New Zealand Royal Commission found the same structural pattern after Christchurch: “a systemic failure” in resource allocation, not an operational failure, and recommended system-level reform (see Section 5B above).[^106] These recommendations were set out in detail in the interim submission. They are reproduced here in summary form.

6.1 Database Integration

224. ASIO identified Naveed Akram in 2019. His father obtained six firearms from the NSW Firearms Registry in 2023. No cross-reference occurred. The Akrams then spent 28 days in a region where ISIS-designated groups operate, and cleared customs without question. ASIO records, the NSW Firearms Registry, and Border Force travel monitoring operate as separate systems with no automatic cross-referencing. A significant financial intelligence gap also exists: no AUSTRAC investigation connected to the attack has been publicly disclosed. The full evidentiary case is set out in the interim submission.

Finding sought [Direct]: The Commission should find, on the basis of former Prime Minister Turnbull’s public statement, Senate Estimates testimony, and the absence of any intelligence alert following the Akrams’ Mindanao travel, that ASIO records, the NSW Firearms Registry, and Border Force travel monitoring operate as separate systems with no automatic cross-referencing, and that this separation directly enabled the Bondi attack: ASIO identified Akram in 2019, his father obtained six firearms in 2023, and the family travelled to Mindanao in 2025, all without triggering intelligence alerts. (ToR 2, ToR 3)

6.2 Post-Release Supervision and Risk Assessment

225. Continuing Detention Orders — enacted to keep high-risk terrorism offenders detained beyond sentence expiry — have been used zero times under Attorney-General Dreyfus. Four convicted terrorists were released without post-sentence orders; the Uweinat CDO application was filed six days before release and failed. The risk assessment tool used in CDO proceedings, VERA-2R, was found by a government-commissioned report to perform “no better than flipping a coin,” and the finding was withheld from public release for three years. The supervision regime has failed systematically, with multiple released terrorism offenders breaching conditions or returning to radicalisation networks. Isaac El Matari’s maximum sentence expires approximately November 2026, weeks before the CDO regime sunsets on 7 December 2026 — creating an unacceptable gap in public protection. The full evidentiary case is set out in the interim submission.

Finding sought [Direct]: The Commission should find, on the basis of Senator Cash’s Senate Estimates testimony (14 February 2024), the Australian Institute of Criminology Special Report 14, and Justice Hollingworth’s remarks in the Supreme Court of Victoria, that Continuing Detention Orders were used zero times under Attorney-General Dreyfus; that the risk assessment tool VERA-2R was found by the AIC report to perform “no better than flipping a coin”; and that this finding was withheld from public release for three years. (ToR 2)

6.3 Network Disruption

226. Wissam Haddad appears on every control order examined — released extremists are forbidden from contacting him, yet he remains free to receive them. Abdul Nacer Benbrika met Haddad within days of release. Moudasser Taleb was found with an illegally modified firearm while under supervision. The prison communications failure is particularly alarming: from inside Supermax, El Matari maintained an active correspondence network with Uweinat, Lawrence, and Saadieh, communicating operational doctrine including access to weaponry and explosives suppliers. The full evidentiary case is set out in the interim submission.

Finding sought [Direct]: The Commission should find, on the basis of control order proceedings in Booth v Dakkak [2020] FCA 1882, Attorney-General v Amin [2023] NSWSC 1280, and proceedings concerning Biber and Church, that Wissam Haddad appears on every control order examined — meaning released terrorism offenders are forbidden from contacting him — yet he remained free to receive them, and that AFP surveillance documented Abdul Nacer Benbrika meeting Haddad within days of his release in December 2023. (ToR 2)

6.4 Travel Monitoring

227. Multiple members of the AMDC network had documented connections to the Philippines. The Akrams spent 28 days in Mindanao — the operating area of groups designated as terrorist organisations under subsection 102.1(1) of the Criminal Code. The existing legal framework should have caught this but did not, because databases connecting known associates of convicted terrorism networks to travel in designated terrorist groups’ operating areas do not communicate with each other. The full evidentiary case is set out in the interim submission.

6.5 The Encrypted Communications Challenge

228. ASIO Director-General Mike Burgess confirmed that the Bondi attackers “went dark to stay off the radar.” The six-year gap between ASIO’s 2019 investigation and the 2025 attack represents a period of unmonitored encrypted communications during which radicalisation progressed to operational planning. The current policy debate focuses on restricting visible public speech while the actual threat operated in encrypted channels. Resources directed at speech legislation and protest policing should be redirected toward intelligence capabilities that would address the actual threat vector. The full evidentiary case is set out in the interim submission.

Recommendation 12 (Previously submitted in the interim submission of 13 March 2026): Implement automatic cross-referencing between ASIO databases, the firearms registry, and Border Force travel records. Any ASIO flag should trigger review of associated firearms licences and travel patterns.

Recommendation 13 (Previously submitted in the interim submission of 13 March 2026): Require CDO assessment to commence no later than 12 months before the scheduled release of any terrorism offender, with adequate resourcing to prepare applications in time.

Recommendation 14 (Previously submitted in the interim submission of 13 March 2026): Replace VERA-2R with a validated risk assessment tool and commission independent review of all assessments conducted using VERA-2R.

Recommendation 15 (Previously submitted in the interim submission of 13 March 2026): Establish automatic intelligence flags for travel to terrorism-linked regions by any person with terrorism-related associations.

Recommendation 16 (Previously submitted in the interim submission of 13 March 2026): Conduct a comprehensive audit of prison communications security for all terrorism offenders, including review of correspondence monitoring, approved association lists, and the capacity of correctional facilities to prevent unauthorised communications between terrorism inmates.

Section 7: Foreign Influence

Terms of Reference 1 (drivers) and 4 (social cohesion)

229. The Commission’s terms of reference require examination of drivers of antisemitism and threats to social cohesion. Foreign influence operates on both sides of this equation and must be examined in full.

7.1 State-Sponsored Attacks

230. ASIO formally assessed that the IRGC directed at least two attacks on Australian Jewish targets: the arson attack on Lewis Continental Kitchen, a kosher food company in Sydney, in October 2024; and the firebombing of the Adass Israel Synagogue in Melbourne in December 2024, which “completely gutted” the interior, collapsed part of the roof, and destroyed Torah scrolls. This assessment led to the expulsion of Iran’s ambassador—the first such expulsion since World War II—and the listing of the IRGC as a state sponsor of terrorism.[^110]

231. ASIO also assesses that Iran likely directed additional attacks that have not been publicly specified. Critically, Iran sought to disguise its involvement by using criminals and members of organised crime gangs as proxies. AFP Commissioner Reece Kershaw confirmed investigators are examining whether “overseas actors or individuals have paid local criminals in Australia to carry out some of these crimes.” The use of organised crime figures with no antisemitic ideology represents a threat category that current data systems cannot capture and that speech restrictions cannot address.

Finding sought [Direct]: The Commission should find that ASIO formally assessed that Iran’s IRGC directed at least two attacks on Australian Jewish targets using criminal proxies, and that Iran sought to disguise its involvement by using individuals with no antisemitic ideology. This threat category cannot be addressed by speech restrictions; it requires disruption of foreign intelligence operations and organised crime networks. (ToR 1, ToR 2) It requires disrupting organised crime networks, countering foreign interference, and protecting vulnerable communities from exploitation—none of which is achieved by banning protest slogans.

7.2 Lobbying Infrastructure

232. The Commission’s examination of threats to social cohesion requires understanding the infrastructure through which policy is shaped. The following section documents organisations, personnel, and channels of influence that connect pro-Israel lobbying to legislative outcomes, litigation strategy, data production, and media coverage. This is not a claim of conspiracy. It is a factual description of documented institutional relationships that the Commission should examine when assessing whether Australia’s response to antisemitism has been driven by evidence or by political pressure.

233. The infrastructure through which pro-Israel lobbying operates in Australia involves multiple organisations, overlapping personnel, and documented channels of influence across the political, media, judicial, and academic spheres. Three organisations are central.

234. AIJAC (Australia/Israel & Jewish Affairs Council) has hosted over 500 Australian politicians, journalists, and senior public servants on sponsored trips to Israel since 2003. These trips are structured as study missions and include briefings by Israeli government officials, military personnel, and intelligence figures. Participants return to positions where they influence policy, editorial direction, and public discourse. AIJAC’s senior partner, Mark Leibler AC, is also National Chairman of AIJAC. His firm, Arnold Bloch Leibler, is instructed in litigation against pro-Palestinian speech, including the Cassuto v Kostakidis proceedings. The same organisation that funds trips for politicians also funds litigation against critics of Israel.[^111]

Finding sought [Direct]: The Commission should find, on the basis of AIJAC’s own public records and parliamentary disclosure requirements, that AIJAC has hosted over 500 Australian politicians, journalists, and senior public servants on sponsored trips to Israel since 2003, and that participants return to positions where they influence policy, editorial direction, and public discourse. (ToR 4)

235. The Executive Council of Australian Jewry, through its co-CEO Peter Wertheim and Deputy President Robert Goot AO SC, has pursued the lawfare strategy documented in Section 3 of this submission. ECAJ also produces the annual antisemitism data examined in Section 2. The same organisation that provides the data used to justify speech legislation is also pursuing litigation to restrict speech. This dual role warrants scrutiny.

236. The Australia-Israel Allies Caucus has 35 sitting parliamentarians. It was relaunched in February 2025. It is connected to the Knesset Christian Allies Caucus and the Israel Allies Foundation—an American organisation headquartered in Jerusalem that coordinates “faith-based diplomacy” across 51 countries. The Foundation’s purpose is to mobilise evangelical Christian political support for Israel in national parliaments worldwide. Its presence in the Australian Parliament connects Australian legislative outcomes to an international network driven by American evangelical theology.[^112]

237. Jillian Segal AO was appointed Special Envoy to Combat Antisemitism on 9 July 2024. She is a former president of the Executive Council of Australian Jewry (2019–2023) and former chair of the Australia-Israel Chamber of Commerce. Her husband’s family trust, the Segal Family Trust, donated $50,000 to Advance Australia—a conservative political advocacy organisation—two weeks before her appointment. She did not disclose this. Her report recommended defunding universities that did not adopt the IHRA definition, and terminating public servants who expressed pro-Palestine views on social media. These recommendations would directly benefit the organisations she previously led.[^113]

Finding sought [Direct]: The Commission should find that Jillian Segal AO, appointed Special Envoy to Combat Antisemitism, is a former president of ECAJ and former chair of the Australia-Israel Chamber of Commerce; that her husband’s family trust donated $50,000 to Advance Australia two weeks before her appointment; that she did not disclose this; and that her recommendations would directly benefit the organisations she previously led. (ToR 4)

238. The theological dimension requires separate examination. The federal Combatting Antisemitism Bill creates a defence for conduct consisting of “directly quoting from, or otherwise referencing, a religious text for the purpose of religious teaching or discussion.” American dispensationalist Christianity—the belief that the modern state of Israel fulfils biblical end-times prophecy—drives significant political support for Israel in the United States and, increasingly, in Australia.[^114] On 20 February 2026, US Ambassador to Israel Mike Huckabee—a Baptist minister—stated on camera that Israel has a biblical right to the land “from the Nile to the Euphrates,” and when asked if Israel should take all of it: “It would be fine if they took it all.”[^115] This theology is not Australian. Yet the federal bill’s religious text defence exempts scriptural claims while state bans criminalise the political challenge to those claims. Section 116 of the Constitution prohibits the Commonwealth from establishing a religion. Criminalising speech that contradicts a religious territorial claim while protecting the scriptural basis for that claim warrants examination under this prohibition.

7.3 Israeli Government Information Operations

239. The domestic lobbying infrastructure documented above operates within a broader context: the Israeli government’s publicly declared program to shape foreign public opinion through paid digital campaigns, covert social media operations, and influencer networks. The evidence for this program is not drawn from inference or leaked documents. It is drawn from the Israeli officials’ own statements, US Department of Justice filings under the Foreign Agents Registration Act, and enforcement actions by Meta and OpenAI.

240. The scale of declared spending has grown exponentially. Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar secured a $150 million allocation for “public diplomacy” — approximately 20 times previous annual hasbara budgets — as part of his November 2024 coalition agreement with Prime Minister Netanyahu. Sa’ar’s office released a statement at the time of signing confirming the funds would be used “to influence sentiment in the foreign press and on social media,” including “concentrated activity on US campuses to change their attitude towards Israel” to be “carried out in cooperation with American Jewish groups.”[^139] In a December 2024 interview with Maariv, Sa’ar described this as “consciousness warfare.”[^140] For 2026, Finance Minister Smotrich and Sa’ar approved NIS 2.35 billion (approximately $729 million) for hasbara, with an official government statement specifying uses including “financing social media campaigns, partnering with civil society groups, and bringing delegations of political leaders, elected officials, influencers, and other high-profile figures to Israel.”[^141]

241. On 26 September 2025, Prime Minister Netanyahu told a gathering of approximately 18 American social media influencers at the Israeli Consulate in New York — in remarks captured on video by attendee Debra Lea — that social media is “the most important weapon” and that “we have to fight back” using influencers.[^142]

242. Two FARA filings provide documentary confirmation of specific spending programs. The “Esther Project,” filed in 2025, disclosed contracts worth up to $900,000 through Bridges Partners LLC — registered as a foreign agent for Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs — to recruit 14–18 social media influencers to publish 25–30 pieces of pro-Israel content per month at rates of approximately $6,000–$7,000 per post. The Clock Tower X contract, filed September 2025 by Brad Parscale’s firm, disclosed a $1.5 million per month engagement for “strategic communications” including AI-driven tools to “shape outputs of GPT-based chatbots.” Both contracts were funded from Sa’ar’s $150 million allocation.[^143]

243. The covert dimension is also documented. In mid-2024, The New York Times and Israeli watchdog FakeReporter, citing four current and former officials from Israel’s Ministry of Diaspora Affairs, reported that the ministry paid approximately $2 million to STOIC, a Tel Aviv-based firm, to run a covert campaign using hundreds of fake social media accounts posing as American citizens — including accounts specifically targeting Black Democratic members of the US Congress. Meta removed 510 Facebook accounts, 11 pages, and 32 Instagram accounts linked to the operation. OpenAI confirmed STOIC had used ChatGPT to generate the content, rating the campaign’s impact at 2 out of 6 on its Breakout Scale.[^144] The architecture of concealment was explained on the record by Ronen Menalis, former Director of the Strategic Affairs Ministry, in Knesset State Control Committee testimony: “The understanding was that it would be easier for them to appear as a [Public Benefit Company] than as something that the Israeli government is behind. In the end, you see a bank transfer from a PBC and not a bank transfer from the Israeli government. That’s the idea.”[^145]

244. It is submitted that this material is relevant to the Commission’s inquiry for three reasons. First, the Commission is examining the information environment in which antisemitism and threats to social cohesion develop; a foreign government spending hundreds of millions of dollars to shape that environment is a material factor. Second, the institutional strategy of identifying Jewish communal safety with Israeli government policy — the conflation documented in Section 4 — is reinforced by state-funded campaigns explicitly designed to achieve that identification. Third, when covert operations are exposed — as the STOIC campaign was — the revelation that a foreign government used fake accounts to manipulate domestic political discourse increases precisely the kind of public hostility toward Jewish communities that the operations purport to combat. The Commission should consider whether these programs, whatever their intent, function as a driver of the social cohesion breakdown they claim to address.

245. If the Commission examines foreign influence on social cohesion, it must examine all vectors. The IRGC directed violent attacks on Jewish Australians using criminal proxies. AIJAC has taken over 500 Australian decision-makers on sponsored trips to Israel. The Israeli government has declared a $729 million program to shape foreign opinion through paid social media campaigns, covert operations, and influencer networks. The Israel Allies Foundation coordinates parliamentary caucuses across 51 countries. The integrity of the Commission requires even-handedness on this question.

Recommendation 17: The Commission should examine all foreign influence vectors affecting Australian social cohesion — including IRGC-directed operations targeting Jewish Australians, the domestic lobbying infrastructure influencing Australian policy on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and Israeli government-funded information operations targeting the opinion environment in allied democracies — and should consider whether any such operations have operated within Australia or targeted Australian institutions, media, or public discourse.

Section 8: Summary of Recommendations

URGENT — The Bondi Attack (Terms of Reference 2 and 3)

240. Recommendation A (URGENT): Examine the CDO position for Isaac El Matari. His maximum sentence expires approximately November 2026. The CDO legislative regime sunsets on 7 December 2026. The Commission should urgently examine whether a CDO application has been made or is in preparation, and whether the CDO sunset date creates an unacceptable gap in public protection. Previously submitted in the interim submission of 13 March 2026.

241. Recommendation 1: Examine the intelligence relationship between Wissam Haddad and law enforcement agencies. The Sydney Morning Herald report that Haddad was “a good intel source” raises questions about whether the decision not to charge him was justified given the cost. Previously submitted in the interim submission of 13 March 2026.

242. Recommendation 2: Examine Youssef Uweinat’s communications between November 2022 and December 2025. Without a control order, no one monitored his contacts. His role in facilitating Philippine connections remains unexamined. Previously submitted in the interim submission of 13 March 2026.

243. Recommendation 3: Examine the firearms licensing failure. ASIO identified Naveed Akram in 2019. His father subsequently obtained a firearms licence and acquired six firearms. No cross-reference between ASIO’s intelligence holdings and the NSW Firearms Registry occurred. Previously submitted in the interim submission of 13 March 2026.

244. Recommendation 3A: Seek disclosure of the suppressed Saadieh prohibited contact list (34 names) and the full Dakkak control order schedule, and examine the current status and activities of all individuals on them. Previously submitted in the interim submission of 13 March 2026.

Data and Methodology (Term of Reference 1)

245. Recommendation 4: Establish an independent government mechanism for antisemitism data collection and verification, consistent with arrangements in the UK, US, Germany, and France.

246. Recommendation 5: Examine ECAJ and JCCV methodology, including the basis for the “far-left” categorisation that shifted from 8% to 53.4% in a single year.

Legal Proceedings and Speech (Terms of Reference 1 and 4)

247. Recommendation 6: Examine whether the pattern of complaints against pro-Palestinian speech constitutes a coordinated deterrent strategy. Forty-seven cases since October 2023, disproportionately targeting women, overwhelmingly failing on their merits.

248. Recommendation 7 (reframed in response to the Commissioner’s opening hearing position): The core IHRA definition is appropriately applied as an analytical framework for the Commission’s inquiry. The Israel-related illustrative examples — particularly examples 7 and 11 — should not be recommended for adoption as legal or regulatory instruments (that is, as a basis for complaints, prosecutions, employment sanctions, or institutional codes of conduct), because their codification would eliminate the contextual analysis the Commissioner has correctly identified as essential.

249. Recommendation 8: Examine the role of lobby groups — including ECAJ, AIJAC, and the Zionist Federation of Australia — in influencing institutional decision-making, and whether coordinated complaint campaigns, legal proceedings, and political pressure have contributed to social cohesion or undermined it.

250. Recommendation 8 (Social Cohesion): Examine the social cohesion impact of the lawfare strategy — whether coordinated legal proceedings, media pressure campaigns, and institutional adoption of broad antisemitism definitions have contributed to or undermined intercommunal relations, with reference to the parallel surge in anti-Muslim hatred documented by the Islamophobia in Australia Report 2023–24.

The Conflation That Endangers Jews (Terms of Reference 1 and 4)

251. Recommendation 8A: Examine whether the institutional conflation of Jewish identity with the State of Israel — as practised by ECAJ, AIJAC, the ZFA, and international equivalents — constitutes a driver of antisemitism under Term of Reference 1, by amplifying the channel through which conflict-activated prejudice reaches Australian Jewish communities.

252. Recommendation 8B: Recommend that government-funded programs to combat antisemitism include education that explicitly distinguishes between the State of Israel and Jewish Australians, consistent with Justice Stewart’s finding in Wertheim v Haddad that “political criticism of Israel, however inflammatory or adversarial, is not by its nature criticism of Jews in general.”

253. Recommendation 8C: Consider the Jerusalem Declaration on Antisemitism as an alternative framework to the IHRA definition — one endorsed by over 350 scholars in Jewish Studies and Antisemitism Studies, which defines antisemitism as hostility toward Jews as Jews while preserving the distinction between racial hatred and political criticism.

Policy Response (Terms of Reference 2 and 4)

254. Recommendation 9: Do not criminalise protest slogans. Twenty years of evidence shows anti-vilification laws produce “little to no change.” Two NSW laws have already been struck down as unconstitutional.

255. Recommendation 10: Invest in evidence-based community engagement programs modelled on international precedents. Only sustained relationships reduce prejudice.

256. Recommendation 11: Apply counter-terrorism responses consistently regardless of the community targeted. The disparity between the Bondi and Perth responses undermines social cohesion.

Security Fixes (Terms of Reference 2 and 3)

257. Recommendation 12: Implement automatic cross-referencing between ASIO, firearms, and Border Force databases. This requires no new legislation. It requires existing systems to communicate. Previously submitted in the interim submission of 13 March 2026.

258. Recommendation 13: Commence CDO assessment 12 months before scheduled release of terrorism offenders, with adequate resourcing. Every release date is known years in advance. Previously submitted in the interim submission of 13 March 2026.

259. Recommendation 14: Replace VERA-2R with a validated risk assessment tool. Commission independent review of all assessments conducted using VERA-2R. Previously submitted in the interim submission of 13 March 2026.

260. Recommendation 15: Establish automatic intelligence flags for travel to terrorism-linked regions by any person with terrorism-related associations. Previously submitted in the interim submission of 13 March 2026.

261. Recommendation 16: Conduct a comprehensive audit of prison communications security for terrorism offenders. El Matari communicated operational doctrine from Supermax to at least three members of the network. The Commission should examine how this was possible and what has been done to prevent recurrence. Previously submitted in the interim submission of 13 March 2026.

Foreign Influence (Terms of Reference 1 and 4)

262. Recommendation 17: Examine all foreign influence vectors. The IRGC directed attacks on Jewish Australians using criminal proxies. AIJAC has taken over 500 politicians and public servants on sponsored trips to Israel. The Israel Allies Foundation coordinates parliamentary caucuses in 51 countries. All require scrutiny.

Section 9: Conclusion

263. This submission, read together with the interim submission filed on 13 March 2026, presents a comprehensive evidentiary case across all four terms of reference. The interim submission identified the security failures that enabled the Bondi attack and the urgent reforms required for the 30 April interim report. This final submission addresses the broader institutional, legal, and policy dimensions of the Commission’s inquiry.

264. The evidence across both submissions demonstrates that the Bondi attack was the product of a specific, identifiable radicalisation network — centred on the Al Madina Dawah Centre and its preacher Wissam Haddad — and was enabled by systemic failures in intelligence sharing, firearms licensing, post-release supervision, and travel monitoring. None of these failures would have been addressed by restricting political speech.

265. The Commissioner’s opening hearing on 24 February 2026 confirmed that the interim report will focus on the third term of reference — the circumstances surrounding the Bondi attack. The interim submission provides the evidentiary foundation for that report. But this final submission presents evidence that the policy response since December 2025 has been directed at the wrong targets. Post-attack legislation has already produced two constitutional defeats. The data infrastructure on which the policy is being built lacks independent government verification. The institutional conflation of Jewish identity with the State of Israel — documented through the organisations’ own charters, the academic literature, and the Federal Court record — amplifies the prejudice the Commission is charged with addressing.

266. The Commissioner invited submissions on the controversial IHRA illustrative examples. This submission has accepted that invitation, arguing that the core definition is appropriately applied as an analytical framework but that the Israel-related examples should not be recommended for adoption as legal or regulatory instruments. The Federal Court in Wertheim v Haddad demonstrated that existing Australian law can identify and condemn antisemitism without those examples — indeed, that judgment identified twenty-five antisemitic imputations by a preacher who never mentioned Israel at all.

267. Senior Counsel Assisting Mr Lancaster SC reminded the Commission at the opening hearing that social cohesion “is not a uniformity of opinion” and does not require “the suppression of fair criticism and debate.” That principle, drawn from the Act establishing this Commission, should guide its recommendations. The evidence presented here demonstrates that the current policy trajectory — criminalising protest slogans, adopting contested definitions as legal instruments, and deploying lawfare against political critics — undermines social cohesion rather than strengthening it.

268. This Commission has the authority and the responsibility to examine what actually went wrong. The failures are documented. The fixes are specific, implementable, and within the power of the executive government. They do not require constitutional amendment. They do not require restricting political speech. They require the existing systems to function as Parliament intended.

269. Fifteen people were murdered at Bondi Beach during a Hanukkah celebration. The question before this Commission is whether Australia will respond to their deaths by addressing what actually went wrong, or by restricting the political speech of people who had nothing to do with it.

Notes

Appendix A: Published Articles

Appendix B: Court Cases Referenced

Appendix C: Individual Profiles Referenced

Appendix D: Source Index

270. The 267 indexed research files supporting this submission include court judgments, sentencing remarks, surveillance transcripts, ASIO threat assessments, Senate Estimates Hansard, AFP operational statements, ECAJ and JCCV annual reports, IHRA Working Definition documentation, academic studies on anti-vilification law effectiveness, international comparative data from the UK Community Security Trust, the US Anti-Defamation League, and the Institute for Jewish Policy Research, as well as media reports from ABC, SBS, the Sydney Morning Herald, CNN, Time, The Guardian, and other outlets. A complete index with document descriptions and term-of-reference mapping is available on request.

SCHEDULE OF DOCUMENTS AND INFORMATION SOUGHT BY WAY OF ORDER FOR PRODUCTION

Royal Commission into Antisemitism and Social Cohesion

Application pursuant to section 2 of the Royal Commissions Act 1902 (Cth) and the Commission’s Practice Guideline — Document Production Guideline (February 2026)

Preliminary Note

This schedule seeks factual records and statistical data from cooperative or neutral custodians. It does not seek documents that are publicly available on the Federal Court website, the Parliament of Australia website, or the ASIC register. It does not seek communications between lawyers and clients about legal advice or litigation strategy. Where a simple factual answer is required, a Notice to Give Information is used rather than a Notice to Produce.

Documents produced should comply with the Document Management Protocol at Part E of the Document Production Guideline.

PART A — DOCUMENTS FOR THE INTERIM STAGE

Purpose: Documents needed before the interim report (30 April 2026).

1. El Matari: Continuing Detention Order preparation

Type: Notice to Give Information

Question: (a) Is a Continuing Detention Order application in preparation for Isaac El Matari, whose sentence expires approximately November 2026? (b) What is the current status of any such application? (c) Has the Attorney-General’s Department assessed the impact of the CDO regime sunset (December 2026) on this matter?

Directed to: Attorney-General’s Department (Commonwealth)

Relevance: The CDO regime sunsets December 2026 and El Matari’s sentence expires approximately November 2026. This is the single most time-critical question before the Commission. The interim submission (Section 1) documents El Matari’s role in the radicalisation pipeline that led to the Bondi attack.

Supports: Interim submission ¶6–45; Final submission ¶240 (Recommendation A)

2. VERA-2R risk assessment report

Type: Notice to Produce

Documents sought: All documents relating to the government-commissioned report finding the Violent Extremism Risk Assessment Version 2 Revised (VERA-2R) tool had no predictive validity, including: (a) the report itself; (b) documents relating to the three-year delay in public disclosure; (c) any replacement assessment tool or methodology adopted.

Directed to: Attorney-General’s Department (Commonwealth)

Relevance: The report’s finding that the tool was “no better than flipping a coin” was disclosed through court proceedings and Senate Estimates. The documents are partly in the public domain. The suppression of the report for three years while the tool continued to be used in CDO applications is directly relevant to the Commission’s assessment of post-release supervision.

Supports: Interim submission ¶6–45

3. Firearms cross-referencing protocols

Type: Notice to Produce

Documents sought: (a) Sajid Akram’s firearms licence applications and approvals; (b) any protocols in force at the time of the Bondi attack for cross-referencing firearms licence applicants with national security databases or intelligence holdings; (c) any post-Bondi review of cross-referencing procedures.

Directed to: NSW Firearms Registry; NSW Police Force

Relevance: The interim submission documents that Akram obtained firearms despite his father’s known association with terrorism-linked networks. The cross-referencing gap between firearms licensing and national security databases is a factual question addressable through administrative records.

Supports: Interim submission ¶6–45; Final submission ¶8–13

4. Travel monitoring protocols

Type: Notice to Give Information

Question: (a) Did any alert or flag exist in Australian Border Force systems for any member of the Akram family at the time of their travel to the Philippines? (b) What are the current protocols for flagging travel by persons associated with terrorism-related investigations to high-risk regions?

Directed to: Australian Border Force

Relevance: The interim submission documents the Akram family’s travel to the Philippines before the attack. Whether any monitoring was in place is a factual question.

Supports: Interim submission ¶6–45

5. AFP released-offender surveillance team

Type: Notice to Give Information

Question: (a) On what date was the AFP’s released-offender surveillance team disbanded? (b) What was the team’s budget allocation and staffing level prior to disbandment? (c) Was the disbandment the subject of any internal correspondence regarding funding shortfalls?

Directed to: Australian Federal Police

Relevance: The disbandment of the team responsible for monitoring released terrorism offenders is already partly in the public record through Senate Estimates. The factual details (date, budget, rationale) fill an evidentiary gap.

Supports: Interim submission ¶42

6. El Matari prison correspondence

Type: Notice to Produce

Documents sought: (a) El Matari’s approved association list while in Supermax custody; (b) records of all correspondence to or from El Matari that was screened, intercepted, or permitted by Corrective Services NSW; (c) any post-Bondi audit of prison communications involving terrorism offenders.

Directed to: Corrective Services NSW

Relevance: The interim submission documents communication between El Matari and other members of the network while in Supermax. Prison correspondence records are administrative records held by Corrective Services, not intelligence material.

Supports: Interim submission ¶6–45

7. Archer Park Hanukkah event — permit and event management documents

Type: Notice to Produce

Documents sought: All documents relating to the Hanukkah celebration held at Archer Park, Bondi Beach on 14 December 2025, including: (a) the permit application and any supporting materials submitted to Waverley Council; (b) the permit or approval issued; (c) any risk assessment, security plan, or event management plan submitted with the application or required as a condition of approval; (d) any communications between the event organisers and Waverley Council concerning security arrangements; (e) any communications between Waverley Council and NSW Police concerning security for the event.

Directed to: Waverley Council

Relevance: The Bondi attack targeted a public gathering of approximately 1,000 people at a Hanukkah celebration. The permit application and any associated risk or security assessment are routine local government records. Whether protective security was assessed or required for a large Jewish community event — particularly following two years of escalating threat reporting — is directly relevant to the Commission’s examination of institutional failures preceding the attack.

Supports: Interim submission ¶48; Final submission ¶8–13

8. ABL partner positions

Type: Notice to Give Information

Question: A current list of all positions held by Mark Leibler AC, Jeremy Leibler, Leon Zwier, Raphael Leibler, and any other partner of Arnold Bloch Leibler in: (a) the seven organisations represented by ABL before this Commission; (b) any other advocacy, communal, charitable, or religious organisation relevant to the Commission’s terms of reference; (c) any foreign statutory body, including but not limited to the Jewish Agency for Israel, Keren Hayesod, the World Zionist Organization, or the World Jewish Congress; and (d) any entity that has sponsored parliamentary trips or provided hospitality to elected officials.

Directed to: Arnold Bloch Leibler

Relevance: The ABL supplementary submission (¶12–16) documents overlapping roles. A comprehensive factual list from ABL itself would confirm or complete the public record. This is factual, non-privileged information.

Supports: ABL submission ¶12–16, 20, 32–35, 41–44, 51

9. Robert Goot’s positions

Type: Notice to Give Information

Question: A current list of all positions held by Robert Goot AO SC in communal, advocacy, and international organisations, including but not limited to: the Executive Council of Australian Jewry, the World Jewish Congress, and the NSW Jewish Board of Deputies.

Directed to: Robert Goot AO SC; and separately ECAJ

Relevance: Goot’s concurrent roles are documented at ABL submission ¶20–26. Factual, non-privileged.

Supports: ABL submission ¶20–26, 31, 48–49

10. ABL disclosure to the Commission

Type: Notice to Give Information

Question: Has Arnold Bloch Leibler made any disclosure to the Commission or to Solicitors Assisting regarding: (a) the concurrent holding of leadership positions by ABL partners in the organisations being represented; (b) ABL’s concurrent role as solicitors on the record in Cassuto v Kostakidis (VID404/2025); or (c) any other matter relevant to the structural conflicts identified in the ABL supplementary submission?

Directed to: Solicitors Assisting the Commission

Relevance: This is obtainable from the Commission’s own records. It establishes whether the Commission was in a position to make an informed assessment of ABL’s submissions.

Supports: ABL submission ¶46–47, 50–51

11. ABC communications re Lattouf

Type: Notice to Produce

Documents sought: All external communications received by the Australian Broadcasting Corporation from persons identified in Lattouf v ABC [2025] FCA 669 as members of the “Lawyers for Israel” WhatsApp group, concerning the employment or termination of Antoinette Lattouf, during the period 18 December 2023 to 31 January 2024.

Directed to: Australian Broadcasting Corporation

Relevance: The ABC is a public broadcaster that has already produced these documents in the Lattouf trial. The relevant communications are factual records of lobbying activity — not privileged. This request is directed to the ABC only (a cooperative custodian), not to the WhatsApp group members.

Supports: ABL submission ¶22–23; Coordinated campaigns submission

PART B — DOCUMENTS FOR THE FINAL STAGE

12. ECAJ antisemitism data methodology

Type: Notice to Produce

Documents sought: All documents constituting, recording, or evidencing the methodology used by the Executive Council of Australian Jewry to collect, classify, and verify antisemitism incident data, including: (a) classification criteria and definitions; (b) inter-rater reliability assessments; (c) quality assurance or verification processes; (d) raw incident data for 2023 and 2024; (e) any communications with government regarding the data.

Directed to: Executive Council of Australian Jewry

Relevance: ECAJ’s data is cited to justify legislation and is placed before the Commission as evidence of antisemitism prevalence. The Commission is mandated to examine this (ToR 1). Methodology documents are factual records, not privileged.

Supports: Final submission ¶21–49

13. JCCV antisemitism data methodology

Type: Notice to Produce

Documents sought: All documents constituting, recording, or evidencing the methodology used by the Jewish Community Council of Victoria to collect and classify antisemitism incident data, including: (a) the criteria and decision-making process for the reclassification of incidents from 8% to 53.4% “far-left”; (b) any external review of that reclassification; (c) raw incident data and classification worksheets.

Directed to: Jewish Community Council of Victoria

Relevance: The “far-left” reclassification from 8% to 53.4% is documented in the final submission (¶22–26) and has legislative consequences. Factual, non-privileged.

Supports: Final submission ¶22–26

14. NSW Police antisemitism database

Type: Notice to Produce

Documents sought: The complete dataset of hate-crime incidents classified as antisemitic by NSW Police, including the 38 acknowledged duplicates, and any separately maintained database of hate crimes charged and prosecuted.

Directed to: NSW Police Force

Relevance: Deputy Commissioner Hudson has testified publicly about database limitations. The raw data is factual and administrative. The Commission has compulsory power over state police.

Supports: Final submission ¶36

15. AHRC aggregate complaint data

Type: Notice to Give Information

Question: (a) The total number of complaints under section 18C of the Racial Discrimination Act relating to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict received by the AHRC since 1 October 2023; (b) the disposition of each (conciliated, terminated, escalated to Federal Court); (c) any assessment by the AHRC of the reliability of antisemitism incident data produced by advocacy organisations.

Directed to: Australian Human Rights Commission

Relevance: Aggregate statistical data from the national regulatory body. The AHRC is a cooperative custodian. This fills a gap in the Commission’s understanding of the volume and disposition of 18C complaints.

Supports: Final submission ¶50–113; ABL submission ¶14–19

16. AHPRA complaint data

Type: Notice to Give Information

Question: (a) The total number of complaints against health practitioners relating to social media posts about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict received by AHPRA since 1 October 2023; (b) the disposition of each; (c) whether any pattern of coordinated or templated complaints was identified.

Directed to: Australian Health Practitioner Regulation Agency

Relevance: The ABL submission (¶15) documents 188 complaints against 95 practitioners. AHPRA is a cooperative regulatory custodian that can provide aggregate data without identifying individual complainants.

Supports: ABL submission ¶15

17. Wertheim–Scott communications re Keane

Type: Notice to Produce

Documents sought: All communications between Peter Wertheim AM (or any officer of ECAJ) and Mark Scott (Vice-Chancellor, University of Sydney) or any officer of the University of Sydney concerning complaints about Professor John Keane, during the period 1 October 2023 to 30 June 2024.

Directed to: University of Sydney

Relevance: The Statement of Claim in Toltz v Keane records this advocacy. These are not privileged — Wertheim was acting as an ECAJ officer making representations to a university administrator, not receiving or giving legal advice. The University of Sydney is an independent custodian.

Supports: ABL submission ¶29; Final submission ¶50–113

18. Section 93Z enforcement data

Type: Notice to Give Information

Question: (a) The total number of charges brought under section 93Z of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) since its commencement; (b) the number of prosecutions conducted and their outcomes; (c) the number of DPP declinations to prosecute, with reasons if available.

Directed to: NSW Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions; and separately NSW Police Force

Relevance: The final submission (¶163–239) argues the existing law is adequate but unenforced. Enforcement data is factual and administrative.

Supports: Final submission ¶163–239

19. Organisational charters

Type: Notice to Produce

Documents sought: The current constitution, charter, or mission statement of each of the seven organisations represented by ABL before this Commission, insofar as those documents address the relationship between Jewish identity, Zionism, and the State of Israel.

Directed to: ECAJ, AIJAC, ZFA, NSW Jewish Board of Deputies, Jewish Community Council of Victoria, National Council of Jewish Women, Dor Foundation

Relevance: The final submission (¶114–162) documents institutional conflation of Jewish identity with Israel. Many charters are publicly available; a formal request ensures completeness. These are governance documents, not privileged.

Supports: Final submission ¶114–162

20. IHRA adoption survey

Type: Notice to Give Information

Question: For each university that has adopted the IHRA Working Definition of Antisemitism: (a) the date of adoption; (b) the terms of adoption (endorsed, adopted, noted); (c) whether any impact assessment was conducted; (d) whether any complaints have been brought under the definition.

Directed to: Each university that has adopted the IHRA definition (Universities Australia may assist in identifying these)

Relevance: The final submission (¶8–20) addresses the IHRA definition. The pattern of adoption, terms, and any impact assessment are factual governance records.

Supports: Final submission ¶14–20

21. Legislative consultation records

Type: Notice to Produce

Documents sought: (a) The complete list of submissions received during the 72-hour consultation period for the Combatting Antisemitism Bill 2024 (Cth); (b) any record of consultation with communities other than those listed in the public record; (c) the Statement of Compatibility with Human Rights.

Directed to: Attorney-General’s Department (Commonwealth)

Relevance: The final submission (¶163–185) and the pre-enactment review submission document the abbreviated consultation period. The list of submissions is factual. This does not seek legal advice (Solicitor-General advice is excluded).

Supports: Final submission ¶163–185; Pre-enactment review submission

22. FITS registration status

Type: Notice to Give Information

Question: (a) Has the Attorney-General’s Department assessed whether any of the following organisations is required to register under the Foreign Influence Transparency Scheme: the Jewish Agency for Israel, Keren Hayesod, the United Israel Appeal of Australia, the Australia/Israel & Jewish Affairs Council, or the Zionist Federation of Australia? (b) How many FITS registrations currently exist relating to advocacy for the interests of any foreign state? (c) How many compliance actions have been taken under FITS since its commencement?

Directed to: Attorney-General’s Department (Commonwealth)

Relevance: The ABL submission (¶41–45) and the final submission (¶240–262) document the FITS enforcement gap. This request seeks aggregate factual data, not operational assessments. The PJCIS has already published findings on “abject failure of enforcement.”

Supports: ABL submission ¶41–45, 53; Final submission ¶240–262

23. Segal appointment conflict assessment

Type: Notice to Give Information

Question: (a) Was a conflict of interest assessment conducted before the appointment of Jillian Segal AO as Special Envoy to Combat Antisemitism? (b) What are the terms of the Special Envoy’s mandate?

Directed to: Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet

Relevance: The appointment and the Segal Report are public. Whether a conflict assessment was conducted is a factual yes/no question.

Supports: Final submission ¶237

24. Board resolutions to appoint ABL

Type: Notice to Produce

Documents sought: The board resolution, minute, or equivalent governance record of each of the seven organisations recording the decision to appoint Arnold Bloch Leibler to represent the organisation before this Commission. Any discussion of legal advice may be redacted; only the resolution itself is sought.

Directed to: ECAJ, AIJAC, ZFA, NSW Jewish Board of Deputies, Jewish Community Council of Victoria, National Council of Jewish Women, Dor Foundation

Relevance: The ABL submission documents the structural concentration of decision-making. Whether each organisation made an independent governance decision is relevant to the submission’s argument. Board resolutions recording a decision (as distinct from advice received) are governance records, not privileged.

Supports: ABL submission ¶3–5, 34–35, 51–52

NOTES ON PRODUCTION

Form of Production

Documents should be produced in accordance with the Document Management Protocol at Part E of the Document Production Guideline. Electronic documents should be produced via the Commission’s file-sharing platform in native format or as searchable PDFs.

Confidentiality

Where any producing party claims confidentiality, the procedures at paragraphs 8–10 of the Document Production Guideline apply. Documents are still produced; confidentiality is managed through designation, not exclusion.

Legal Professional Privilege

Where privilege is claimed, section 6AA of the Act and the Practice Guideline — Legal Professional Privilege apply. The schedule has been drafted to avoid requests that would attract sustainable privilege claims. Request 24 explicitly permits redaction of privileged content while requiring production of the governance record itself.

Relationship to Other Production Schedules

This schedule supersedes and incorporates relevant requests from the Schedule of Documents for Production filed with the structural conflicts submission (Section 3D). Where requests overlap, this schedule governs.

Filed: [Date]

In support of the submissions to the Royal Commission into Antisemitism and Social Cohesion

SCHEDULE OF DOCUMENTS SOUGHT BY WAY OF ORDER FOR PRODUCTION

Royal Commission into Antisemitism and Social Cohesion

Application pursuant to section 2 of the Royal Commissions Act 1902 (Cth) and the Commission’s Practice Guideline – Document Production Guideline (February 2026)

In support of the supplementary submission: Structural Conflicts of Interest in Advocacy Representation Before the Commission – Arnold Bloch Leibler: A Case Study

Preliminary Note on Procedure

This schedule is prepared in accordance with the Commission’s Practice Guideline – Document Production Guideline (February 2026), which provides at paragraph 1.1 that the Commission may require the production of documents by way of Notices to Produce, Notices to Give Information, and Notices to Give a Statement in Writing. The General Practice Guideline (February 2026) confirms at paragraph 5.1 that the Commission has the power under the Royal Commissions Act 1902 (Cth) to require a person or organisation to provide it with documents or information. Documents produced should comply with the Document Management Protocol at Part E of the Document Production Guideline, including the use of unique Document Identifiers (Document IDs) assigned by the Commission, the electronic index requirements at paragraph 20, and the Production Specification at Schedule 1A or 1B.

Where confidentiality is claimed over documents produced, the producing party should follow the procedures set out at paragraphs 8-10 of the Document Production Guideline. Where legal professional privilege is claimed, the producing party should refer to section 6AA of the Act and the Practice Guideline – Legal Professional Privilege.

The documents are sought in two tranches, reflecting the Commission’s need for early access to threshold materials (Part A – Interim Stage) and broader documentary evidence for its final report (Part B – Final Stage).

PART A – DOCUMENTS FOR THE INTERIM STAGE

Purpose: Documents needed early to establish the structural conflicts of interest before the Commission and to inform its approach to receiving submissions from Arnold Bloch Leibler on behalf of the seven jointly represented organisations. These documents go to the threshold question of whether the Commission should require disclosure of conflicts and the basis upon which ABL’s submissions should be received.

Date range unless otherwise specified: 1 January 2023 to the date of production.

Category A1: ABL’s Retainer and Scope of Representation

A1.1

Document or category of documents: All documents constituting, recording, or evidencing the terms of the retainer or engagement between Arnold Bloch Leibler and each of the seven organisations announced on 24 February 2026 as jointly represented before this Commission (being the Executive Council of Australian Jewry, the Australia/Israel & Jewish Affairs Council, the Zionist Federation of Australia, the NSW Jewish Board of Deputies, the Jewish Community Council of Victoria, the National Council of Jewish Women, and the Dor Foundation), including but not limited to costs agreements, letters of engagement, terms of reference for the engagement, scope of work documents, and any memoranda of understanding between the seven organisations regarding the joint retainer.

Custodian: Arnold Bloch Leibler

Relevance: Establishes the precise scope of ABL’s representation and whether the engagement documents address the structural conflicts identified in the submission, including the concurrent holding of leadership positions by ABL partners in the organisations being represented. Relevant to whether any conflict management protocols were established.

Submission paragraphs: 3, 4, 5, 36-39, 46, 51, 52

A1.2

Document or category of documents: All documents constituting, recording, or evidencing any conflict of interest assessment, conflict check, or conflict waiver conducted or obtained by Arnold Bloch Leibler in connection with the retainer referred to in Category A1.1, including any documents recording consideration of the concurrent roles of Mark Leibler AC as National Chairman of AIJAC, Jeremy Leibler as President of the ZFA, and any other partner’s concurrent leadership positions in the organisations being represented.

Custodian: Arnold Bloch Leibler

Relevance: Directly relevant to the regulatory gap identified in section 5 of the submission. Establishes whether the structural conflicts were identified and addressed prior to the engagement, and the adequacy of any conflict management framework adopted.

Submission paragraphs: 36-39, 46, 51, 52, 53

A1.3

Document or category of documents: All documents constituting, recording, or evidencing informed consent obtained from each of the seven organisations referred to in Category A1.1 to the joint retainer arrangement, including any disclosure to each organisation of the concurrent roles held by ABL partners in other organisations within the group.

Custodian: Arnold Bloch Leibler; and separately each of: Executive Council of Australian Jewry (ECAJ), Australia/Israel & Jewish Affairs Council (AIJAC), Zionist Federation of Australia (ZFA), NSW Jewish Board of Deputies, Jewish Community Council of Victoria, National Council of Jewish Women, and the Dor Foundation

Relevance: Rules 10-12 of the Australian Solicitors’ Conduct Rules require informed consent to concurrent representation. The submission identifies the structural problem that the lawyer is the leader of the client organisation, which collapses the conventional conflict framework.

Submission paragraphs: 36-39, 52, 53

A1.4

Document or category of documents: All documents constituting, recording, or evidencing the decision by each of the seven organisations to jointly appoint ABL, including board minutes, executive committee minutes, resolutions, or email correspondence concerning the selection and appointment of ABL as legal representative before this Commission.

Custodian: ECAJ, AIJAC, ZFA, NSW Jewish Board of Deputies, Jewish Community Council of Victoria, National Council of Jewish Women, and the Dor Foundation

Relevance: Relevant to the question of whether the appointment decision was made independently by each organisation or was coordinated by individuals who simultaneously hold positions in ABL and in one or more of the organisations. Goes to the integrity of the consent process and the structural concentration of decision-making.

Submission paragraphs: 3, 4, 28, 34, 52

Category A2: Concurrent Litigation and Commission Representation

A2.1

Document or category of documents: All documents constituting, recording, or evidencing the terms of ABL’s retainer in Cassuto v Kostakidis (VID404/2025), including the authority to act, costs agreements, letters of engagement, and any documents recording the involvement of the Zionist Federation of Australia or any of its officers (including but not limited to Alon Cassuto and Jeremy Leibler) in instructing or directing the proceedings.

Custodian: Arnold Bloch Leibler

Relevance: Establishes the nature and scope of ABL’s concurrent role as solicitors on the record in litigation advancing a legal theory (that criticism of Israel constitutes racial vilification under section 18C) which the Commissioner has implicitly disclaimed, while simultaneously representing peak organisations before this Commission. Directly relevant to the submission’s argument regarding incompatible concurrent positions.

Submission paragraphs: 8, 10, 11, 46, 51

A2.2

Document or category of documents: All communications between Arnold Bloch Leibler and any of the seven organisations referred to in Category A1.1 concerning the preparation of submissions to this Commission, to the extent that such communications discuss, reference, or are informed by any of the following ongoing or concluded Federal Court proceedings: Cassuto v Kostakidis (VID404/2025), Wertheim & Goot v Haddad [2025] FCA 720, Lattouf v ABC [2025] FCA 669, Toltz v Riemer (NSD950/2025), or Toltz v Keane (NSD951/2025).

Custodian: Arnold Bloch Leibler

Relevance: The submission documents at paragraphs 33-35 an interconnected web of legal proceedings in which the same organisations, through overlapping leadership, are building interlocking precedent. This category seeks to establish whether the submissions to the Commission are coordinated with the litigation strategy across these proceedings.

Submission paragraphs: 33-35, 46, 51

A2.3

Document or category of documents: All documents constituting, recording, or evidencing any disclosure made by ABL to this Commission or to the Solicitors Assisting regarding the concurrent representation and litigation roles identified in the submission, including any disclosure of the matters set out in Recommendation S10 of the submission (partner leadership positions, concurrent litigation, pro bono political services).

Custodian: Arnold Bloch Leibler; and separately, the Solicitors Assisting the Commission (ASCRC.SolicitorsAssisting@royalcommission.gov.au)

Relevance: Establishes whether ABL has voluntarily disclosed the structural conflicts to the Commission, and whether the Commission was in a position to make an informed assessment of how to receive ABL’s submissions.

Submission paragraphs: 46, 51, 52

Category A3: WhatsApp Groups and Coordination

A3.1

Document or category of documents: The complete message log and any media files (images, documents, links) shared within the WhatsApp group known as “Lawyers for Israel,” from its creation (on or about 7 October 2023) to the date of production, or such portion thereof as is within the custody, power, or control of the person to whom the notice is directed.

Custodian: Nicky Stein (administrator of the group); and separately Robert Goot AO SC; and separately any other member of the group who is an officer, partner, employee, or agent of any of the seven organisations represented by ABL before this Commission or of ABL itself

Relevance: The submission documents at paragraphs 16-18 the role of this group in coordinating the campaign that led to the unlawful termination of Antoinette Lattouf. The group is directly relevant to the Commission’s terms of reference regarding the suppression of speech and the use of coordinated pressure campaigns. Robert Goot’s participation – including his single-word confirmation “Israel” – is pleaded from the judgment in Lattouf v ABC [2025] FCA 669 and goes to the credibility and completeness of presentations made by the same individuals to other courts and to this Commission.

Submission paragraphs: 16-18, 19, 24, 47, 49, 50

A3.2

Document or category of documents: The complete message log and any media files shared within the WhatsApp group known as the “Creative WhatsApp Group” (being a private group of approximately 600 Jewish creatives and academics), from its creation to the date of production, or such portion thereof as is within the custody, power, or control of the person to whom the notice is directed, insofar as such messages relate to: (a) Mary Kostakidis; (b) any referral of matters to lawyers, legal groups, or legal proceedings; (c) any coordination of complaints to the Australian Human Rights Commission, AHPRA, or any other regulatory body; or (d) any coordination of responses to public commentary on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Custodian: The administrator(s) of the Creative WhatsApp Group; and separately any member of the group who is an officer, partner, employee, or agent of any of the seven organisations represented by ABL before this Commission

Relevance: The Defence in Cassuto v Kostakidis (paragraph 29(g)) pleads that this group operated as a referral pipeline to the legal proceedings ABL now prosecutes. The submission documents at paragraph 18 specific messages from 6 December 2023 and 14 January 2024 in which group members discussed legal action against Kostakidis, with one member providing a phone number linked to the lawyers group. This establishes the coordinated nature of the campaign.

Submission paragraphs: 18, 74

A3.3

Document or category of documents: All documents constituting, recording, or evidencing communications between any member of the “Lawyers for Israel” WhatsApp group and any officer, partner, employee, or agent of the Australian Broadcasting Corporation concerning the employment, rostering, programming, or termination of Antoinette Lattouf, during the period 18 December 2023 to 31 January 2024.

Custodian: Robert Goot AO SC; Nicky Stein; and separately the Australian Broadcasting Corporation

Relevance: Establishes the mechanism by which the coordinated campaign documented in the submission translated into the unlawful termination found by Justice Rangiah in Lattouf v ABC [2025] FCA 669. Goot’s statement “I understand she will be gone from morning radio from Friday” suggests access to inside information about ABC editorial decisions.

Submission paragraphs: 16, 19, 47

Category A4: Key Individual Disclosure Documents

A4.1

Document or category of documents: A current list of all positions held by Mark Leibler AC, Jeremy Leibler, Leon Zwier, Raphael Leibler, and any other partner of Arnold Bloch Leibler in any of the following: (a) the seven organisations represented by ABL before this Commission; (b) any other advocacy, communal, charitable, or religious organisation relevant to the Commission’s terms of reference; (c) any foreign statutory body, including but not limited to the Jewish Agency for Israel, Keren Hayesod, the World Zionist Organization, or the World Jewish Congress; and (d) any entity that has sponsored parliamentary trips or provided hospitality to elected officials.

Custodian: Arnold Bloch Leibler

Relevance: The submission documents the structural concentration of roles at paragraphs 6-11, 14, 20. A comprehensive current list is necessary for the Commission to assess the full extent of the structural concentration and to make an informed decision regarding the weight to be given to ABL’s submissions.

Submission paragraphs: 6-11, 14, 20, 28, 34, 40-43, 52

A4.2

Document or category of documents: All documents constituting, recording, or evidencing Robert Goot AO SC’s current positions in communal, advocacy, or international organisations, including but not limited to: (a) the Executive Council of Australian Jewry (and any predecessor or subsidiary body); (b) the World Jewish Congress and any of its committees, policy councils, or governing bodies; (c) the NSW Jewish Board of Deputies; and (d) any other organisation relevant to the Commission’s terms of reference.

Custodian: Robert Goot AO SC; and separately ECAJ

Relevance: Goot’s multiple concurrent roles are documented at paragraphs 14-19 of the submission. His role as co-applicant in Wertheim v Haddad while simultaneously participating in the Lawyers for Israel WhatsApp campaign is central to the submission’s argument about partial disclosure across forums.

Submission paragraphs: 14-19, 24, 48-50

PART B – DOCUMENTS FOR THE FINAL STAGE

Purpose: Broader documentary evidence for the Commission’s final report, addressing the full pattern of coordinated campaigns, foreign influence dimensions, pro bono political services, and the internal workings of the advocacy organisations relevant to the structural concentration documented in the submission.

Date range unless otherwise specified: 1 January 2018 to the date of production (extended to capture the Rambam Fellowship data and longer-term patterns).

Category B1: The Full Pattern of Coordinated Campaigns

B1.1

Document or category of documents: All documents constituting, recording, or evidencing the planning, coordination, or execution of complaints to the Australian Human Rights Commission against Mary Kostakidis, including but not limited to: (a) the AHRC complaint lodged by Lauren Winn of ABL on behalf of Alon Cassuto on 14 July 2024; (b) any earlier drafts of the complaint; (c) instructions from Alon Cassuto, Jeremy Leibler, or any other officer of the ZFA to ABL concerning the complaint; (d) the demand letters sent to Kostakidis on 8 July 2024 and 17 July 2024; and (e) any communications between ABL and the ZFA concerning the decision to hold a press conference on 14 July 2024 – the same day the AHRC complaint was lodged – and the decision to publicise the complaint before Kostakidis had been contacted by the AHRC.

Custodian: Arnold Bloch Leibler; and separately the Zionist Federation of Australia

Relevance: The submission documents at paragraphs 8, 10-13 and 18 the sequence of events from the WhatsApp referral to the demand letters to the AHRC complaint to the press conference to the Federal Court proceedings. The timing – press conference on the same day as the AHRC filing, before Kostakidis was contacted – is relevant to the Defence’s characterisation of the proceedings as “a deliberate campaign to undermine and discredit the Respondent… in order to cause a chilling effect.”

Submission paragraphs: 8, 10-13, 18

B1.2

Document or category of documents: All documents constituting, recording, or evidencing the decision to omit Alon Cassuto’s role as CEO of the Zionist Federation of Australia from the original Statement of Claim filed 31 March 2025 in Cassuto v Kostakidis (VID404/2025), and the subsequent decision to include that role in the Amended Statement of Claim filed 8 May 2025.

Custodian: Arnold Bloch Leibler

Relevance: The submission documents at paragraph 10 that Cassuto’s role as CEO of the ZFA was not disclosed in the original pleading. This is relevant to the pattern of selective disclosure across forums that the submission identifies as a structural problem.

Submission paragraphs: 10, 24, 49, 50

B1.3

Document or category of documents: All documents constituting, recording, or evidencing the role of the Executive Council of Australian Jewry (ECAJ), or any of its officers (including Peter Wertheim AM and Robert Goot AO SC), in: (a) publicly supporting complaints against Antoinette Lattouf; (b) making representations to the ABC or any ABC officer concerning Lattouf; (c) coordinating with the “Lawyers for Israel” WhatsApp group or any of its members concerning Lattouf; and (d) any internal ECAJ communications concerning the Lattouf matter.

Custodian: Executive Council of Australian Jewry; and separately Peter Wertheim AM

Relevance: The submission documents at paragraphs 21, 47, and 49 that ECAJ publicly supported the complaints against Lattouf which the Federal Court found were part of an unlawful termination. Wertheim’s affidavit in Wertheim v Haddad does not disclose these matters.

Submission paragraphs: 21, 24, 47, 49

B1.4

Document or category of documents: All documents constituting, recording, or evidencing communications between Peter Wertheim AM (or any other officer of ECAJ) and Mark Scott (Vice-Chancellor, University of Sydney) or any other officer of the University of Sydney concerning complaints about Professor Keane, during the period 1 October 2023 to 30 June 2024.

Custodian: Executive Council of Australian Jewry; Peter Wertheim AM; and separately the University of Sydney

Relevance: The submission documents at paragraph 22 that the Statement of Claim in Toltz v Keane records Wertheim’s direct advocacy with the Vice-Chancellor on 1 December 2023. This places ECAJ in the chain of events leading to the Toltz litigation and illustrates the breadth of the coordinated activity.

Submission paragraphs: 22, 34

B1.5

Document or category of documents: All documents constituting, recording, or evidencing the role of ECAJ staff or officers in identifying, contacting, preparing, or briefing witnesses for the Wertheim & Goot v Haddad proceedings (NSD1503/2024), including but not limited to: (a) communications between ECAJ officers and prospective witnesses; (b) any research conducted by “a researcher from the Executive Council of Australian Jewry” as referenced in the Respondents’ Closing Submissions at paragraph 29; and (c) any documents provided by ECAJ to witnesses or prospective witnesses.

Custodian: Executive Council of Australian Jewry; Peter Wertheim AM; Robert Goot AO SC

Relevance: The Respondents’ Closing Submissions documented that most witnesses had not viewed the relevant speeches in full until provided to them by the applicants’ solicitors or an ECAJ researcher. This goes to the institutional deployment of ECAJ resources in proceedings brought in personal capacity, and the structural concentration of roles.

Submission paragraphs: 23, 34

B1.6

Document or category of documents: All documents constituting, recording, or evidencing the coordination of AHPRA complaints against health practitioners during the period 7 October 2023 to 30 June 2025, including but not limited to: (a) the personal complaint filed by Jeremy Leibler on 24 October 2023; (b) any template complaints or guidance documents distributed for the purpose of making AHPRA complaints; (c) any communications between members of the “Lawyers for Israel” group, the “Creative WhatsApp Group,” or any other group concerning the making of AHPRA complaints; and (d) any documents relating to the “notmydoctor48” Instagram account or any similar account used to publicise the personal details of health practitioners.

Custodian: Jeremy Leibler; Zionist Federation of Australia; and separately any administrator of the “notmydoctor48” Instagram account or similar doxxing accounts identified in the submission

Relevance: The submission documents at paragraph 9 an estimated 188 complaints against 95 health practitioners, the vast majority anonymous, involving infiltration of closed Facebook groups and doxxing of practitioners’ personal details. The ZFA president’s personal participation in this campaign while holding a partnership at the firm litigating on behalf of the ZFA illustrates the structural concentration.

Submission paragraphs: 9

Category B2: Foreign Influence and FITS-Related Documents

B2.1

Document or category of documents: All documents constituting, recording, or evidencing: (a) Mark Leibler AC’s membership of, appointment to, or participation in the Board of Governors and Executive of the Jewish Agency for Israel, from 1 January 2018 to the date of production; (b) any communications between Leibler in his capacity as a Board member or Executive member of the Jewish Agency and any Australian government minister, department, or agency; and (c) any documents recording whether the Jewish Agency for Israel, or any person acting on its behalf in Australia, has been assessed for registration under the Foreign Influence Transparency Scheme Act 2018 (Cth).

Custodian: Mark Leibler AC; Arnold Bloch Leibler; and separately the Attorney-General’s Department (FITS Registry)

Relevance: The submission documents at paragraphs 40-43 that Leibler has served on the Board of Governors and Executive of the Jewish Agency for Israel – an Israeli statutory body – since 1992, while simultaneously chairing AIJAC and serving as ABL’s senior partner. This is directly relevant to Recommendation S12 and the Commission’s consideration of FITS enforcement.

Submission paragraphs: 40-43, 54

B2.2

Document or category of documents: All documents constituting, recording, or evidencing: (a) the role of Keren Hayesod and the United Israel Appeal of Australia in remitting funds to Israel, including financial statements, annual reports, and remittance records, for the period 1 January 2018 to the date of production; (b) Mark Leibler AC’s role as Life Chairman of the United Israel Appeal of Australia and Chair of the World Board of Trustees of Keren Hayesod; and (c) any documents recording whether the United Israel Appeal of Australia or Keren Hayesod has been assessed for registration under FITS.

Custodian: United Israel Appeal of Australia; Mark Leibler AC; and separately the Attorney-General’s Department (FITS Registry)

Relevance: The submission documents at paragraph 40 that the United Israel Appeal has remitted $376 million to Israel via Keren Hayesod since 2013, with $50.9 million in tax-deductible donations in 2024 alone. This is relevant to the foreign influence dimension and to whether the regulatory framework has been applied.

Submission paragraphs: 40, 42-44, 54

B2.3

Document or category of documents: All documents constituting, recording, or evidencing: (a) the registration of Eastfleet Pty Ltd and Intercorp Pty Ltd (shelf companies for Israel Aerospace Industries) at ABL’s Melbourne address, including ASIC records, for the period 2010 to 2020; and (b) the nature and scope of any professional relationship between ABL and Israel Aerospace Industries or its subsidiaries.

Custodian: Arnold Bloch Leibler; and separately the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (public register)

Relevance: The submission notes at paragraph 41 that ABL’s address was listed as the registered corporate address for Israel Aerospace Industries’ Australian shelf companies. While law firms routinely provide registered addresses, this illustrates the breadth of the relationship between the firm and Israeli state entities, relevant to the FITS analysis.

Submission paragraphs: 41, 42

B2.4

Document or category of documents: All documents held by the Attorney-General’s Department constituting, recording, or evidencing: (a) any assessment of whether AIJAC, the ZFA, the United Israel Appeal of Australia, or any other Australian advocacy organisation whose leadership holds concurrent positions on boards of foreign statutory bodies is required to register under FITS; (b) any referral, investigation, or compliance action under FITS relating to advocacy for the interests of the State of Israel; and (c) any policy decision or departmental advice regarding the enforcement of FITS in relation to advocacy organisations as distinct from commercial lobbyists.

Custodian: Attorney-General’s Department (Commonwealth)

Relevance: The submission documents at paragraphs 42-44 the gap between the FITS framework and its enforcement, including the PJCIS finding of “significant flaws” and “abject failure of enforcement.” This category seeks to establish the factual basis for Recommendation S12.

Submission paragraphs: 42-44, 54

Category B3: Pro Bono Political Services

B3.1

Document or category of documents: All documents constituting, recording, or evidencing pro bono legal services provided by Arnold Bloch Leibler (or any of its partners acting in their capacity as partners) to any elected official, political appointee, or candidate for elected office, during the period 1 January 2018 to the date of production, including but not limited to: (a) the pro bono legal advice to Peter Dutton disclosed on 23 December 2024; (b) any engagement with Bill Shorten during or in connection with the 2015 Trade Union Royal Commission; (c) the representation of Josh Frydenberg in his 2017 citizenship challenge; (d) any representation of Tony Abbott in defamation proceedings; (e) any representation of Arthur Sinodinos or Jason Falinski in dual citizenship matters; and (f) any other pro bono or reduced-fee legal services to politicians not yet publicly disclosed.

Custodian: Arnold Bloch Leibler

Relevance: The submission documents at paragraphs 25-26 the pattern of pro bono services to senior politicians from both major parties. These services are provided while ABL’s senior partner chairs AIJAC, which is the largest private sponsor of parliamentary trips to Israel. This is directly relevant to Recommendation S10(c).

Submission paragraphs: 25-26, 52

B3.2

Document or category of documents: All documents constituting, recording, or evidencing: (a) the AIJAC Rambam Israel Fellowship program, including records of all parliamentary trips sponsored between 2010 and the date of production; (b) the itineraries, participant lists, and costs of such trips; (c) any communications between AIJAC and the sponsored parliamentarians before, during, or after the trips; and (d) any disclosures made by sponsored parliamentarians to the Register of Members’ Interests or equivalent.

Custodian: Australia/Israel & Jewish Affairs Council (AIJAC); and separately Mark Leibler AC in his capacity as National Chairman of AIJAC

Relevance: The submission documents at paragraph 26 that between 2010 and 2018, AIJAC sponsored 102 parliamentary trips to Israel – more than any other country program. The same firm that provides free legal services to politicians also oversees the program that flies those politicians to Israel. This is relevant to the structural concentration and to the Commission’s assessment of foreign influence on Australian political life.

Submission paragraphs: 26, 28, 40

Category B4: Internal Communications of Advocacy Organisations

B4.1

Document or category of documents: All documents constituting, recording, or evidencing internal communications within ECAJ (including board minutes, executive committee minutes, and staff communications) concerning: (a) the decision to jointly retain ABL to appear before this Commission; (b) the preparation of submissions to this Commission; (c) the Wertheim & Goot v Haddad proceedings, including any role played by ECAJ in those proceedings; (d) the Lattouf v ABC proceedings, including ECAJ’s public support for the complaints; and (e) any assessment of the structural conflicts identified in the present submission.

Custodian: Executive Council of Australian Jewry

Relevance: ECAJ is both a represented organisation before this Commission and an organisation whose officers (Wertheim as Co-CEO, Goot as Deputy President) are applicants or active participants in multiple proceedings examined by the Commission. Its internal records will reveal the extent to which the institutional resources of ECAJ were deployed across these proceedings.

Submission paragraphs: 3, 20-24, 33-34, 47-50

B4.2

Document or category of documents: All documents constituting, recording, or evidencing internal communications within the Zionist Federation of Australia (including board minutes, executive committee minutes, and staff communications) concerning: (a) the decision to file the Section 18C complaint against Mary Kostakidis in July 2024; (b) the decision to hold a press conference on 14 July 2024; (c) the role of Jeremy Leibler (as both ZFA President and ABL partner) in the decision-making process for the complaint and the subsequent litigation; (d) any discussions about the structural conflict arising from Jeremy Leibler’s dual role; and (e) the decision to jointly retain ABL to appear before this Commission.

Custodian: Zionist Federation of Australia

Relevance: The ZFA is both a represented organisation before this Commission and the organisation whose CEO is the nominal applicant in Cassuto v Kostakidis, whose president is a partner at the firm prosecuting that case, and which held a press conference publicising the complaint before the respondent was contacted. Its internal records go to the heart of the structural concentration.

Submission paragraphs: 8-13, 18, 33-34

B4.3

Document or category of documents: All documents constituting, recording, or evidencing internal communications within AIJAC (including board minutes, executive committee minutes, and staff communications) concerning: (a) the Rambam Israel Fellowship program and its relationship to AIJAC’s advocacy objectives; (b) any coordination between AIJAC and ABL concerning submissions to this Commission; (c) any media monitoring or advocacy concerning journalists or academics, including but not limited to the monitoring of Sophie McNeill referenced in Mark Leibler’s 2018 speech; and (d) the decision to jointly retain ABL to appear before this Commission.

Custodian: Australia/Israel & Jewish Affairs Council (AIJAC)

Relevance: AIJAC is chaired by ABL’s senior partner and is one of the seven organisations represented by ABL before this Commission. Its internal records are relevant to the structural concentration and to the submission’s documentation of media monitoring and pressure campaigns.

Submission paragraphs: 6-7, 26, 33-34

B4.4

Document or category of documents: All documents constituting, recording, or evidencing the collection, compilation, and publication of antisemitism incident data by ECAJ, AIJAC, or any of the seven organisations represented by ABL before this Commission, including: (a) methodological documents; (b) raw data and incident reports; (c) any quality assurance or verification processes; (d) any communications with government regarding the data; and (e) any documents recording the use of such data in Federal Court proceedings (Wertheim v Haddad, Cassuto v Kostakidis, Toltz v Riemer, Toltz v Keane).

Custodian: ECAJ; AIJAC; and separately each of the other five organisations represented by ABL

Relevance: The submission at paragraph 55 recommends the establishment of an independent government body to collect antisemitism data, removing dependence on data produced by organisations that are simultaneously litigants, lobbyists, and advocacy bodies. This category seeks to establish the current data ecosystem and any conflicts in the data production process.

Submission paragraphs: 55

Category B5: The Mark Leibler “Repulsive and Revolting” Incident

B5.1

Document or category of documents: All documents constituting, recording, or evidencing: (a) the promoted tweet by Mark Leibler in February 2025 calling anti-Zionist Jews “repulsive and revolting human beings” and “vicious antisemites”; (b) the payment and promotion of that tweet, including any records from X (formerly Twitter) regarding the promotion; (c) the AHRC complaint filed by six Melbourne Jews in response; (d) Leibler’s subsequent apology; and (e) any internal ABL or AIJAC communications concerning the incident and its management.

Custodian: Mark Leibler AC; Arnold Bloch Leibler; AIJAC

Relevance: The submission documents at paragraph 57 that the senior partner of the firm representing peak Jewish organisations before a Royal Commission into antisemitism publicly denounced dissenting Jews as “repulsive and revolting.” This is directly relevant to the Commission’s mandate regarding social cohesion within the Jewish community and the question of whether the represented organisations’ positions reflect the diversity of Jewish opinion.

Submission paragraphs: 29, 57

Category B6: The Suppression Order and Contempt Proceedings

B6.1

Document or category of documents: All documents constituting, recording, or evidencing: (a) the application by eight or nine members of the “Lawyers for Israel” WhatsApp group for a 10-year suppression order over their identities at the start of the Lattouf trial; (b) the subsequent contempt proceedings brought against Nine Entertainment journalists; (c) the engagement of Sue Chrysanthou SC in those proceedings; and (d) any communications between the suppressed members and any officer of ECAJ, AIJAC, the ZFA, or ABL concerning the suppression application or the contempt proceedings.

Custodian: The eight or nine suppressed members of the Lawyers for Israel group (through their legal representative, Sue Chrysanthou SC, or such other representative as may be identified); and separately Nine Entertainment

Relevance: The submission documents at paragraph 18 (final sub-paragraph) the attempt to suppress the identities of WhatsApp group members and the subsequent failed contempt proceedings. The use of suppression orders and contempt proceedings to prevent journalistic reporting on coordinated campaigns is directly relevant to the Commission’s terms of reference regarding media freedom and the chilling effect on public discourse.

Submission paragraphs: 18

NOTES ON PRODUCTION

1. Form of Production

All documents should be produced in accordance with the Commission’s Practice Guideline – Document Production Guideline (February 2026), including the Document Management Protocol at Part E. In particular:

1. Electronic documents should be produced via the Commission’s file-sharing platform in their native format or as searchable multi-page PDFs, in accordance with paragraphs 2.1-2.3 and 4-5 of the Document Production Guideline.

2. Each document should be assigned a unique Document ID in the format prescribed at paragraph 14 of the Protocol (XYZ.0001.0001.0001), with the party code to be issued by the Commission.

3. Productions should be accompanied by the electronic index of documents in Microsoft Excel format as required at paragraph 20 of the Protocol, including all prescribed metadata fields.

4. Productions should be accompanied by the Production Tracker Form at Schedule 3 of the Protocol.

5. WhatsApp messages and other social media/messaging content should be produced using the “Social Media/Messaging” document type identified in Schedule 2 of the Protocol.

6. Complete email chains should be produced in their entirety, including all attachments, in accordance with paragraphs 7.1 and 15 of the Protocol.

2. Confidentiality

Where any producing party claims confidentiality over documents produced, the procedures at paragraphs 8-10 of the Document Production Guideline should be followed. In particular:

1. Documents produced via the file-sharing platform should be designated as “confidential” in the electronic index, with a separate note specifying which documents are subject to the claim, in accordance with paragraph 8.2.

2. The Commission will maintain confidentiality pending determination of any claim, in accordance with paragraph 11.1.1.

3. The applicant notes that claims of confidentiality over coordination and campaign documents should be assessed against the public interest in the Commission understanding the full scope of coordinated activity relevant to its terms of reference.

3. Legal Professional Privilege

Where any producing party claims legal professional privilege, the procedures in section 6AA of the Act and the Practice Guideline – Legal Professional Privilege should be followed. The applicant notes:

1. Communications between ABL partners acting in their capacity as leaders of the organisations (e.g., Jeremy Leibler as ZFA President, Mark Leibler as AIJAC Chairman) are not communications with a lawyer qua lawyer and are not properly the subject of a claim of legal professional privilege.

2. The structural conflict identified in the submission – where the lawyer is the leader of the client organisation – means that particular scrutiny should be applied to privilege claims, as the conventional distinction between lawyer and client does not apply.

3. Documents recording the exercise of organisational leadership functions (board minutes, executive decisions, public advocacy, media strategy) are not privileged merely because the person performing those functions is also a lawyer.

4. Proportionality and Staging

The applicant recognises the Commission’s broad discretion regarding the scope and timing of production orders. The division into Part A (Interim) and Part B (Final) is intended to assist the Commission in prioritising:

1. Part A documents are narrowly targeted at the threshold question of structural conflicts and are sought on an urgent basis so that the Commission can make an informed decision about how to receive ABL’s submissions.

2. Part B documents are broader but remain focused on the specific matters documented in the submission. Many of these documents are already in the public domain (court filings, ASIC records, parliamentary disclosures) or are held by organisations that have voluntarily engaged with the Commission.

Filed: [Date]

In support of the supplementary submission: “Structural Conflicts of Interest in Advocacy Representation Before the Commission – Arnold Bloch Leibler: A Case Study”