Sajid Akram, 50, father of Naveed Akram. Co-perpetrator of the December 14, 2025 attack at Bondi Beach. Fifteen dead. Forty-two injured. Shot dead by police at the scene. His son Naveed was critically wounded and later charged with 59 offences including 15 counts of murder and one count of committing a terrorist act.
In 2020, Sajid applied for a firearms licence. One year after ASIO opened an investigation into his son. The NSW Firearms Registry delayed for about 2.5 years. Then approved it in 2023. By the attack, Sajid owned six high-powered firearms. All legal. Under NSW law, association with someone on a terrorism watchlist should disqualify you. But no cross-check happened between ASIO's database and the firearms registry. Father and son lived at the same address in Bonnyrigg, western Sydney. The systems didn't talk.
November 1-28, 2025. Sajid and Naveed flew to Davao City, Mindanao. Twenty-seven days at the GV Hotel, Room 315. They paid 930 pesos per night—about $16 USD—in cash. Week by week. Hotel staff said they left the room about an hour per day. No visitors. Sajid "always looked down." Naveed handled all interactions. Staff described them as "not approachable like other foreigners." They ate only Jollibee takeaway. Minimal luggage.
Philippine investigators confirmed the Akrams visited Panabo in Davao del Norte. Met with "Muslim religious leaders." Identities unknown. Mindanao has ISIS-affiliated groups—Dawlah Islamiyah, remnants of the Maute group that seized Marawi in 2017. Australian security sources claimed the Akrams received "military-style training." The Philippine government pushed back. National Security Adviser Eduardo Ano: "A mere visit does not support allegations of terrorist training, and the duration of their stay would not have allowed for any meaningful or structured training." A month in a known terrorism hotspot. Sixteen days before the attack. No intelligence alerts.
October 2025. Sajid and Naveed recorded an ISIS pledge video together. Police found it on devices seized after the attack. Four improvised explosive devices deployed on December 14. Three pipe bombs. One tennis ball bomb. All failed. Explosives expert Allan Orr: "competent in the use of firearms but lacked the technical knowledge to operate the bombs."
Former Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull asked the question everyone was thinking: "Why when ASIO had identified Naveed Akram in 2019, was his father been allowed to keep six guns? This gets back to the problem that I think we face all around the world—are databases talking to each other?" They weren't. The failure to cross-reference terrorism files with firearms applications exposed a breakdown between federal security agencies and state licensing authorities. Systemic. Lethal.
Related Cases
- R v El Matari [2021] NSWSC 1260 - Sentencing of Isaac El Matari, whose July 2019 arrest triggered ASIO investigation of Naveed Akram
- Wertheim v Haddad [2025] FCA 720 - Federal Court case documenting the antisemitic content disseminated at AMDC
Related Essays
- After Bondi: Will Australia learn from the War on Terror, or repeat it? - Analysis of the firearms licensing failure and other institutional breakdowns
- Peripheral Figure: Part 1 - Examination of the radicalisation ecosystem and the Philippines connection