Omarjan Azari was a central figure in Operation Appleby—the September 2014 counter-terrorism operation that resulted in Australia's largest terrorism raids at the time. His case documents how street preaching functioned as a recruitment vector for violent extremism. And the operational connections between Australian ISIS supporters and foreign fighters in Syria.
Azari was radicalized in 2012 through street preaching in Parramatta. Court documents explicitly identify "street dawah" as his pathway into extremism, naming Mohamed Elomar and Khaled Sharrouf as the individuals who recruited him. Both would later travel to Syria to fight for ISIS. Both became infamous for photographs with severed heads. Sharrouf's seven-year-old son holding a severed head—one of the most shocking images associated with Australian foreign fighters. Both men were killed in Syria.
By 2014, Azari had become part of a "Shura"—a consultative council connected to Mohammad Ali Baryalei in Syria. Baryalei, an Australian who became a senior ISIS commander, was directing operations back to Australia from the Middle East. The prosecution established that Azari was in communication with Baryalei and receiving instructions for operations to be conducted in Australia.
On September 18, 2014, Azari was arrested as part of Operation Appleby. The Crown case: he was planning a terrorist act involving a random public beheading to be filmed and disseminated as ISIS propaganda. Intercepted communications revealed discussions about seizing a member of the public, beheading them, recording the act while displaying the ISIS flag. The intended target was to be selected at random in a public location. Martin Place in Sydney's CBD was identified as a potential site.
The plan showed sophisticated understanding of propaganda value and symbolic targeting. The beheading wasn't designed merely to kill but to terrorize through public spectacle and media distribution. The ISIS flag and filming would claim the act for the organization and inspire others. Martin Place—a central Sydney location—would maximize visibility and impact on the Australian public.
Azari was also charged with and convicted of intentionally providing funds to ISIS. He provided money to Australian foreign fighters to facilitate ISIS operations in Syria. Terrorism networks require not only those willing to conduct attacks but also those who provide material support, logistics, financing.
On March 27, 2019, Justice Adams sentenced Azari to 18 years imprisonment with a non-parole period of 13 years and 6 months for conspiring to do acts in preparation for a terrorist act and providing funds to a terrorist organization. The court found that Azari had "embraced the violent jihadist ideology promoted by Islamic State." His offending was objectively serious, involving planning for an act that would have resulted in "significant harm to individuals and the community."
The judgment noted that Azari had been "indoctrinated into violent extremism" through his contact with Elomar and Sharrouf during street preaching activities. Justice Adams observed that the offending occurred during a period of heightened terrorist threat when ISIS was calling on supporters to conduct attacks in Western countries. The sentence reflected the need for denunciation and deterrence given the gravity of the planned conduct and the danger posed to the community.
Azari's case is one of five terrorism prosecutions that explicitly document street dawah as the recruitment mechanism. Youssef Uweinat recruited at age 14 by street preachers "well-known to national security authorities." Alo-Bridget Namoa recruited at age 14 and a half by female street preachers. Hanifi Halis and Ertunc Eriklioglu both radicalized through street dawah at MyCentre in Melbourne. The pattern across multiple cases: street preaching wasn't an incidental factor. It was a systematic recruitment method.
The connection to Baryalei in Syria shows the command-and-control relationship between ISIS foreign fighters and operatives remaining in Australia. Not isolated "lone wolves." Australian ISIS supporters were part of an international network with direction from overseas and coordination of activities across multiple countries. The communication infrastructure and organizational hierarchy was documented through telecommunications intercepts and subsequent investigation of foreign fighter activities in Syria.
Operation Appleby revealed the extent of ISIS recruitment and operation in Australia at the peak of the caliphate's territorial control in 2014. The network included multiple individuals at various stages of radicalization and operational planning. Some were preparing for foreign travel to join ISIS in Syria. Others were planning domestic attacks. Others were providing financial and logistical support. The interconnection through personal relationships, ideological alignment, and operational coordination demonstrated infrastructure for terrorism—not isolated incidents.
Related Cases
- R v Azari [2019] NSWSC 314 — Sentencing judgment detailing street dawah recruitment and planned beheading