Antisemitism in Australia: What the Data Shows and What It Doesn't

The numbers are stark. A 316% increase in antisemitic incidents. Physical assaults up 491%. Fifteen people murdered at a Hanukkah celebration. ASIO's Director-General declaring antisemitism the agency's "number one priority"—the first time any form of racism has held this designation.

These figures document a real and serious problem requiring urgent attention. None of this is in dispute.

But if we want to develop effective solutions—rather than just reactions—we need to understand what this data actually tells us. And one finding in particular deserves far more scrutiny than it has received.

The "far-left" finding that's driving policy

The Jewish Community Council of Victoria (JCCV) reported that 53.4% of antisemitic incidents in 2024 were attributed to "far-left" perpetrators. This finding has been widely cited in media coverage, parliamentary debates, and policy discussions. It represents a dramatic reversal from the historical pattern where far-right perpetrators dominated—59% pre-October 7, 2023.

Before October 7, only 8% of Victorian incidents were attributed to the far left.

This shift—from 8% to 53.4%—has shaped the national conversation. It has informed claims about the Palestine solidarity movement. It has influenced how politicians frame the problem. It underpins arguments for particular policy responses.

But what does "far-left" actually mean in this data? And does the category measure what we think it measures?

The definition and the data don't align

The JCCV explicitly defines "far-left" as encompassing "revolutionary socialist, anarchist, or radical anti-fascist ideologies."

This is a specific ideological claim. It describes people motivated by a particular political worldview—committed socialists, anarchists, or radical anti-fascists whose antisemitism flows from that ideological framework.

But here's what the same report reveals: 99% of these "far-left" incidents were "explicitly connected to Israel, Palestine, or Zionism."

This creates a fundamental question: Is the "far-left" category capturing actual ideological motivation, or is it simply capturing the context of pro-Palestinian protests?

Consider what this means in practice. A person shouting abuse at an identifiable Jewish person during a Palestine rally may be correctly classified as committing an antisemitic incident. The abuse is real. The harm is real. But whether that person holds "revolutionary socialist" convictions—or is motivated by them—is a separate empirical question.

The methodology doesn't answer it. The reports don't explain how investigators determine whether a perpetrator at a protest holds anarchist views versus having no particular political ideology at all. The 99% overlap with Israel/Palestine content suggests the category may function as a proxy for "pro-Palestinian context" rather than measuring actual left-wing ideology.

Why this distinction matters

This isn't semantic nitpicking. The distinction between context and ideology has direct implications for policy.

If antisemitism is being driven by committed far-left ideologues—people whose revolutionary socialist or anarchist worldview generates hostility to Jews—then interventions should target that ideological infrastructure. Counter-radicalisation programs, monitoring of far-left organisations, and ideological counter-messaging would be appropriate responses.

If antisemitism is being driven by situational factors—people with no particular ideological commitment who are swept up in the emotions of a conflict and direct hostility at the nearest available target—then interventions should look quite different. De-escalation strategies, conflict resolution approaches, and education about distinguishing political criticism from ethnic hatred would be more relevant.

The current data cannot tell us which is occurring. It counts incidents, attributes them to categories, but cannot explain the mechanisms.

The dramatic shift from 8% to 53.4% in a single year is itself suggestive. Genuine ideological movements don't multiply sixfold overnight. What changed wasn't the number of revolutionary socialists in Australia—it was the Gaza conflict and its associated protests. The category appears to respond to current events rather than track a stable ideological tendency.

What we actually know about perpetrators

The sparse data on who commits antisemitic acts and why reveals complexity that simple categories obscure.

NSW Police Deputy Commissioner David Hudson, discussing Strike Force Pearl's investigation of serious attacks in Sydney, revealed something striking: many were driven by organised crime rather than ideology.

"None of the individuals we have arrested have displayed any form of antisemitic ideology. I think these organised crime figures have taken an opportunity to play off the vulnerability of the Jewish community." — David Hudson, NSW Police Deputy Commissioner

AFP Commissioner Reece Kershaw confirmed investigators are examining whether "overseas actors or individuals have paid local criminals in Australia to carry out some of these crimes."

This complicates the picture considerably. If some attacks coded as antisemitic are actually criminally motivated—potentially directed by foreign actors paying local gangs—they don't fit neatly into "far-left" or "far-right" categories. They require entirely different interventions: disrupting organised crime networks, countering foreign interference, protecting vulnerable communities from exploitation.

The current categorisation system cannot distinguish between an anarchist motivated by ideology, a university student caught up in protest emotions, and a criminal paid to attack Jewish targets. All might be counted in the same statistics.

The broader data infrastructure problem

The "far-left" categorisation issue reflects a wider gap in how Australia collects and verifies antisemitism data.

Australia's statistics come almost entirely from community organisations—the Executive Council of Australian Jewry (ECAJ) and the JCCV. The ECAJ has published annual reports since 1990, representing genuine institutional dedication to documenting a real problem.

But no Australian government body independently tracks and publishes antisemitism data. Unlike the UK (where Home Office statistics operate alongside Community Security Trust monitoring), the US (where FBI hate crime statistics run parallel to ADL data), Germany (where police statistics complement government-funded RIAS monitoring), and France (where community and government systems are integrated)—Australia has no verification mechanism.

Neither ECAJ nor JCCV publishes inter-rater reliability data or quality control procedures. When multiple reviewers assess the same incident, how often do they reach the same classification? What training do reviewers receive on distinguishing "far-left" from other categories? These are standard requirements in academic research but absent from published reports.

International comparison shows Australia is anomalous

Australia's explicit "far-left" percentage reporting is unusual internationally.

The UK Community Security Trust—which has tracked incidents since 1984—does not have a formal "far-left" category. It categorises by incident type (assault, damage, threats, abusive behaviour) rather than perpetrator ideology.

The US Anti-Defamation League also does not categorise incidents by political ideology in its primary framework. It uses three categories—assault, harassment, vandalism—and tracks perpetrator characteristics when identifiable, but does not produce "far-left" percentages.

The Institute for Jewish Policy Research in the UK conducted a detailed study finding that "levels of antisemitism among those on the left-wing of the political spectrum, including the far-left, are indistinguishable from those found in the general population," while "the most antisemitic group on the political spectrum consists of those who identify as very right-wing."

This doesn't mean Australia's finding is wrong—but it does mean Australia is producing a category of data that comparable organisations internationally have chosen not to produce, potentially because of the methodological difficulties involved.

Internal community debate reveals the complexity

Not all Australian Jews agree on these methodological questions.

Dr. Larry Stillman of the Australian Jewish Democratic Society has published detailed critiques, arguing ECAJ reports conflate "political hurt over Israel" with "deep hurt or intimidation on the basis of ethnicity." He notes reports list protest banners saying "From the River to the Sea" alongside neo-Nazi material without distinguishing between them: "I don't like the slogan 'From the River to the Sea'... But it is politically directed, it is not necessarily motivated by racism."

The Jewish Council of Australia has raised similar concerns, arguing that "recommending the adoption of politicised definitions of antisemitism aims at silencing political speech."

These organisations represent minority positions within the community. But their existence indicates that what counts as antisemitism—and how to categorise it—is not settled even among Australian Jews themselves.

The IHRA definition complicates matters further

Both ECAJ and JCCV use the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) Working Definition as a guide. This definition—with 11 examples, seven relating to Israel—has been recommended for widespread institutional adoption.

Notably, Kenneth Stern, the lead drafter of the original 2004–2005 text that IHRA adopted, has become one of its strongest critics. In September 2024 Senate testimony, he stated the definition "was never intended to target or chill speech on a college campus" and that "many pro-Israel Jewish groups eventually weaponised the definition to suppress student speech."

Over 128 leading scholars in antisemitism and Jewish studies have criticised the definition. Over 104 human rights organisations—including Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch—urged the United Nations not to adopt it.

When the definitional framework itself is contested—including by its original author—data generated using that framework requires particularly careful interpretation. This is especially true for the Israel-related incidents that comprise 99% of the "far-left" category.

What better data would enable

The argument for better data is not scepticism about the problem. It is about developing better solutions.

If we had rigorous data on perpetrator motivations, we could answer the question this article poses: Is the "far-left" surge ideological or situational? The answer would shape entirely different policy responses.

If we had independent government verification, we could have greater confidence in the numbers being cited in parliamentary debates and used to justify legislation.

If we had disaggregated reporting—distinguishing swastika graffiti from "Free Palestine" slogans, distinguishing ideologically-motivated assaults from criminally-motivated attacks—we could target interventions appropriately.

The December 2025 government commitment to a National Hate Crimes and Incidents Database represents a step toward addressing these gaps. But until such systems are operational with transparent methodology, community organisations remain the primary data source—and findings like "53.4% far-left" will continue to drive policy despite the substantial methodological questions surrounding them.

Conclusion

Australian Jews have experienced a genuine surge in hostility since October 7, 2023. Physical assaults have increased dramatically. Major violent attacks have occurred. Security agencies have elevated threat assessments. This is real and requires serious response.

But effective responses require understanding causes, not just counting incidents. The finding that "53.4% of antisemitic incidents come from the far-left" is being used to shape policy—yet the category may measure protest context rather than ideological motivation. The 99% overlap with Israel/Palestine content, the sixfold increase in a single year, and the lack of methodological transparency all suggest caution in interpretation.

If the actual driver is emotional responses to conflict rather than revolutionary socialism, then counter-radicalisation programs targeting far-left ideology will miss the mark.

Australian Jews deserve protection from real threats. They also deserve—and effective policy requires—data that can distinguish between different types of perpetrators, different motivations, and different contexts. Without that precision, we cannot know whether our responses are addressing actual causes or politically convenient categories.

The question isn't whether antisemitism has increased. It clearly has. The question is whether we understand it well enough to stop it.